Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 75 | Issue 2

Article 2

12-1-1999

Fostering Harmony among the Justices: How
Contemporary Debates in Theology Can Help to
Reconcile the Divisions on the Court Regarding
Religious Expression by the State
Kathleen A. Brady

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Recommended Citation
Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony among the Justices: How Contemporary Debates in Theology Can Help to Reconcile the Divisions on
the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the State, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 433 (1999).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol75/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

FOSTERING HARMONY AMONG THE JUSTICES:
HOW CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN THEOLOGY
CAN HELP TO RECONCILE THE DIVISIONS ON
THE COURT REGARDING RELIGIOUS
EXPRESSION BY THE STATE
Kathleen A. Brady*
INTRODUCTION ....................................................

I.

H.

434

H ISTORY ...................................................

440

A. The Strength of Human Faculties........................
B. The Power of God .....................................
C. Other Voices ...........................................

448
461
470
477
479

THEOLOGY .................................................

A. The Turn to the Subject in Modern Theology ..............
B. The Primacy of the Community in the PostliberalChallenge .................................................
C. Theology in the 1990s ..................................

489
500

III. DMISIONS ON THE COURT .................................
A. The Positions of the Justices.............................

506

1. Separationism ....................................
2. The Endorsement Test ...........................
3. Accommodationism ..............................

509
513
517

An Individualistic Conception of Religious Belief ..........
The Separated Community ..............................
The Importance of the Public Community .................
The PluralisticNature of Religion .......................

519
529
537
544

B.
C.
D.
E.

IV.

FOSTERING HARMONY AMONG THE JUSTICES ................

507

549

* Fellow in Law and Religion and Lecturer in Law, Emory University School of
Law. J.D., 1994, Yale Law School; MAR., 1991, Yale Divinity School; BA., 1989, Yale
College. My thanks to John Witte, Jr. and Michael J. Broyde for their support at
Emory; Kathryn Tanner and Jeffrey Hensley for their guidance regarding
contemporary theology and for helpful comments on an earlier draft; CharlesJ. Reid
for helpful discussions of my ideas; and to Will Haines of the Emory Law School

Library.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

75:2

INTRODUCTION

In his famous Memorial and Remonstrance,' James Madison eloquently describes his expectation that the separation of religion and
government will produce "moderation and harmony" 2 among differ3
ent religious sects and promote "forbearance, love and charity"
among their adherents. In this statement, Madison is echoing a belief
that is common to the leading proponents of religious liberty in eighteenth-century America. 4 These leaders envisioned that a careful demarcation of the roles and responsibilities of religion and government
and the dismantling of state establishments to support religion would
help to diffuse the tensions among the sects by removing one of the
1 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS (1785), reprintedin 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295 (Robert A. Rutland &
William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973). Madison's Memorial and Remonstrancewas written to
protest a bill under consideration by the Virginia legislature to provide for a general
assessment to support teachers of the Christian religion. For a discussion of the As-

sessment controversy, see Marvin K. Singleton, Colonial Virginia as First Amendment
Matrix: Henry, Madison, and Assessment Establishment, 8 J. CHURCH & ST. 344 (1966),
and see also THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA

140-48 (1986); Lance Banning, James
Madison, the Statutefor Religious Freedom, and the Crisis of Republican Convictions, inTHE
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN

AMERICAN HISTORY 109 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988).
2 MADISON, supra note 1, at 302.
3 Id. at 303. Madison borrows this language from Article 16 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CON-

STITUTIONS 50 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979). Madison was instrumental in drafting
Article 16. For discussions of Madison's role in drafting Article 16, see THOMAS E.
BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY NEW VIRGINIA 1776-1787, at 17-19
(1977), and JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY- THE EXPERIENCE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 69-70 (1998).
4

See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

161 (William

Peden ed., 1982) (1787) (stating that in states without establishments, "harmony"
among sects is "unparalleled"). Leading defenders of religious liberty from dissenting
evangelical communities expressed the same views. See, e.g., ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL
TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1773), reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH,
STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789, at 303, 335 (William G. McLoughlin
ed., 1968) [hereinafter BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM] (asserting that equal

liberty among religious societies produces "happy... effects in civil society" whereas
coercive measures provoke "emulation, wrath, and contention"); JOHN LELAND, THE
VIRGINIA CHRONICLE (1790), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LE-

LAND 91, 109 n.* (L.F. Greene ed., New York, G.W. Wood 1845) [hereinafter LELAND
WRITINGS] ("The only way to live in peace and enjoy ourselves as freemen, is to think
and speak freely, worship as we please, and be protected by law in our persons, prop-

erty and liberty.").
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chief causes of their animosities. 5 As a general matter, they were certainly correct that state-supported religion was a source of divisions
among the sects, and the abandonment of state establishments in
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century America has undoubtedly
contributed to a lessening of these tensions. However, demarcating
the precise boundary between religion and state has proved neither
easy nor obvious, and while animosities among the sects have died
down with the passing of the most egregious forms of establishment,
disagreements among jurists, scholars, and the larger American populace have continued to rage about the proper contours of the relationship between church and state.6 Indeed, it is, perhaps, commonplace
to note that the task of giving meaning to the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment has been the source of some
of the deepest divisions on the Court.
Nowhere have the disagreements among the Justices been so
highly charged than in the Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence regarding religious expression by the state. The contours of
the Court's current jurisprudence in this area began to emerge in
1983 with the decision in Marsh v. Chambers.7 Marsh addressed the
constitutionality of legislative chaplains paid by the state, and the next
year the Court decided the first of its holiday display cases in Lynch v.
Donnelly.8 In 1989, the Court addressed two additional holiday displays in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,9 and, in 1992, the Court addressed the practice of using clergy members to offer graduation
5 See MADISON, supra note 1, at 302-03; see also BACKUS, supra note 4, at 336
(citing argument made by Baptists in Providence in early 18th century).
6 Indeed, even Madison was not always sure where the line should be placed and
his views on this subject changed over time. In 1785, the same year that Madison
wrote in his Memorial and Remonstrance that religion is "wholly exempt" from the "cognizance" of civil government, MADISON, supra note 1, at 299, he also introduced bills
in the Virginia legislature for the punishment of Sabbath breakers and for appointing
days of public fast and thanksgiving, see A Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious
Worship and Sabbath Breakers, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 555 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1950); A Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and Thanksgiving, in 2
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 556. He later recognized that government proclamations recommending days of thanksgiving and fasts were inconsistent
with his separationist principles. SeeJames Madison, DetachedMemoranda, reprintedin
3 Wm. & MARY Q. 534, 560-61 (Elizabeth Fleet ed., 1946) [hereinafter Madison, Detached Memoranda]; see also Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10,
1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 98, 100-01 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1900-10).
7 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
8 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
9 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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prayers in public high schools in Lee v. Weisman.10 While there are
nuances which distinguish the views of the various Justices, these views
have coalesced around three general positions. One position is a
strict separationism that draws historical support from the writings of
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. The second is the "endorsement" analysis proposed by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly and
embraced by a number of other Justices, including those who have
expressed separationist tendencies. The third position is held by accommodationists,"1 who oppose both separationism and the endorsement test and would permit a far greater scope for religious
expression by the state.
The intensity and, indeed, animosity which have characterized
the Court's divisions in this area are well illustrated by the opinions in
Allegheny. The most bitter disagreements are between accommodationists, on the one hand, and those who favor a separationist or en10 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
11 As will be discussed further below, I am using the term "accommodationist" to
refer to those justices who believe that the government may, consistent with the Establishment Clause, engage in religious expression that "acknowledges," "recognizes,"
and even "celebrates" the central role that religion plays in American society. See, e.g.,
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657, 663 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674-81. Accommodationists reject the view that
religion and government should be kept strictly separate, and they believe that government endorsement of religion is permissible as long as it merely reflects or "accommodates" the religious traditions of the American people and does not use
coercive force, cross over into proselytizing, or provide direct benefits to religion in a
way that tends to establish a state religion. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-60 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678.
It is important to note, however, that there is considerable debate amongJustices
and scholars about the proper use of the term "accommodationism." Those who
favor the separationist or endorsement approach recognize that some degree of accommodation of religion will be necessary in a society with considerable numbers of
religious people, but they define the scope of permissible accommodation much
more narrowly than those I have termed "accommodationists." For example, separationists and supporters of the endorsement approach agree that accommodation is
permissible if it is designed to alleviate identifiable burdens on free exercise, but
many would limit accommodation to this limited purpose. See, e.g., Weisinan, 505 U.S.
at 629 (SouterJ., concurring); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613 n.59. Those who believe that
accommodation is properly limited to alleviating identifiable burdens on free exercise
might object to my use of the term "accommodationism" and argue that their opponents are not, in any true sense, "accommodationists." Cf Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613
n.59 (stating that where no discernible burden on free exercise exists, "accommodation plainly has no relevance"). However, my use of the term "accommodationism"
reflects the language of those who adopt this position, and also has the virtue of providing a good indication of the type of relationship between church and state they
envision.

1999]

FOSTERING HARMONY AMONG THE JUSTICES

dorsement approach on the other. Led by Justice Kennedy, the
accommodationists accuse their colleagues of harboring a "latent hostility toward religion"' 2 and a "callous indifference toward religious
faith."' 3 Justice Blackmun, writing at this point for a majority that includes both separationists and those who favor an endorsement approach, counterattacks by arguing that Justice Kennedy's
"accusations" are both "offensive" and "absurd." 14 He then accuses
the accommodationists of failing to show sufficient respect for religious liberty and pluralism, 15 an accusation which is repeated by several other Justices. 16 When Justice Kennedy suggests that his views
regarding Justice O'Connor's endorsement test might be "uncharitable,"' 7 Justice Stevens jumps upon this comment to suggest that Justice Kennedy's criticisms are not only "uncharitable" but
"unfounded,"'8 and Justice Blackmun goes a step further by taking
the opportunity to air some of his own "uncharitable" opinions regardingJustice Kennedy's position. 19 Tempers flare in Allegheny, and
there are, perhaps, few other Court decisions characterized by such
bitter invective and even personal insult.
This Article endeavors to identify the underlying source of these
disagreements and to offer an approach which recognizes and reconciles the concerns of the Court's different factions. There are certainly numerous factors which contribute to the divisions on the
Court. The Justices disagree over the relevance of history to their
analyses and how to apply history. 20 They also disagree about the ap12 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in thejudgment in part and
dissenting in part).
13 Id at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
14 I&.at 610 (Blackmun, J.).
15 See id. at 610-13 (Blackmun, J.).
16 See id. at 627-28 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 653 & n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 Id. at 675 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
18 Id. at 650 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19 Id. at 607 (Blackmun, J.).
20 For example, while Justices Scalia and Kennedy have argued that the relevant
history is the nation's long-standing practices and traditions, see Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 631-32 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), Justice Brennan
looks at the level of principle rather than practice. ForJustice Brennan, the fact that
the founders may have approved of a practice which has continued as a long-standing
historical tradition is not decisive if the practice is inconsistent with their principles
and purposes. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816-17 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Weisman, 505 U.S. at 622-26 (Souter, J., with Stevens, J. &
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propriateness of fact-sensitive inquiries and the dangers associated
with judicial discretion. 21 There have also been disagreements about
22
which approach is best for the state.
However, one of the most important, though largely unrecognized, areas of disagreement is theological. Echoing James Madison
and the other leading proponents of religious liberty in eighteenthcentury America, all of the Justices argue that their position is best for
religion as well as the state. Their opponents immediately suspect
them of disingenuousness. These uncharitable assumptions are due,
in large part, to the fact that the Justices fail to see that they are working with very different understandings of the nature of religious belief
and the conditions essential for its protection. The opinions of the
Justices make clear that each faction does, in fact, care deeply about
religion. Indeed, it is precisely this sensitivity to the importance of
religion and its protection that contributes to the raised tempers and
bitter tone of their debates. Where the real disagreement lies is in
their theological assumptions regarding how religious faith is formed
and how it is sustained.
The first three Parts of this Article will clarify these theological
differences. Part I begins by looking at the historical sources that the
Court has most commonly relied upon in the interpretation of the
O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that it is the ideals and principles and not the
practices of the founders that are decisive).
21 For example, Justices Scalia and Kennedy have both opposed Justice
O'Connor's endorsement approach on the grounds that its fact sensitive approach
gives too much discretion and too little guidance to judges. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at
674-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia argues that deference to long-standing historical practices is critical to
ensure that judges are not "left to [their] own devices," Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 751 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting), with the
resulting danger that constitutional guarantees "rest upon the changeable philosophical predilections" of the Court, Weisman, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). By
contrast, Justice O'Connor believes that part of the judicial task involves "sifting
through the details" and drawing "fine lines" based "on the particular facts of each
case." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
22 For example, Justice Stevens has expressed great concern about protecting the
state from "bitter religious controversy," Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 814 (1995) (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting)), and this concern lies behind
his frequent adoption of a separationist position, see id. at 797, 811-14; see also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 650-51 & n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). By contrast, Justice Scalia is more apt to emphasize the beneficial effects of
religious diversity in the public square. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that graduation prayer by rabbi is a "unifying mechanism" that "inoculate [s] [those of other faiths] from religious bigotry and prejudice").
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Establishment Clause and the theological assumptions that underlie
these sources. The focus in this Part will be on the writings ofJames
Madison and Thomas Jefferson and their counterparts in the Baptist
tradition who also played a critical role in the struggle for religious
liberty in the early republic. All of these figures favored strict separationism. While the Court has recognized that an absolute separation
between church and state is not possible 2 3 and the use of Madison and
Jefferson as the touchstone for Establishment Clause jurisprudence
has been challenged particularly over the past fifteen years, 24 it is appropriate to begin with these figures because their positions have continued to exert great influence on the Court's decisions and have
been used repeatedly to support a separationist approach.
In Part II, the Article moves from a discussion of history to an
examination of contemporary debates in academic theology and how
these debates both support and challenge the theological assumptions
underlying strict separationism in the founding era. As in Part I, the
discussion in Part II focuses on debates regarding the nature of religious belief and how religious faith is developed and sustained. This
Part draws primarily upon theological scholarship in the Christian tradition. While work in other traditions may well prove as fruitful for
the project in this Article, they lie beyond my own expertise, and it
would not be possible to do justice to other traditions in a single
article.
23 Indeed, it was not long after the Court adopted a separationist stance in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), that it recognized that the "wall of
separation" advocated byJefferson cannot be absolute, see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 312 (1952). Many of those who continue to advocate strict separationism also
recognize that a complete separation between church and state is not possible. See,

e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 809 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Rosenberger,515 U.S. at
889 (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing limited exceptions to strict prohibition
against direct funding of religious activities).
24 The firstJustice to challenge directly the use ofJefferson as a source for First
Amendment jurisprudence was Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (RehnquistJ., dissenting) (noting thatJefferson was in France
at the time of the drafting of First Amendment). While Rehnquist's dissent recognized Madison's central role in drafting the First Amendment, Rehnquist argued that
"it was James Madison speaking as an advocate of sensible legislative compromise,"
not as an advocate of strict separation. Id. at 97-98. In case law regarding religious
expression by the state, accommodationists have also rejected the use ofJefferson and
Madison's strict separationist principles in favor of deference to long-standing historical practices which frequently manifest a far closer relationship between church and
state than separationist principles would allow. See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657,
671-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-77 (1984) (Burger, C.J.).
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In Part III, the contemporary theological debates discussed in
Part II will be used to help clarify the theological divisions which underlie the Court's jurisprudence regarding religious expression by the
state. I will not be making the claim that there is a causal connection
between contemporary debates in theology and the theological positions adopted by the Justices. With few exceptions, 25 there is no evidence that the Justices are deeply versed in academic theology or
aware of these debates. However, theologians and jurists both exist in
the same cultural milieu, and thus, it is perhaps not surprising to find
strong correlations between their understandings of religious belief.
Examining the positions of academic theologians can be extremely
helpful in understanding the views of the Justices because theological
scholarship can elucidate assumptions that remain largely unarticulated and perhaps even unrecognized by the Justices themselves.
In Part IV, the Article moves beyond clarifying the theological
assumptions that divide the Court to developing an approach to the
case law that seeks to reconcile and balance these underlying theological divisions. I will be arguing that all of the factions on the Court
have important insights regarding the nature of religious belief and
legitimate concerns regarding its protection. My proposal seeks to restore harmony among the Justices by accounting for all of these concerns. In doing so, I will be shifting my attention from case law
addressing religious expression by the state to the Court's decisions
regarding private religious expression in the public sphere. I will be
arguing that robust private religious expression in the public square
rather than religious expression by the government is the best way to
address the concerns of the accommodationists while also respecting
the concerns of separationists and supporters of the endorsement approach. Even if I do not succeed in reconciling the various factions
on the Court, I hope that I will at least succeed in promoting greater
charity among them.
I.

HISTORY

In 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education,2 6 the Court squarely addressed the meaning of the Establishment Clause for the first time.
Everson was also the first time that the Court applied the clause to the
states, and thus, the Court was faced with the task of developing Establishment Clause principles that would apply to the states as well as the
25 Justice Brennan's opinions do evidence considerable awareness of theological
scholarship, and as will be discussed later, Justice Brennan taps into one of the foundational sources for "postliberal" theology. See infra text accompanying notes 633-34.
26 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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federal government. History played a substantial role in the Court's
decision, and in developing the principles for its decision, the Court
turned to the history surrounding the struggle for religious liberty in
Virginia and the passage of the Virginia Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom. 27 The Court focused, in particular, on the views of James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson and made their principles a touch28
stone for Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The Everson Court recognized that Jefferson and Madison both
supported a strict separation between religion and government, and
one of the most frequently quoted paragraphs in the Court's decision
ends with an affirmation of Jefferson's famous metaphor of a "wall of
separation between church and state." 29 The Court's choice to look
to the leading figures in the passage of the Virginia statute as the standard for constitutional meaning has been heavily criticized by scholars
and historians as has the use of the "wall" metaphor. The Virginia
struggle preceded the adoption of the federal Constitution and the
passage of the Bill of Rights, and the purposes of the two provisions
were not the same.3 0 The strict separationist principles embraced by
27 See id. at 13 ("This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the
First Amendment, in the drafting and adopting of which Madison and Jefferson
played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the
same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia
statute.").
28 In 1785,James Madison played a key role in defeating a general assessment bill
sponsored by Patrick Henry for "Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian
Religion." A year later Madison spear-headed the passage of the Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, which was authored by Thomas Jefferson. See CURRY,
supra note 1, at 142-46; ARLN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS

LERTY. THE

CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION

CLAUSES 11-12 (1990). For general works on the Virginia struggle and the role of
Madison and Jefferson, see BuCKLEY, supra note 3, and HJ. ECEENRODE, SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA A STUDY N THE DEVELoPMENT OF THE REVOLUTION
(1910). For additional material, see also THE VIRGnIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 1.
29 Eversc, 330 U.S. at 16. The metaphor comes from Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 16 THE WRrNGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 281, 282 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904-05).
30 See, e.g., GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 3, 12
(1987). Whereas the purpose of the Virginia statute was to prohibit government support for religion at the state level, scholars have forcefully argued that the First
Amendment was not intended to interfere with state establishments but, rather, was
designed to express clearly that the federal government is one of limited powers without a "shadow of a right... to intermeddle with religion." CURRY, supranote 1, at 208
(quoting fromJames Madison's remarks in defense of the Constitution at the Virginia
Ratifying Convention onJune 12, 1788); see also STEv N D. SmrnI, FOREORDAINED FAILuRE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 21 (1995)
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Madison and Jefferson were also inconsistent with many of the practices of the nation's early Congresses.3 1 Jefferson, it is further noted,
was in France when the First Amendment was drafted,3 2 and his reference to a wall of separation between church and state was in a letter to
the Danbury Baptist Association eleven years after the Bill of Rights
was adopted.

33

However, regardless of the criticisms of scholars and commentators, the Court has repeatedly returned to the Virginia struggle in its
later decisions, and it has never followed the suggestion of scholars
and dissentingJustices that it correct its original misstep.3 4 The Court
has, to be sure, scaled back from an absolute separation between
church and state.3 5 However, a separationist current has continued to
(explaining that the First Amendment was designed to keep the federal government
out of religion and to leave religious questions to the jurisdiction of the states). Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike agreed on this principle. See CURRY, supranote 1, at
208. Indeed, some of the strongest defenders of the need for the religion clauses
were Virginia Anti-Federalists who had supported the general assessment bill in the
Virginia legislature a few years earlier. These included Patrick Henry, the bill's sponsor, and Richard Henry Lee, both of whom demanded protection for religious liberty
in the Constitution. See Speech of Patrick Henry in the Virginia Ratifying Convention
(June 12, 1788), in5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 239, 240 (HerbertJ. Storing ed.,
1981); Letter of Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph (Oct. 16, 1787),
in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 111, 116.
31 See, e.g., CHESTERJ. ANTIrAu, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 180-82, 208
(1964); ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION 51-80 (1988). For additional discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 258-60.
32 Justice Rehnquist emphasized this argument in his dissent in Wallace v. Jafifree,
472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985).
33 The Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791 when Virginia became the necessary
11th state to ratify the amendments. See ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 28, at 19.
Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists was written in 1802. See Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association, supra note 29, at 281.
34 See ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 28, at 11 ("[N] o other historical episode
has influenced the Supreme Court's interpretation of the religion clauses more than
the Virginia experience.").
35 In Everson, the Court stated that the wall between church and state erected by
the First Amendment "must be kept high and impregnable" without "the slightest
breach." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). In subsequent cases, the
Court has recognized that an absolute separation between church and state is not
possible. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973)
(" [D] espite Madison's admonition and the 'sweep of the absolute prohibitions' of the

Clauses, this Nation's history has not been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and State. It has never been thought either possible or desirable to
enforce a regime of total separation ...

.")

(footnote omitted); Zorach v. Clauson,

343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) ("IT] he separation must be complete and unequivocal. The
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run through the case law, both in majority opinions36 and, more recently, predominantly in concurrences and dissents,3 7 and separationism is a major strand in the Court's recent case law addressing
religious expression by the state. 38 When Justices do embrace separationist principles, they return to the Virginia struggle and to the ideas
of Madison and Jefferson. 39
ThoseJustices who have embraced the separationist position have
also recognized a second historical source supporting their views. In
addition to Madison and Jefferson, they frequently cite the Baptist tradition that they associate with Roger Williams as support for separationism.40 The reference to Roger Williams is actually a historical
First Amendment within the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State.").
36 See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1982) ("Jefferson's idea of a 'wall,' was a useful figurative illustration to emphasize the concept of
separateness. Some limited and incidental entanglement between church and state
authority is inevitable in a complex modem society, but the concept of a 'wall' of
separation is a useful signpost.") (citations omitted); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431
(1962) ("[U]nion of government and religion tends to destroy government and to
degrade religion.").
37 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243-44 (1997) (SouterJ., dissenting)
(drawing on Madison and Roger Williams to support the claim that a "flat ban on
subsidization" of religion is necessary to protect religion from being compromised by
the taint of secularism); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 868-74 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (drawing upon the Virginia struggle to
support the principle that the First Amendment prohibits any direct public funding
of religious activities); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
797 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he sequence of sectarian displays disclosed
by the record in this case illustrates the importance of rebuilding the 'wall of separation between church and State' thatJefferson envisioned."); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 599-601, 606 & n.8, 608-09 (1992) (Blackmun,J., concurring) (approving of the
separationism strain in the Court's past case law and the history on which this case law
rests); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802-03 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (approving of Jefferson's "wall" metaphor and stating that the First Amendment embraces the principles of "separation" and "neutrality"); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Rel. Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling for a
return of the "'high and impregnable' wall between church and state constructed by
the Framers of the First Amendment" in the Court's parochial school funding cases
(quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 18)); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 257 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
38 See infra Part III.
39 See cases and parentheticals cited in supra note 37.
40 See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 243 (Souter, J., dissenting); Weisman, 505 U.S. at
608 n.l (Blackmun, J., concurring); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 260 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court made its first reference to the views of Roger Williams in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 n.20 (1962),
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anachronism. The Justices are correct that in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, the Baptists played a critical role in the
struggle for religious liberty both in New England and in the southern
states. The most influential of the Baptist leaders in this struggle were
Isaac Backus and John Leland. Both of these evangelists were active in
the struggle for disestablishment in New England, and Leland also
worked with Madison in Virginia to defeat Patrick Henry's general assessment bill for the support of Christian education and to pass Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. 4 1 It was Backus who
rediscovered the works of Williams, whose writings had remained
largely forgotten 42 and without any continuous influence outside of
Rhode Island. 43 In addition to Roger Williams, the Baptists drew
upon Scripture, Locke, and their own experience of persecution,
44
which was the crucible in which their views were formed.
Madison and Jefferson and these Baptist leaders shared a similar
view that'4government
and religion were separate 'Jurisdictions" 45 or
6
"spheres" that must not be "mixed"47 or "confounded"48 together.
and one year later in Schempp, Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stated that "the
views of Madison andJefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, came to be incorporated
not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States,"
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 214.
41 As agent of the Warren Baptist Association, Backus spearheaded the Baptist
cause in New England. See C.C. GOEN, REVIVALISM AND SEPARATISM IN NEw ENGLAND
1740-1800, at 269 (1962). Leland played a significant role in the struggle in Massachusetts and Connecticut and a leading role in Virginia. See ADAMS & EMMERICH,
supranote 28, at 12; WILIA G.McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1833, at
928 (1971).

42

See WILA

G. McLoUGHLIN,

ISAAC BACKUS AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTISTIC

124 (1967).
43 See SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
182-83 (1972).
44 See William G. McLoughlin, Introduction to BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 4, at 1, 17; WILLIAM G.McLouGHLIN, SOUL LIBERTY. TiH BAPTnSTS'
STRUcGLE IN NEW ENGLAND 1630-1833, at 262 (1991).
45 ISAAC BACKUS, GOVERNMENT AND LIBERTY DESCRIBED (1778), reprintedin BACKUS,
TRADITION

CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM,

supra note 4, at 345, 357; JOHN

LELAND, THE YANKEE

Spy (1794), reprinted in LELAND WRITINGS, supranote 4, at 215, 228; Letter from James
Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 6, at 98, 100; Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 77, 77 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
46 Declaration of the Virginia Association of Baptists (Dec. 25, 1776), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 6, at 660, 661; see alSOJOHN LELAND, A BLOW
AT THE ROOT (1801), reprinted in LELAND WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 233, 240 ("Religious opinions are not the object of government or in any way under its control.");
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association, supra note 29, at
282 (advocating "wall of separation between church and state"); Madison, Detached
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They argued that the state simply has no business "interfering"49 or
"intermeddling"50 with religion, and when it came to religious expression by the state, most interpreted this principle strictly. For example,
Jefferson and Madison opposed presidential proclamations recommending days of thanksgiving, fasts, and prayer, and they also opposed funding for legislative chaplains. 5 1 Backus voiced no
opposition to days of thanksgiving or prayer,5 2 and his only recorded
objection to legislative chaplains appears to focus primarily on the fact
that the chaplains at that time were Episcopalians.5 3 However, the
principles that Backus expressed in his writings were strictly separationist,5 4 and Leland followed similar principles to their logical conMemoranda, supra note 6, at 555 (stating that God has put religion and government
"asunder").
47 LELAND, A BLOW AT THE ROOT, supra note 46, at 251; Letter from James
Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 6, at 102; see also IsAc BACKus, PoIcy AS
WELL As HoEsrv (1779), reprinted in BAcKus, CrujcaH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra
note 4, at 375, 380 (arguing that church and state must not be "blended").
48 BACKUS, supra note 4, at 312.
49 Id at 315; JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALENABIL (1791), reprinted in LELAND WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 177, 191; Letter from James Madison to
Reverend Adams (1832), in 9 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON, supra note 6, at 484,
487.
50 BAcKus, supra note 45, at 358; LELAND, supra note 49, at 302; Letter from
ThomasJefferson to the Reverend Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 11 THE WRrINGS
OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 6, at 428, 428.
51 See Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supranote 6, at 100-01;
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Reverend Samuel Miller, supra note 50, at 428;
Madison, DetachedMemoranda, supranote 6, at 558-62. In 1785, Madison presented to
the Virginia Legislature A Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and
Thanksgiving, supra note 6, and he also followed the practice of earlier presidents in
recommending days of thanksgiving and fasts, see Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 6, at 101. However, later in life he opposed such practices as inconsistent with the principle of "perfect separation." Id at 101-02; see also
Madison, DetachedMemoranda, supranote 6, at 560-62. Similarly, while Madison later
opposed funding for legislative chaplains, see Letter from James Madison to Edward
Livingston, supra note 6, at 100; Madison, Detached Memoranda, supra note 6, at
558-59, he was a member of the congressional committee that recommended funding for chaplains, see CORD, supra note 31, at 25, and there is no evidence that he
voiced any opposition when the funding was first approved, see ANTwAu, supra note
31, at 180-81.
52 Indeed, Backus observed government appointed days of fast and thanksgiving
in his own congregation. See McLOUGHLrN, supra note 44, at 268.
53 See IsAAc BACKUS, THE TESTIMONY OF THE Two WITNESES 46-47 (Boston, Samuel Hall 2d ed. 1793).
54 See, e.g., BAcKus, supranote 4, at 312 ("God has appointed two kinds of government. . . never to be confounded together, one of which is called civil and the other
ecclesiastical government."). In the same work, Backus writes,
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clusion and rejected both practices 55 as well as any laws which gave
56
special recognition or protection to religion.
And it appears to us that the true difference and exact limits between ecclesi-

astical and civil government is this, That the church is armed with light and
truth to pull down the strongholds of iniquity and to gain souls for Christ
and into his Church to be governed by his rules therein .... while the state is
armed with the sword to guard the peace and the civil rights of all persons
and societies and to punish those who violate the same. And where these
two kinds of government, and the weapons which belong to them are well
distinguished and improved according to the true nature and end of their
institution, the effects are happy, and they do not at all interfere with each
other.
Id. at 315. Backus also frequently cited passages from Roger Williams which reflect
the strict separationism of his thought. See, e.g., id. at 322.
55 See 2 McLoUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 931, 933; McLoUGHLIN, supranote 44, at
194. For specific citations to Leland's writings regarding legislative chaplains, see
John Leland, Speech Delivered at the House of Representatives of Massachusetts on
the Subject of Religious Freedom (1811), in LELAND WRITINGS, supa note 4, at 353,
355, and Letter from John Leland to Col. R.M. Johnson (Jan. 8, 1830), in LELAND
WRITINGS, sup-a note 4, at 561, 563.
56 See LELAND, supra note 49, at 188; JOHN LELAND, TRANSPORTATION OF THE MAIL
(1830) [hereinafter LELAND, TRANSPORTATION OF MAIL], reprintedin LELAND WRITINGS,
supra note 4, at 564, 565; see also Edwin S. Gaustad, The Backus-Leland Tradition, in
BAPTIST CONCEPTS OF THE CHURCH 106, 130 (Winthrop S. Hudson ed., 1959). Leland
even went so far as to oppose a petition for stopping the mails on Sunday. See id., in
BAPTIST CONCEPTS OF THE CHURCH, supra,at 132. See LELAND WRITINGS, supra note 4,
at 561-69, for some of Leland's correspondence regarding the Sunday mail. Backus
and Leland both opposed compulsory Sabbath attendance, see 1 McLOUGHLIN, supra
note 41, at 605-06 (discussing Backus's discussion of this issue in a letter in the Boston Independent Chronicle on Dec. 2, 1779); see also ISAAC BACKUS, A DOOR OPENED FOR
CHRISTIAN LIBERTY (1783) [hereinafter BACKUS, CHRISTIAN LIBERTY], reprinted in
BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 4, at 427, 433 ("We believe that
attendance upon public worship and keeping the first day of the week holy to God are
duties to be inculcated and enforced by his laws instead of the laws of men, but we
have had no controversy with our rulers about that matter."); JoHN LELAND, ADDREss
DELIVERED AT THE REQUEST OF THE REPUBLICAN COMMITrEE OF ARRANGEMENTS, AT

4, 1824) [hereinafter LELAND, AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE], reprinted in LELAND WRITINGS, supra note 4, at
501,506;JOHN LELAND, ON SABBATICAL LAws (1815) [hereinafter LELAND, SABBATICAL
LAWS], reprinted in LELAND WRITINGS, supranote 4, at 440, and even voiced opposition
to laws regulating morality where there is no danger of injury to others, see ISAAc
BACKUS, THE DOCTRINE OF PARTICULAR ELEcTION AND FINAL PERSEVERANCE (1789)
[hereinafter BACKUS, PARTICULAR ELECTION], reprinted in BACKUS, STATE, AND CALVINiSM, supra note 4, at 447, 468; LELAND, supra note 46, at 237; JOHN LELAND, SHORT
ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT (1820) [hereinafter LELAND, ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT], reprinted in LELAND WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 473, 476.
One preeminent historian on Backus has noted that most Baptists in the 18th
and 19th centuries did not oppose all government support for religion and were content with laws for compulsory church attendance, the inculcation of the Westminster
PITTSFIELD, ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (July
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For all of these men, strict separationism was not intended primarily to protect the government from religion. Rather, for all of
them, religion was of deep if not supreme importance, 57 and the Justices who draw upon their principles note that they were certain that
religion will thrive best where government and religion are kept
strictly separate. 5 8 This Part analyzes the theological assumptions that
lie behind this confidence. Understanding these assumptions is critical for understanding the current divisions on the Court regarding
religious expression by the state. When the Justices adopt the Madisonian or Baptist statement that religion thrives best where it is wholly
Confession in the New England public schools, and laws against profanity, blasphemy,
theater-going, or desecration of the Sabbath. See McLoUGHLIN, supranote 42, at 149.
McLoughlin notes that Backus himself did not object to most of these laws, see id-;
McLouGHLIN, supranote 44, at 267-68, and he also notes that Backus even appeared
to support the clause in the Massachusetts Constitution requiring all officeholders to
take an oath stating "I believe the Christian religion and have a firm persuasion of its
truth," id. at 194, 267. However, close examination of the passage McLoughlin cites
to support the latter point reveals that Backus's support for the oath seems to rest
primarily on the fact that Christian officeholders will recognize that the Gospel demands the separation of church and state. See BACKUS, CHtmTiAN LIBERTY, supra, at
436-37. Furthermore, while McLoughlin argues that the other practices Backus supported place him closer to the contemporary accommodationists on the Court rather
than separationists, see MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 44, at 259, 267-69. Backus's principles are clearly closer to the latter. The fact that Backus may not have taken these
principles to their logical conclusion does not mean that he did not have separationist
principles.
57 Some scholars argue that Jefferson, in particular, favored the separation of
church and state largely for secular reasons. For the views of these scholars and a
refutation of their argument, see infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
58 See BACKUS, supra note 4, at 333-34 (arguing that state support of religion
"tends to destroy the purity and life of religion" by "bringing in an earthly power between Christ and his people"); JoHN LELAND, AN ORATION, DELIVERED AT CHESIRE,
JULY 5, 1802, ON THE CELEBRATION OF INDEPENDENCE, reprinted in LELAND WRrrINGS,
supra note 5, at 257, 270 ("The GospeL The only hope of man: may it prevail in its
virgin purity-free from the legal apparatus and traditional complexion which have
long covered its native beauty."); Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston,
supranote 6, at 103 ("Religion flourishes in greater purity, without the aid of government."); Jefferson, supra note 45, at 77 (stating that "truth is great and will prevail if
left to herself').
The Justices repeatedly cite Madison, in particular, for his belief that religion
thrives in greater purity when it is separated from the state. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
608 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 (1983)
(Brennan,J., dissenting). Roger Williams is also cited on this point. See, e.g., Agostini,
521 U.S. at 243 (Souter, J., dissenting); Weisman, 505 U.S. at 608 n.11 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259-60
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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separate from the government, 59 they are affirming a statement that
rests on a series of assumptions regarding the nature of religious belief, how people come to faith, and how faith is sustained. As will become clear below, while the religious views of Madison and Jefferson
and the Enlightenment stamp that they bear differ dramatically from
the evangelical underpinnings of the Baptist tradition, all of these
figures agreed that the survival of religion does not require its formation by and through a religious community. Jefferson, Backus, and
Leland shared an individualistic conception of religious belief, and
they did not believe that churches were essential to mediate religious
truth. While Madison's understanding of religion was less individualistic, he also did not view communities as essential for the formation
of faith. In their view, establishments were not necessary to support
religion because the role of churches is not so much to inculcate religion as to serve as a voluntary association of individuals who already
share a common faith.
A.

The Strength of Human Faculties

While the religious views of Madison andJefferson differed significantly, they were both deeply influenced by the Enlightenment, and
it is these influences that best explain why they were certain that religion will thrive best where religion and government are kept strictly
separate. The impact of Enlightenment thought on the views of
Madison and Jefferson as well as many of the other leading figures in
the founding era is well recognized, 60 but there is significant controversy over what "the Enlightenment" means. 61 The Enlightenment in
both Europe and America certainly comprised a wide variety of thinkers whose conclusions often differed widely,62 and some scholars are
63
now challenging the idea that there ever was "one" Enlightenment.
However, many scholars continue to argue that it is possible to identify an underlying principle that unites these diverse thinkers, and this
underlying unity has usually been described as a new attitude or ap59
60
EENTH

61
62

See cases cited in supra note 58.
See AHLSTROM, supra note 43, at 358-59; HERBERT M. MoRAIs, DEISM IN EIGHTCENTURY AMERICA 17 (1934).
See, e.g., DORINDA OUTRAM, THE ENLIGHTENMENT 1 (1995).
See ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT, at v (1951); AD-

RIENNE KOCH,

THE

AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN EXPERI-

MENT AND A FREE SOCIETy 36 (1965).

63

See, e.g., HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976) (arguing that

there were four distinct Enlightenment developments in America); see also OurRAM,
supra note 61, at 1; Roy PORTER, THE ENLIGHTENMENT 10 (1990).
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proach to knowledge and philosophic thought. 64 Ernst Cassirer, who
remains the leading authority on the philosophy of the Enlightenment, locates the foundation for this "new perspective" 65 in the
method developed by Newton for the natural sciences. 66 Reason is
conceived of as an intellectual force which can, through observation
and experiment and the other tools of the "new science," discover the
truths about reality. 67 Enlightenment thinkers take these new meth-

ods and apply them to all fields of knowledge, including law, government, religion, and psychology as well as the natural sciences. 68 As
they seek a firm foundation for knowledge in reason and investigation, received opinions, tradition, and authority come under scrutiny,
and the greatest obstacles to the discovery of truth become the "ignorance," "superstition," or "prejudice" which result from accepting re69
ceived opinions without questioning.
64

See CASSrRER, supra note 62, at vi-vii; see also KoCH, supra note 62, at 37; JACK

Tim ENuGI-TENmENT, at xiv (1966). Even Henry May, one of the foremost
critics of the idea of a homogenized Enlightenment, develops two propositions uniting Enlightenment thought. See MAY, supranote 63, at xiv; HENRY F. MAY, The Enlightenment in America: The Jeffersonian Moment, in THE DIVIDED HEART: ESSAYS ON
PRoTESrANTsM AND Tim ENLIGHTENMENT IN AmEuCA 161, 162 (1991).
65 CAssIm-R, supra note 62, at vii.
66 See id. at 7-14. It is important to note that there is disagreement among scholars over whether to include the deductive "rationalism" characteristic of 17th century
thinkers such as Descartes or Leibniz within the scope of the Enlightenment or
whether to limit the Enlightenment to those who embraced the scientific "empiricism" that dominated in the 18th century. Cassirer limits the Enlightenment to those
thinkers who adopted the empirical methods of Newton, see id., but other scholars
would not exclude thinkers whose thoughts draw primarily upon the older deductive
methods, see, e.g., IvELY, supra note 64, at xiii; MAY, supra note 63, at xiv. Indeed,
Cassirer himself includes the English rationalist Samuel Clarke among those he considers Enlightenment thinkers. See CASSER, supra note 62, at 177-78.
Note that in the following text and notes, I am using the term "rationalist" or
"rationalism" to refer generally to Enlightenment trends rather than specifically to
those who follow deductive methods in their work. Thus, the reference includes
predominantly empirical thinkers but also covers Clarke and other 18th century philosophers and divines who made considerable use of deductive arguments but were
nonetheless central participants in the philosophical debates of the 18th century.
67 See CASSrRER, supra note 62, at vii, 7-9, 13-14.
68 See id. at vii, 12, 136.
69 See id. at 161-65; see also ISAIAH BERLIN, THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENmF
: THE
EIG-mHTErH CENTURY PHILosoPHFERs 15, 29 (1956). Locke describes these sentiments
well. He condemns "blind[ ]" obedience to authority, JOHN LocxE, A LETFER CONCERNING TOLERATION 19 (Patrick Romanell ed., Bobbs-Merrill 2d ed. 1955) (1689)
[hereinafter LOCKE, A LEurrER CONCERNING TOLERATION]; see alsoJOHN LOCKE, ESSAY
ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, ESSAY ON HUMAN UNDERSrANDING], reprintedin 2 THE WoRKs OFJOHN LOCKE 1, 272-73 (London, C. &J. Rivington 12th ed. 1824), and states that the greatest source of ignorance and error is
LIVELY,
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Americans partook of the currents of the Enlightenment in different degrees and assimilated its patterns of thought in different
ways. 70 For most Americans, "the wines of the Enlightenment were
sipped with cautious moderation, '7 1 and those who were most deeply
influenced still generally followed Locke in believing that revelation is
72
a necessary supplement to the truths discoverable by reason.
Others, however, followed the English deists in arguing that reason
alone should be the standard for religious truth, and that whatever is
in the Bible that is unreasonable must be stripped away. 73 Jefferson
was one of the latter,7 4 and the very individualistic understanding of
"the giving up of our assent to the common received opinions, either of our friends or
party, neighborhood or country," id at 294. In religious matters, too, "[r]eason must
be our last judge and guide," id at 280, and "every man ought sincerely to inquire
into himself, and by meditation, study, search, and his own endeavors attain the
knowledge of [such matters]." LOCKE, A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra, at
31.
70 See AHLSTROM, supra note 43, at 358, 366-68.
71 Id. at 358.
72 See id. at 357, 366; Mop-Is, supra note 60, at 13-15; see also MAY, supra note 63,
at 353 (stating that liberal New England clergy in 18th and early 19th centuries continued to argue that revelation is necessary to complement reason). As discussed in
supranote 69, Locke believes that "[r] eason must be our lastjudge and guide in every
thing," LocKE, EssAY ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 69, at 280, and this applies to religious matters as well as all other fields of knowledge. Some truths about
religion can be discovered through reason alone. See id. at 273. Revelation also enlarges these discoveries with truths above reason which are communicated directly by
God and assented to by faith. See id. However, Locke insists that the mind must be
justified in its faith by proofs that attest to the divine origin of Biblical materials because "it still belongs to reason to judge the truth of its being a revelation." Id. at 269,
270. The evidence that Locke cites for his belief that the Bible is the source of divine
revelation is the miracles performed by Jesus and His disciples and the fact that reason confirms the principles they taught. See JOHN LocKE, THE REASONABLENESS OF
CHRISTIANITY 63-64, 67 (I.T. Ramsey ed., Stanford Univ. Press 1958) (1695). The
English divines that followed Locke in defending the truth of Christianity against deism and skepticism made similar arguments, see AHLSTROM, supra note 43, at 354-55;
MAY, supra note 63, at 12, which were also adopted by clergymen in America, see AHISTROM, supra note 43, at 356-57.
73 See AHLSTROM, supra note 43, at 366; MoRAis, supra note 43, at 15-16.
74 See MAY, supra note 63, at 293; MoRAIs, supra note 43, at 116, 15-17; see also
ADRIENNE KOCH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMASJEFFERSON 27 (Quadrangle Books 1964)
(1943). Jefferson often called himself a Unitarian Christian rather than a deist, see
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Waterhouse (Jan. 8, 1825), in RoYJ. HONEYWELL, THE EDUCATIONAL WORK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 92, 92 (1931); see also KOCH,
supra, at 26; MAY,supra note 63, at 293; MAY, supra note 64, at 172, and like many
American deists, he certainly saw himself as a reformer of Christianity not its destructor, see MoRAis, supranote 60, at 15. However, he shared with the English deists the
view that the Bible discloses no truths beyond reason and that whatever the Bible
contains that is not reasonable must be discarded. ForJefferson as the English deists,
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religious belief that results from these suppositions explains why Jefferson was certain that religion would survive best where it is kept
strictly separate from government.
According to Jefferson, reason is the "only oracle" which God has
given for the discovery of religious truth.75 The path to true religion
is a process of "free enquiry"76 which "shake [s] off all the fears and
servile prejudices" 7 7 that dominate the mind and keep it under ignorance and error. For Jefferson, this process of discovery is fundamentally an individual enterprise. It should not be commenced until an
age when reason has reached maturity, 78 and then individuals must
"think for themselves" and form their own opinions. 79 Jefferson's
grandson recalled Jefferson's reticence about his religious beliefs
among his family members: "If asked by one of them, his opinion on
any religious subject, his uniform reply was, that it was a subject each
was bound to study assiduously for himself, unbiased by the opinions
of others-it was a matter solely of conscience... that the expression
of his opinion might influence theirs, and he would not give it!"80
Thus, for Jefferson, reason provides a direct link between the individual and God. It is as though reason functions as a ladder upon
which the individual can climb directly to God. Churches have no
role to play in this process but are, rather, potentially dangerous
sources of error. It is the "priests"8' who have obscured the "pure and
it is reason that provides the standard for identifying what is true in the Bible. See
MAY, supra note 63, at 20-21, for a discussion of English deism.
75 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Miles King (Sept. 26, 1814), in 14 THE W=RINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 196, 197; Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note

29, at 256, 261.
76 JEFFERSON, supranote 4, at 160; see also Letter from ThomasJefferson to BenjaRush (Apr. 21, 1803), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 29,
at 379, 379-80 (stating that Jefferson's religious views are the "result of a life of inmin

quiry and reflection").

77 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, supra note 75, at 258.
78 SeeJEFFERSON, supranote 4, at 147; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Car,
supra note 75, at 258; see also ROBERT M. HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC

173 (1962).
79 Letter from ThomasJefferson toJohn Adams (Aug. 22, 1813), in 13 THE WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 349, 349; Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Mrs. M. Harrison Smith (Aug. 6, 1816), in 15 THE WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 29, at 59, 60; see also HEALEY, supra note 78, at 26.
80 Letter from Thomas Jefferson Randolph to Henry S. Randall (undated), in 3
HENRY S. RANDALL, THE LIFE OF THOMASJEFFERSON 671,672 (Books for Libraries Press
1970) (1857).
81 Jefferson's condemnations of "priests" (by which he means clergymen in general) and theologians are numerous. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
EDUCATION
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simple"8 2 teachings of Jesus with "artificial structures" 83 and dogmas
that "enslave" 84 the mind in ignorance and superstition. 85 Without
them, the mind will easily discover true religion, which for Jefferson
was the three-fold creed accepted by rationalist Christians and deists
alike: one God, a virtuous life, and a future state of rewards and punishments.8 6 According to Jefferson, these were the doctrines taught by
Jesus, and these doctrines and the pure and simple morals 8 7 which He
taught are "within the comprehension of a child"8 8 and easily separable from the accretions added by His followers as "the diamond from
89
the dunghill."

Charles Clay, Esq. (Jan. 29, 1815), in 14 THE Wurnaris OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra

note 29, at 232, 233; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Timothy Pickering, Esq. (Feb.
27, 1821), in 15 THE WrrnGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 322, 323-24;

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Apr. 13, 1820), in 15 THE WRmINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 243, 246-47.

82 This description of Jesus's teachings also recurs throughout Jefferson's writings. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Timothy Pickering, Esq., supra note
81, at 323.
83 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. M. Harrison Smith, supra note 79, at 60;
see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Oct. 31, 1819), in 15 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 219, 221 (condemning the use of

"artificial systems").
84 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (Jan. 19, 1810), in 12 THE
WrrrnGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 345, 345.

85 Jefferson speaks of the doctrines of the "priests" as placing "spells on the
human mind." Letter from ThomasJefferson to William Short, supra note 81, at 246.
According to Jefferson, these doctrines and systems have been erected as "instruments
of wealth, power, and preeminence" for the clergy. Letter from ThomasJefferson to
Charles Clay, Esq., supra note 81, at 233; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Samuel Kercheval, supra note 84, at 345.
86 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Waterhouse (June 26, 1822), in
15 TiE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 383, 384; Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Joseph Priestly (Apr. 9, 1803), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON, supranote 29, at 374, 374-75; see also MoiArs, supra note 60, at 15

(stating that rationalist clergy and deists accept the same three-fold creed of "a First
Cause, . . . acceptance of a future state and.., emphasis upon virtuous living").
87 Jefferson frequently refers to Jesus's moral teachings as the "purest" ever
preached. Letter from ThomasJefferson to Mrs. M. Harrison Smith, supra note 79, at
60; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, supra note 84, at 345; Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to William Short (Aug. 4, 1820), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 257, 259.

88

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (July 5, 1814), in 14 THE WRrr-

INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 144, 149.

89

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short, supra note 83, at 220.
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Deeply suspicious of organized religious communities, Jefferson
sometimes speaks as though he thinks that they should not exist, 90
and he repeatedly emphasizes his individualistic conception of religion as "a matter which lies solely between man and his God."9 1 At
other times, Jefferson states his willingness to worship with Unitarians.9 2 At best, however, religious communities are understood as
strictly voluntary associations of like-minded individuals, not as vehides for forming faith or "moulding [the] mind[]. 9 3 Early in his life,
Jefferson adopted Locke's understanding of churches as "voluntary
societ[ies]" based on mutual consent. 9 4 Individuals join that society
which they determine to be in accordance with their own beliefs, and
they are free to leave if they discover anything erroneous after joining. 95 Later in life, Jefferson even goes further than Locke and conceives of the church as based on contract:
90 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Ezra Stiles (June 25, 1819), in 15 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 202, 203 ("I am of a sect by myself,
as far as I know."); Letter from ThomasJefferson toJohn Adams, supranote 79, at 350
("We should all then, like the Quakers, live without an order of priests, moralise for
ourselves, [and] follow the oracle of conscience .... ").
91 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association, supra note
29, at 281; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Miles King, supra note 75, at 198;
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Leiper (Jan. 21, 1809), in 12 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 236, 237; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Mrs. M. Harrison Smith, supra note 79, at 60; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Charles Thomson (Jan. 29, 1817), in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, SECOND SERIES: JEFFERSON'S ExrRArS FROM THE GosPus 383, 384 (Dickinson W. Adams ed.,
1983) [hereinafterJEFrrMSON's ExTRACrs].
92 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Waterhouse (July 19, 1822), in
15 THE WRrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 390, 391 ("When I lived in
Philadelphia, there was a respectable congregation of that sect [Unitarians], with a
meeting-house and regular service which I attended, and in which Doctor Priestly
officiated to numerous audiences."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin
Waterhouse, supranote 74, at 92 ("I am anxious to see the doctrine of one god commenced in our state. But the population of my neighborhood is too slender, and is
too much divided into other sects to maintain any one preacher well. I must therefore be contented to be an Unitarian by myself, although I know there are many
around me who would become so, if once they could hear the questions fairly
stated.").
93 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short, supra note 81, at 247.
94 ThomasJefferson, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury (1776), in ITHE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JErr-RsoN, supra note 6, at 544, 545 (emphasis omitted). These notes were
prepared byJefferson for speeches and petitions in the House of Delegates in connection with his efforts to disestablish the Episcopal church. Jefferson quotes directly
from Locke. See LOCXE, A IzTrmx CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 69, at 20.
95 SeeJefferson, supra note 94, at 545; see LoCKE, A LET-ER CONCERNING ToLERA-

supra note 69, at 20. Locke emphasizes that "[n] obody is born a member of any
church." Id.
TION,
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Collections of men associate together, under the name of congregations, and employ a religious teacher of the particular sect of opinions of which they happen to be, and contribute to make up a
stipend as a compensation for the trouble of delivering them, at
such periods as they agree on, lessons in the religion they profess.... Whenever, therefore, preachers, instead of a lesson in religion, put them off with a discourse on the Copernican system, on
chemical affinities, on the construction of government, or the characters or conduct of those administering it, it is a breach of contract, depriving their audience of the kind of service for which they
are salaried, and giving them, instead of it, what they did not want,
or, if wanted, would rather seek from better sources in that particu96
lar art or science.
Thus, for Jefferson, religion will fare the best where there is a
strict separation between church and state because it thrives best
when it is freed from the weight of human authority. It is the model
of religion as something which must be formed and shaped in human
community which Jefferson objects to. Communities are not necessary to mediate religious truth. Like the priests that they support, establishments erect a "spiritual tyranny" 97 and "vassalage"9 8 over the
mind. It is common for scholars to argue that Jefferson favored the
separation of church and state for secular reasons and that his principal concern was to protect the state from religion. 99 Some of the Justices have occasionally repeated this argument. 0 0 However,
Jefferson's writings do not bear this thesis out. To the contrary, Jefferson saw himself as a defender of religious truth. He was, he argued,
the "real Christian,"10 1 and he is certain that when the freedom of reli96

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to P.H. Wendover (Mar. 13, 1815), in 14 THE
supranote 29, at 279, 280-81. Apparently the letter
was never sent.
WRITINcS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,

97 Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography (begun 1821), in I

THE WRITINGS OF

supra note 29, at 1, 57.
98 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 16, 1786), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 8, 10.
99 See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION
AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 2-3, 7-8 (1965); McLouGHLIN, supra note 42, at 149; McLoUGHLIN, supra note 44, at 195.
100 See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259-60
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It has rightly been said that 'our tradition of civil
liberty rests not only on the secularism of a Thomas Jefferson but also on the fervent
sectarianism . . . of a Roger Williams."' (quoting PAUL A. FREUND, THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 84 (1961))).
101 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Thompson (Jan. 9, 1816), in 14 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 385, 385; see also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Salma Hale (July 26, 1818), inJEFFERSON'S ExTRAcrs, supra note
THOMAS JEFFERSON,
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gion guaranteed in law was succeeded by freedom of thought from
"the overbearing inquisition of public opinion, truth will prevail over
fanaticism, and the genuine doctrines of Jesus, so long perverted by
10 2
His pseudo-priests, will again be restored to their original purity."
Indeed, late in life, Jefferson repeatedly expressed his confidence that
"there is not a young man now living in the United States who will not
die an Unitarian."1 0 3
Others in the founding era who shared the deist belief that reason is sufficient by itself to discover religious truth had a similarly individualistic conception of religious belief and supported strict
separationism on grounds resembling those of Jefferson. For example, St. George Tucker, a deist and professor of law at William and
Mary, 10 4 argued that reason in religious matters must be free from
"the control or intervention of any human power or authority whatsoever."'10

5

Establishments hamper the pursuit of truth because they

07
bias the mind' 0 6 and obstruct human inquiry and investigation.
0
8
The result is "superstition."
Thomas Paine even more forcefully

condemned the "King....

Bishop,

. .

. Church or .

.

. State, ...

Parliament, or anything else, that obtrudest thine insignificance between the soul of man and its Maker."' 0 9
91, at 385, 385. This meant a disciple of the pure doctrines ofJesus. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Charles Thompson, supra, at 385; Letter from Thomas Jefferson

to Salma Hale, supra, at 385. Indeed, evidencing the level of his faith, Jefferson took
the time to produce two extracts from the Gospels that isolated what he believed were
the true teachings ofJesus from the "dross" of His followers. See Eugene R. Sheridan,
IntroductiontoJmFxRSON's ExTRAars, supra note 91, at 3, 27-38 (discussingJefferson's
The Philosophy of Jesus (1804) and his The Life and Morals of Jeus (approximately

1819-20)).
102 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the ReverendJared Sparks (Nov. 4, 1820), in
15 THE WRriGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 278, 288.
103

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Waterhouse, supra note 86, at 383,

385; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Smith (Dec. 8, 1822), in 15 THE
WRTN'GS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 408, 409 ("I confidently expect that
the present generation will see Unitarianism become the general religion of the

United States."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), in
15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 29, at 403, 405 ("That this [Unitarianism] will, ere long, be the religion of the majority from north to south, I have no

doubt.").
104 See MAY, supra note 63, at 141.
105 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (1803), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTrruTON, supra note 45, at 96, 97.
106 See id. at 97.
107 See id.
108 Id.
109 THOMAS PAINE,

RIGHTS OF

MAN 86 (Eric Foner ed., Penguin 1984) (1791).

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 75:2

While Madison was also influenced by Enlightenment thought, it
would be a great mistake to equate his religious views with those of
Jefferson. While Jefferson claimed to keep his religious views to himself,110 it was Madison who was by far the more reserved, and thus, it is
difficult to piece together his religious beliefs from the few writings
which touch on them.11 ' It is clear, however, that Madison did not go
as far as Jefferson and the American deists in rejecting revelation as a
supplement to reason, and he certainly remained a Christian. 1 2 However, Madison's religious beliefs were deeply influenced by rationalist
trends, 113 and as for Jefferson, it is these influences that account for
many of the reasons that Madison gives for his belief that religion will
thrive best where there is a strict separation between church and state.
Lacking the deist's confidence in the ability of reason to discover religious truths on its own, Madison does not share Jefferson's radically
individualistic understanding of religion. While he frequently uses an
anticlerical tone when referring to Virginia's Anglican establishment, 114 he expresses no general opposition to the clergy nor is he
deeply suspicious of organized religious communities. To the contrary, he delights in the increase of religious instruction and the attendance of the people on that instruction. 115 However, like
Jefferson, Madison does not view religious communities as essential
for the formation of faith, and for Madison, as for Jefferson, communities flow from, rather than form, the religious choices of individuals.
110
111

See HEA.EY, supra note 78, at 25.

See Ralph L. Ketcham, James Madison and Religion: A New Hypothesis, in JAMES
175, 175 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985).
112 See MAY, supra note 63, at 96-97; Ralph Ketcham, James Madison at Princeton,28
PRINCETON U. LIBR. CHRON. 24, 50-52 (1966). Ketcham writes that "Jefferson's skepticism and eager willingness to depart from orthodoxy are in considerable contrast to
Madison's consistent reserve." Ketcham, supra note 111, at 192.
113 See Ketcham, supra note 111, at 177-180 (describing the influence of English
rationalism and Scottish Common Sense Realism on Madison's religious views); see
also MoRAis, supra note 60, at 115-16.
114 See Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Jan. 24, 1774), in 1
THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON, supranote 6, at 18, 21 ("Poverty and luxury prevail
among all sorts: pride, ignorance, and knavery among the priesthood, and vice and
wickedness among the laity."); Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr.
(Apr. 1, 1774), in 1 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON, supra note 6, at 22, 23 ("[T]he
clergy are a numerous and powerful body, have great influence at home by reason of
their connection with and dependence on the Bishops and Crown, and will naturally
employ all their art and interest to depress their rising adversaries; for such they must
consider dissenters who rob them of the good will of the people, and may, in time,
endanger their livings and security.").
115 See Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (Mar. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 6, at 425, 430-32.
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
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In a letter written to Edward Everett in 1823,116 Madison gives
three reasons that recur in his writings for his conviction that religion
fares better where it is exempt from civil cognizance. One of these
reasons is his familiar argument that experience shows that religion
thrives in greater purity where church and state are strictly separate. 1 7 The other two relate to Madison's theological assumptions
about how religious faith is formed and sustained."l 8 In the first
place, Madison argues that there are "causes in the human breast,
which ensure the perpetuity of religion." 119 At other times, Madison
also speaks of humanity's "propensities [and] susceptibilities" to religion, 12 0 and he associates these with an innate belief in God and future existence. 121 The idea that belief in God and a future existence
are self-evident propositions seen with intuitive force was drawn from
the "Common Sense" philosophy that Madison learned at Princeton
from President John Witherspoon. 12 2 Reacting to the skepticism of
David Hume, "Scottish Common Sense Realism" was a development
in Enlightenment thought in the latter half of the eighteenth century
which discovered at the foundation of all reasoning certain principles
of common sense which are implanted in our natures and whose truth
116

Letter fromJames Madison to Edward Everett (Mar. 19, 1823), in 9 TiH Wrrsupra note 6, at 124.
Id., in TiE WRrnNGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 6, at 127; see also Letter

INGS OFJAMES MADISON,

117

from James Madison to Reverend Adams, supranote 49, at 485-86; Letter fromJames
Madison to Edward Livingston, supra note 6, at 102; MADISON, supra note 1, at 301.

118 In his Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison gives several additional theological
arguments for why he believes that religion survives best where there is a strict separation between religion and government. For example, Madison argues that the "innate excellence" and "patronage of its Author" will preserve Christianity without
external support. MADISON, supra note 1, at 301. Madison also speaks about the
power of the "light of revelation." Id. at 303. These arguments reflect a more orthodox Christian perspective than generally appears in his later writings, and it is unclear
to what extent these arguments reflect Madison's own views or the fact that his Memorialand Remonstrancewas intended for a broad audience including evangelical Baptists
as well as rationalist Episcopalians. It is also possible that Madison's views may have
become more liberal over time. Cf Ketcham, supranote 111, at 178-79 (noting that
while Madison was fond of theological debate in his college years, it is apparent from
his writings that "Madison did not maintain his interest in theological controversy very
long after his period of entrance into public life in 1776"). In any event, Madison
does not emphasize these arguments in his other writings but instead focuses on the
arguments that are discussed in the above text.
119 Letter fromJames Madison to Edward Everett, supra note 116, at 126-27.
120 Letter from James Madison to Reverend Adams, supra note 49, at 485.
121 See id.; see also Letter fromJames Madison to Frederick Beasley (Nov. 20, 1825),
in 9 WRrTn Gs OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 6, at 229, 230-31.
122 See Ketcham, supra note 111, at 179.
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is irresistible. 123 In his Lectures on Moral Philosophy, Witherspoon told
his students that some Scottish thinkers were advancing the argument
that the belief in God was one of these universal "dictates of common
sense," 124 and Madison clearly adopted this position. From the English rationalists who more deeply affected Jefferson, Madison also derived his belief that the existence of God is provable by more abstract
1 25
reasoning as well.

Thus, for Madison, humans are by their nature religious beings,
and humanity's propensity to religion exists prior to organized religion. Establishments are not necessary to support religion because
religion will thrive even apart from the churches that they support.
However, unlike Jefferson, Madison does envision an important role
for religious communities in the discovery of religious truth. In his
letter to Everett, the third reason that Madison gives for his belief that
religion thrives where it is strictly separate from government is that a
multiplicity of rival sects with equal rights will "exercise mutual censorships in favor of good morals." 126 Thus, for Madison, competition

among the sects is instrumental in promoting truth by sustaining a
12 7
marketplace of religious ideas that exposes error and refines truth.
Early in life, Madison expressed his belief that uniformity in religion

123 The founder and central thinker of the Common Sense philosophy was the
Scottish minister and academic Thomas Reid. For a discussion of Reid's philosophy,

see R.F. Stalley, Common Sense and Enlightenment: The Philosophy of Thomas Reid, in PHIENLIGHTENMENT 74 (Peter Gilmore ed., 1990). For a discussion of
Scottish Common Sense Realism and its impact in America, see MAY, supranote 63, at
LOSOPHERS OF THE

342-57.
124 JOHN WITHERSPOON, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS
OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 152, 173 (Thomas Miller ed., 1990).
125 See Ketcham, supra note 111, for a discussion of the influence of the rationalism of 18th century Anglican theology and Scottish Common Sense thought on
Madison's religious views. Ketcham notes that in a letter to Frederick Beasley written
in 1825, Madison approved of the "celebrated work" of the English divine Samuel
Clarke, who sought to prove the central truths of Christianity by deducing them from
universally valid premises. See Letter from James Madison to Frederick Beasley, supra
note 121, at 230. For discussions of Clarke's thought, see MAY, supra note 63, at
11-12, and CASSIRER, supra note 62, at 177-78. Madison's letter to Beasley also bears
the stamp of Scottish Common Sense philosophy, which Madison prefers as the surest
proof for the existence of God. See Letter from James Madison to Frederick Beasley,
supra note 121, at 230-31.
126 Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett, supra note 116, at 127.
127 Madison makes a similar point in his letter to Reverend Adams. See Letter
from James Madison to Reverend Adams, supra note 49, at 487 (stating that if any sect
runs into "extravagances," "[r]eason will gradually gain its ascendancey").
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dulls the mind and begets ignorance, 128 and he argued that knowledge in religion and other fields depends upon an environment of
free inquiry sustained by "mutual emulation and mutual inspection."' 29 For Madison, churches are part of the process of free inquiry
that the Enlightenment championed not antagonistic to it.
However, the type of religious communities that Madison believed would be instrumental in the promotion of truth differ from
the type of community envisioned by the supporters of the establishment. In the general assessment bill which occasioned Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, state support for teachers of the Christian
religion was defended as necessary for the "instruct[ion] [of] such citizens, as from their circumstances and want of education, cannot
otherwise attain such knowledge."' 30 Madison rejected this model of
the church as a formative institution which must shape and mold the
faith of a recipient laity. For Madison, it is not instruction which produces faith but, rather, faith that seeks instruction. Arguing against
state-supported chaplains for the army and navy, Madison writes that
where "the spirit of armies be devout," 3 1 religious instruction will be
supported from voluntary sources, and where that spirit is lacking,
"the official services of their Teachers are not likely to produce it. It is
more likely to flow from the labours of a spontaneous zeal."' 3 2 Thus,

churches do not so much form faith as they are formed by faith, and
one of their critical roles is to purvey rival spiritual products to individuals who are naturally predisposed to religion and free to choose what
seems the most reasonable to them. Consistent with these views,
Madison shares with Jefferson the Lockean view that churches are voluntary associations of like-minded individuals. In Madison's words,
"[r]eligion consist[s] in voluntary acts of individuals, singly, or voluns3
tarily associated.'
The views of Madison's teacher, John Witherspoon, regarding the
role that religious communities play in fostering faith provide an illustrative contrast to those of Madison. While Witherspoon instructed
his students that some Scottish philosophers had advanced the argu128 See Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Jan. 24, 1774), supra
note 114, at 19; Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Apr. 1, 1774),
supra note 114, at 24.
129 Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Apr. 1, 1774), supra note
114, at 23-24.
130 Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (1784), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 72 (1947) (supplemental appendix).
131 Madison, Detached Memoranda, supra note 6, at 559.
132 Id.
133

Id
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ment that belief in God is a self-evident dictate of common sense,13 4
Witherspoon himself questioned this view and expressed sympathy
with those who argued that humans are incapable on their own of
conceiving the idea of a spirit or future state and, thus, that these
ideas must first have been communicated by God and "handed down
by information and instruction from age to age." 13 5 Witherspoon
finds "something ingenious and a good deal of probability in this way
13 7
of reasoning." 13 6 Reflecting this view, Witherspoon lists "tradition"
as one of the supports for belief in God whereas such a reference is
noticeably absent from the writings of his pupil. Witherspoon's view
that religious communities have an important function in inculcating
and forming faith also leads to a critical disagreement with Madison
on the role of the state in supporting religion. Like the sponsors of
Virginia's general assessment bill, Witherspoon argues that there "is a
good deal of reason" for such even-handed support for religious education "so instruction may be provided for the bulk of common people, who would many of them neither support nor employ teachers
unless they were obliged."' 38 Witherspoon views the magistrate's role
as "something like that of a parent" with "a right to instruct, but not to
constrain."1 3 9 Conceiving of the magistrate or clergy in the role of a
parent is wholly alien to the thought of Madison. Madison's commitment to free inquiry and his faith in the capacity of individuals to
sustain this process of inquiry through the healthy competition
among churches has no place for Witherspoon's skepticism regarding
the religious capacities of the common man and the corresponding
role of the church as guardian. 140 For Madison, humans will naturally
form religious communities, and he is not surprised to see them in4
crease when the government withdraws its supporting hand.' '
134 See supra text accompanying note 124.
135 WITHERSPOON, supra note 124, at 173.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 167.
138 Id. at 213.
139 Id.
140 Madison clearly had a strong awareness of the weaknesses of human nature,
and his account of the origins of faction in The Federalistwas one of the most influential contributions to American constitutionalism. However, when it comes to religion,
Madison is confident that humanity's propensity to faith is sufficient to support religion without the hand of government (though the "zeal for different opinions concerning religion," THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), is a chief cause of
faction). For Madison's discussion of faction and other weaknesses of human nature,
see THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 49, 51 (James Madison).

141

See Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh, supra note 115, at 425,

430-32; Letter from James Madison to Reverend Adams, supra note 49, at 485-86.
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The Power of God

In many respects, the evangelical views of the Baptist separationists are in dramatic contrast to the rationalism of Jefferson and the
liberalism of Madison. When John Leland spoke of himself as a "feeble, sinful worm" 142 and of the inability of "natural man" to come to a
knowledge of religious truth, 143 he expressed the Baptist conviction
that humans are born with corrupt and sinful natures that are separated from God.'4 Humans cannot ascend to God on their own
through reason nor do they have a natural propensity towards religion.14 5 However, the Baptists shared Jefferson's belief that religious
truth is discovered as the result of a direct encounter between God
and the individual. For the Baptist, however, it is not the individual
who ascends to God through reason, but God who reaches down directly to the sinner through grace and a powerful and intensely personal conversion experience.
Both Backus and Leland were part of the "Separate-Baptist"
movement that grew out of the Great Awakening in New England in
the mid-eighteenth century. 146 From its inception, Puritan theology
had taught that the church was properly understood as a society of
visible saints called out of the world by the special power of God's
converting grace. 147 However, by the 1730s when the Awakening
broke out, many ministers of New England's standing order had modified the older New England theology to reflect the fact that fewer and
fewer New Englanders were experiencing the conversions of their parents and grandparents, and many communities had only a small body
of professing Christians qualifying as visible saints. 14 Gradually the
church came to be understood as a means of grace rather than as a
142 John Leland, Letter of Valediction on Leaving Virginia (1791), in
supra note 4, at 171, 173.
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143 Leland, supra note 55, at 356.
144 Isaac Backus expressed similar views about the corrupt state of human nature.
See BACKUS, supra note 4, at 311; ISAAC BACKUS, TiE SOVERIGN DECREES OF GOD
(1773), reprintedin BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 4, at 289, 297;
see also McLoughlin, supra note 44, at 39 ("Backus did not here or elsewhere accept
the Enlightenment view that men were inherently good or rational. He always remained a Calvinist, and his own experience as a dissenter from majority rule confirmed Calvin's teachings about the innate depravity of man.").
145 See, e.g, ISAAC BACKUS, TRUTH Is GREAT AND WnIL PREVAIL (1781), reprintedin
BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 4, at 397, 403 (stating that
"[u]nassisted reason" cannot come to a knowledge of the truth).
146 See GOEN, supra note 41, and MCLoUGHLIN, supra note 42, for good discussions of the emergence of the Separate-Baptists.
147 See AHLsrROM, supra note 43, at 145-46; GEN, supra note 41, at 1-4.
148 See GOEN, supra note 41, at 3-5, 40-41.
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communion of visible saints, and the Lord's Supper, formerly available only to those who could attest to a conversion experience, was
now made available as a converting ordinance to the whole community. 14 9 In this context, a new emphasis was placed upon the role of
the community in forming and shaping faith. By nurture and education, the church was understood to prepare individuals for salvation,
which was now viewed as an organic process of growth rather than a
15
dramatic conversion experience.

0

The Great Awakening marked a resurgence of experiential piety
and the pure church model. The famous itinerant preachers who
sparked the revivalistic fervor across New England reemphasized the
necessity of an inner conversion experience for salvation and church
membership and the character of this experience as a work of God,
not man. 151 Initially, many ministers welcomed the Awakening and
the revival of a vital piety in the churches. 15 2 However, divisions soon
arose even among those who supported the revivals as the more extreme "New Lights" were unwilling to remain in churches where "unconverted" ministers failed to make regeneration a condition of
church membership and the more conservative "New Lights" chose to
remain within the established churches and work for renewal from
within. 153 In the 1740s, many of the extreme New Lights left the established churches to form their own "Separate" congregations, and
soon thereafter a steady stream of "Separate-Baptists" left the Separate
churches over the issue of infant Baptism. 154 The Baptists took the
pure church model to its logical extreme and argued that, like the

149 See id. at 4-5. Thus, "the 'pure churches' of 'visible saints' became national
churches with birthright membership." McLoughlin, Introductionto IsAAc BACKUS, A
SHORT DEScRiPTION

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BONDWOMAN

AND THE FREE

(1756), reprinted in BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINIsM, supranote 4, at 130, 131;
see also McLoUGHLIN, supra note 42, at 76.
150 See GOEN, supra note 41, at 5-6, 40-41; McLOUGHLIN, supra note 42, at 63.
Thus, on the eve of the Great Awakening, "one went to heaven in New England by a
diligent employment of the ordinary means of grace offered through the regular ministrations of the churches." COEN, supra note 41, at 40.
151

See AHLSTROM, supra note 43, at 283-87.

152 See id. at 286.
153 See id. at 290; GOEN, supra note 41, at 34-35; McLOUGHLIN, supra note 42, at
18-22. The New Lights also divided over the practice of lay preaching and exhorting
and some of the more extreme emotional manifestations of revivalism with the more
conservative New Lights opposing the practice of lay preaching as well as what they
saw as the Awakening's emotional extravagances. See GOEN, supra note 41, at 34-35.
154 See AHLSTROM, supra note 43, at 292; GOEN, supra note 41, at 206-07.
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Lord's Supper, Baptism is an outward mark of conversion and not a
1 55
means of grace for the unregenerate.
Isaac Backus was among the first generation of Separate-Baptists,
and as a prolific writer, he played a central role in defending the new
movement against the attacks of the standing order. 156 Among the
practices Backus defended was the Baptist commitment to a strict congregational church structure which lodged the choice of ministers in
the hands of the congregation without the educational requirements
or county oversight characteristic of the standing churches.' 5 7 Backus
also took the lead in defending Baptist opposition to compulsory religious taxation and state-supported religion.' 58 The standing order
viewed the Separate-Baptists as trouble-makers whose secession from
the standing churches threatened the survival of religion by undermining the ecclesiastic and social structure of the New England commonwealths.' 5 9 According to the established clergy, without a learned
clergy, the people cannot "know whether [they] have the pure divine
truths or not,' 60 and without the support of the law, "farewell meet61
inghouses, farewell ministers, and farewell all religion."'
Backus's responses to these concerns drew upon the evangelical
theology of the Awakening and its experiential understanding of religious faith. Like other revivalists, Backus emphasized that salvation is
the direct work of God, not man, 162 and he argued that God can be
counted on to produce conversions without the assistance of the formalistic system of training, preparation, and covenant-owning that
had come to characterize the New England churches. 6 3 Like other
Separate-Baptists, he rejected the view that salvation is a process of
See AHLsTROM, supra note 43, at 292; McLoUGHnN, supra note 42, at 75-76.
See AHLsTRoM, supra note 43, at 292-93; GOEN, supra note 41, at 222-24; McLOUGHLIN, supra note 42, at 167.
157 Backus's first published work addressed this issue. See ISAAC BACKUS, A Dis155
156

COURSE SHOWING THE NATURE AND NECESSITY OF AN INTERNAL CALL TO PREACH THE
GoSPEL (1754), reprinted in BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM,

EVERLASTING

supra note 4, at 65-128.
158 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
159 See McLoughlin, supra note 44, at 4-5.
160 See ISAAC BACKUS, A FISH CAUGHT IN His OWN NET (1768), reprintedin BACKUS,
CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 4, at 167, 230 (quoting Reverend Joseph
Fish, the standing minister in Stonington, Connecticut).
161 See 1 McLouGHLIN, supranote 41, at 619 (quoting a letter by Reverend Samuel
West in the Independent Ledger (Apr. 17, 1780)).
162 See BACKUS, supra note 157, at 76-77, 95.
163 See, e.g., BAcGUS, supra note 160, at 265; see also GOEN, supra note 41, at 42;
McLoUGHLN, supra note 42, at 152-53; McLoughlin, supra note 44, at 35; Gaustad,
supra note 56, at 110.
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organic growth mediated by the institutionalized churches, 6 4 and he
viewed salvation as the miraculous effect of a direct personal call of
God to the individual. 165 For Backus as well as other Separate-Baptists, all that is needed is the Word, a preacher, and the Spirit of
God,166 and the best preaching is that which lays bare the sinfulness of
humanity and the need for divine intervention rather than teaches a
167
process of human preparation.
To the charge that a learned ministry was necessary to preserve
true religion, Backus argued that Scripture is the sole standard of
truth in religious matters, 68 and that in the conversion process, the
Spirit of God not only converts the heart but enlightens the mind to
164 See BACKUS, supranote 160, at 265 (stating that people do not become "Christ's
sheep" by "natural growth" but rather by being "born again"). Not all revivalists completely rejected a role for the church in preparing the sinner for salvation. New Light
ministers who stayed within the established order continued to envision an important
role for the churches as means of grace even though they would limit actual membership to those who had experienced conversion. For example,Jonathan Edwards, who
was the chief apologist for the Awakening's experiential piety, see AHLSTROM, supra
note 43, at 301, approved of such a role for the congregational parishes and supported state laws regarding church attendance, seeJOHNATHAN EDWARDS, AN HUMBLE
INQUIRY INTO THE RULES OF THE WORD OF GOD, CONCERNING THE QUALIFICATIONS REQ-

FULL COMMUNION IN THE VISIBLE CHRISTIAN
83 (Boston, S. Kneeland 1749) [hereinafter EDWARDS, HUMBLE INQUIRY]. Edwards also approved of the requirement of an educated ministry, seeJoHNATHAN EDUISITE TO A COMPLEAT STANDING AND
CHURCH

WARDS, THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE PRESENT REVIVAL OF RELIGION IN NEw-ENGLAND

264-66 (Boston, S. Kneeland & T. Green 1742) [hereinafter EDWARDS, REVIVAL OF
RELIGION IN NEW-ENGLAND], and condemned the "excesses" of the Awakening, such as
lay preaching and exhorting and separations from the standing order, see EDWARDS,
HUMBLE INQUIRY, supra, at v. It was, perhaps, the Separate-Baptists' special sensitivity
to the corruptions of the standing order and their decision to come out from these
churches that led them to minimize their role in the process of salvation.
165 See McLoughlin, supra note 44, at 35.
166 See McLOUGHLIN, supra note 42, at 154.
167 See BACKUS, supra note 157, at 92. Backus writes,
And the preparatory work before conversion is quite another thing than
many conceive it to be.... The preparatory work that is wrought in the soul
before conversion is no more of an excellency in the creature, or fitness for
grace and mercy than a man's being brought to see and feel himself full of
sores and dreadful diseases is any qualification in him to be healed.
Id. God calls His evangelists directly, see id. at 78, 80, and works through itinerants
and lay exhorters as well as settled ministers, see BACKUS, supranote 160, at 287 (approving of mutual lay exhortation); BACKUS, supranote 145, at 424 (noting the critical
role of itinerant preachers in the Great Awakening); see also GOEN, supra note 41, at
28-29; McLouGHLIN, supra note 42, at 17-18, 28-29.

168 See BACKUS, supra note 157, at 72, 76; BACKUS, Supra note 144, at 295;
supra note 145, at 423.

BACKUS,
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understand His Word correctly. 169 Human wisdom and learning are
not only unnecessary in this process, 7 0° but are a dangerous source of
error when they place the traditions of men over the truths of Scripture. 171 The convert can and should 'judge for himself '17 2 in religious matters, rather than follow his minister in an "implicit or
customary way." 173
Thus, Backus shares with Jefferson an individualistic understanding of religion, and like Jefferson, he repeatedly states that religion is
"ever a matter between God and individuals."'174 In the conversion
experience that is the center of evangelical piety,
all saints know that when they received Christ they had no creature
to see for them, but each soul acted as singly towards God as if there
had not been another person in the world.... Now if each saint is
complete in him which is the Head of all wisdom and power then they
have no need of philosophers to see for them, nor of princes to give
them power to act for God ....175

The religious community assumes a secondary role in Backus's
theology. Because God's direct call to the sinner precedes church
membership, the church is secondary both in time and significance. 176 Rather than the vehicle for salvation, the church becomes a
"temporary way station for saved souls.'

77

Like Jefferson, Backus ex-

pressly draws upon Locke's understanding of the church as a "free
169 See BACKUS, supra note 157, at 76-77, 103; BACKUS, supra note 160, at 230.
Jonathan Edwards, who was the chief apologist for the experimental piety of the Great
Awakening, see AHISTROM, supra note 43, at 301, laid out a normative pattern for
religious experience that was shared by Backus and others in the revival tradition, see
GoEN, supranote 41, at 13-15. Edwards describes conversion as the direct action of
the Holy Spirit which sheds a new "spiritual light" on the mind and heart of the
sinner so that the sinner gains a "due apprehension" of the teachings of Scripture and
a conviction of their truth in his "heart." JONATHAN EDWARDS, A DIvINE AND SPIRITuAL
LIGHT (1734), reprintedinJoNATHAN EDwARDS: BASIC WRITINGS 123, 126-32 (Elizabeth
Winslow ed., 1966).
170 See BACKUs, supra note 157, at 86, 102-03, 119.
171 See id. at 73, 105, 108, 110; BACKUS, supra note 160, at 280.
172 BACKUS, supra note 4, at 335.
173 BACKUS, supra note 160, at 225.
174 BACKus, CHRusAN LmEa T, supra note 56, at 432; see also ISAAC BACKUS, THE
INFINITE IMPORTANCE OF THE OBEDIENCE OF FAITH 31 (Boston, Samuel Hall 2d ed.
1791); BACKUS, supranote 145, at 422.
175 BACxuS, supra note 160, at 273.
176 See Gaustad, supra note 56, at 113; GoEN, supra note 41, at 289; McLoughlin,
supra note 44, at 35.
177 McLoughlin, supra note 44, at 35; see also Gaustad, supra note 56, at 114.
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and voluntary society,"' 178 and he speaks of saints forming churches
rather than churches forming saints: Christians "use[] their Christian
liberty [to] join[] together to worship God according to their own
understanding of divine rule."1 7 9 Because each saint is complete in
Christ and has the capacity to understand the Scripture on his or her
own, the relationship among church members is egalitarian. Church
members have the right to choose their own ministers,1 8 0 who should
not domineer over their congregations but treat all members as "brethren in Christ, not as slaves or minors." 18 ' Within the churches, mem83
bers are "built up togethe?'18 2 through "mutual watch.'
John Leland belongs to the second generation of Separate-Baptists in New England, 18 4 and like many Separate-Baptists before him,
he played a significant role in spreading Baptist revivalism within the
southern states before returning to his native New England in 1791.185
Leland shared with Backus the belief that the Bible is the standard for
178 BACKUS, supra note 47, at 376 (quoting LOCKE, A LETrER CONCERNING
TOLERATION, supra note 69, at 20).
179

BACKUS, supra note 160, at 249 (emphasis omitted); see also BACKUS, CHRISTIAN
supra note 56, at 432, 437 (arguing that consent is the basis for religious
societies).
LIBERTY,

180
181

See BACKUS, supra note 160, at 273.
Id. at 217 (quoting 2 THOMAS PRINCE, A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF NEw-ENGLAND: THE NEW-ENGLAND CHRONOLOGY 92 (Boston, Kneeland & Green 1736)).
182 Id. at 273.
183 Id. at 248 (quotingJOHN OWEN, A GUIDE TO CHURCH FELLOWSHIP AND ORDER
76 (London, William Marshall 1692)). Backus also emphasizes that Christ is the sole
head and lawgiver of His church and that He calls His ministers directly. See BACKUS,
supra note 4, at 313; BACKUS, supra note 45, at 352; ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE
PEOPLE (1780), reprinted in BACKUS, CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM, supra note 4, at
385, 390, 392. All hierarchies, schemes for licensing ministers, and state support and
interference put man in God's place and human traditions between God and His
church. See BACKUS, supra note 4, at 317, 333-34, (discussing tax support and state
interference); BACKUS, supra note 157, at 109-13 (discussing licensing schemes);
BACKUS, supra note 160, at 184, 274-75 (regarding church hierarchies).
184 Leland experienced his conversion in 1774, see L.H. Butterfield, ElderJohn Leland, Jeffersonian Itinerant, 62 PROC. AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC'Y 155, 156 (1952), 33 years
after Backus, see McLoughlin, supra note 44, at 2 (stating that Backus experienced his
conversion in 1741).
185 SeeJohn Leland, Events in the Life ofJohn Leland, in LELAND WRITINGS, supra
note 4, at 9, 19-29. On the role of the Separate-Baptists in bringing revivalism to the
South, see AHLSTROM, supra note 43, at 319-24. By the end of the 18th century,
union between Separate-Baptists and other Baptist groups in New England and the
South had buried the name of "Separate-Baptist." See id. at 321; GOEN, supra note 41,
at 282. However, the Separate-Baptists left a lasting stamp on the character of Baptist
thought and piety. See AHLsTROM, supranote 43, at 321; GOEN, supra note 41, at 282.
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truth in religious matters 86 and that it is the Spirit of God through
conversion that enlightens the mind to understand revelation correctly. 18 7 Leland also rejects human traditions which depart from the
Biblical standard' 88 and emphasizes the ability of the common man to
think for himself.18 9 Like Backus, Leland describes salvation as the
work of God,1 90 and he also conceives of conversion as an intensely
personal experience in which God acts directly on the heart and mind
of the sinner. 19 1 To the claim of the established clergy that religion
will not survive without state support, Leland answers that God can be
trusted to preserve His church, 192 and he points to the "marvellous
93
work of God" in states without establishments.1
Similarly, churches take on a secondary role in Leland's theology
as they do for Backus. Religion is a "matter entirely between God and
individuals,"' 94 and churches are voluntary associations of the saved,
not formative institutions for sinners. 195 Leland describes a "church
186

See L.F. Greene, Further Sketches of the Life ofJohn Leland, in LELAND WRITsupra note 4, at 41, 51; LELAND, supra note 58, at 270.
187 In his last sermon, Leland preached that "[t]rue Christians are anointed ones;
anointed with gifts and spiritual endowments by the Spirit of Grace which comes from
the Holy One, enlightening and strengthening the eyes of the understanding, and
enabling those who receive it, to 'know all things' concerning Christ and his religion."
Greene, supra note 186, at 47 (quoting from Leland's last sermon).
188 SeeJoHN LELAND, THE BIBLE BAPTIST (c. 1790), reprinted in LELAND WRrTIGs,
supra note 4, at 78, 87; LELAND, supra note 58, at 270.
189 See Leland, supra note 142, at 172; John Leland, A Memorial, in LELAN WRTINGS, supra note 4, at 659, 661; see also JOHN LELAND, TiHE HISTORY OF JACK Nips, reprintedin LELAND WrruINcs, supranote 4, at 73, 76-77. According to Leland, one of
the great defects of establishments is that they "tend[I] to keep people in ignorance.
By implicitly believing what the ruler and the priest says, they give up their own judgments, and suppose it is a crime to think and speak for themselves." LELAND, supra
note 46, at 252.
190 Leland repeatedly speaks of conversions as the "work" of God. See, e.g., Leland,
supra note 185, at 11, 19, 25, 26-27, 30, 31; LELAND, supra note 4, at 112-14; John
Leland, Sermon Preached at Ankram, Dutchess County, N.Y., at the Ordination of
Rev. Luman Birch (June 17, 1806), in LELAND WRrTn=Gs, supra note 4, at 301, 305.
191 SeeJoHN LELAND, A BUDGET OF SCRAPS (1810), reprinted in LELAND WRITINGS,
supra note 4, at 330, 342; Greene, supra note 186, at 47.
192 See Leland, supra note 55, at 358; JoHN LELAND, Ti GovENsiMNT OF CHRIST A
CRISTOCRAcr (1804), reprinted in LELAND WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 273, 279.
INGS,

193

LELAND, supra note 58, at 264.

194 LELAND, supra note 4, at 108; see also LELAND, supra note 46, at 249; LELAND,
supra note 49, at 181; Leland, supra note 55, at 353.
195 See Gaustad, supranote 56, at 113-14. Leland wants to "explode ]" the idea of
a "national church," LELAND, supranote 4, at 107, or "Christian commonwealth," id,
that takes in the entire populace and to replace it with an understanding of the
church as comprising only those who have experienced conversion, see LELAND, supra
note 192, at 275.
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of Christ" as "a congregation of faithful persons, called out of the
world by divine grace, who mutually agree to live together, and execute gospel discipline among them; which government, is not na96
tional, parochial, or presbyterial, but congregational." 1
Relationships among church members are, therefore, not only volun19 7
tary but egalitarian.
The primary difference between Leland and Backus is that Leland takes the principles at the foundation of Baptist theology even
further than Backus. Leland is far more willing to cast aside the past
98
practices of the New England churches as unbiblical tradition.
While Backus is deeply versed in the Calvinist theology of New England's Puritan heritage and continues to engage in detailed theological disputations with clergymen in the standing order, 19 9 Leland
rejects "creeds" and "systems" as formalisms which stand between the
soul and Scripture. 20 0 Leland goes even further than Backus in championing the capacities of the common man, 20 ' emphasizing the ability
of the convert to know truth in religious matters without learning or
education, 20 2 and condemning ministers who enter the ministry for
"filthy lucre's sake."120 3 When it comes to churches, Leland even goes so
LELAND, supra note 4, at 108.
197 Leland also shares with Backus the belief that God governs His church directly
as its only head and lawgiver and that hierarchical structures and state support interfere with divine governance. See id.; LELAND, supra note 192, at 278.
198 For example, Leland becomes embroiled in controversy when he refuses to
celebrate the Lord's Supper at his church in Cheshire, Massachusetts. See Greene,
supra note 186, at 59-64.
199 See NATHAN 0. HATcH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRsnTIANrYY 99
(1989); 2 McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 929.
200 See, e.g., LELAND, supra note 4, at 114 n.* ("[W]hat need of a confession of
faith? Why this Virgin Mary between the souls of men and the scriptures?"); JOHN
196

LELAND, MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS, IN PROSE AND VERSE (after 1810), reprinted in LELAND

WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 406, 423 ("The Bible is not written in systematical
form ....").
201 The references to the ability and requirement that the common man think for
himself are numerous in Leland's writings. See, e.g., L LAND, supra note 46, at 252;
LELAND, supranote 189, at 76-77; Leland, supra note 142, at 172; Leland, supra note
189, at 661. A famous line from Leland's The History ofjack Nips expresses his conviction on this matter well: "Jack Nips for himself" LELAND, supra note 189, at 77.
202 While Backus served on the Board of Trustees of the newly organized Baptist
College in Rhode Island, see McLoUGHLIN, supranote 42, at 215, Leland voiced opposition to the creation of theological seminaries, see 2 McLoUGHLIN, supranote 41, at
932;John Leland, Which Has Done the Most Mischief in the World, The Kings-Evil or
Priest-Craft?, in LELAND WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 484, 494.

203 John Leland, The Modern Priest, in LELAND WRITINGS, supra note 4, at 193,
195. Leland, like Jefferson, expressed a significant degree of anti-clericalism. He repeatedly condemns ministers of the established churches who "rush[ ] into the sacred
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far as to say that joining a church is an optional matter for the
204

convert.
Scholars have noted the continuity between Leland's thought
and that of other populist evangelical leaders in the early nineteenth
century who shared a strong individualism and strident anti-clericalism and anti-institutionalism. 20 5 As these populist leaders championed the ability of the common man to shape his own faith, they
"mounted a frontal assault upon tradition, mediating elites, and institutions. '20 6 Other scholars have also noted a rationalist strain in Leland's writings that is not present in Backus's thought and bears more
resemblance to the ideas of Thomas Jefferson.20 7 For example, Leland frequently states that truth is found through "cool investigation
and fair argument,"208 "fair reasoning," 209 and an "honest appeal to
the reasons and judgments of men."210 LikeJefferson, Leland argues

that conscience must be set free from "Priest-Craft" 2 11 and formalistic
creeds 212 which frustrate the pursuit of truth by "confin[ing] the mind
into a particular way of reasoning" 2 13 and establish truths "beyond the
reach of investigation." 214 However, Leland just as often states that
"natural men" cannot know religious truth without the converting
power of God's spirit, 215 and that conscience is by nature weak and "so
defiled by sin" that it can only judge aright if kept in "strict subordinawork for the sake of ease, wealth, honor and ecclesiastical dignity." Leland, supra
note 202, at 484; see also LELAND, supranote 49, at 186; L.Am, supranote 58, at 269.
Backus also makes this accusation against many members of the established clergy in
New England, see, e.g., BACKUS, supra note 157, at 94-95, 119-20, 121; BACKUS, supra
note 160, at 256, but he does so with less frequency and force.
204 See Greene, supra note 186, at 70-71; see also Gaustad, supra note 56, at 113.
205 See HATCH, supra note 199, at 93-101.
206 Id. at 182.
207 See Gaustad, supranote 56, at 110; Butterfield, supra note 184, at 159; see also 2
MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 931 (mentioning that some scholars call Leland a
"rationalist" and disputing that characterization).
208 LELAND, supra note 49, at 185; see also LELAND, supra note 46, at 254 (asserting
that support of religion should be left to "argument and free debate").
209 John Leland, Catechism, in LELAND WRrrNGS, supra note 4, at 450, 451; LELAND, SABBATICAL LAws, supra note 56, at 444.
210 JOHN LELAND, SABBATICAL LAws, supra note 56, at 443; see also Leland, supra
note 202, at 485. Leland also argued that the first Christians "asked for nothing but a
dispassionate hearing and a correspondent belief, on rational evidence." Id. at 490.
211 Leland, supra note 202, at 484.
212 See LELAND, supra note 4, at 91, 114 n.*; see alsoJoHN LELAND, OATHS (1830),
reprinted in LELAND WarrrNGs, supra note 4, at 597, 597.
213 LELAND, supra note 4, at 114 n.*.
214 Leland, supra note 202, at 484.
215 See Leland, supra note 55, at 357; Leland, supra note 202, at 492.
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tion" to the Gospel.21 6 Thus, for Leland reason and free inquiry must
always take place in a Biblical world and can only lead to truth where
the mind is enlightened by the Spirit of God. Qualified in this way,
however, Leland does place a new emphasis on reason and free inquiry that is not present in Backus's works, but this emphasis serves
only to further the individualism already present in earlier Baptist
thought.
Thus, while there are certainly differences between Backus and
Leland, what they share is, perhaps, the more important, at least when
it comes to explaining why they were certain that true religion would
thrive best where government and religion are kept separate. For
both, religious truth is discovered as the result of a direct encounter
between God and the individual rather than by and through the
churches. The danger of established churches is that by taking on a
mediating role between God and the individual, they do more to frustrate the work of God than to promote it. While Jefferson was sure
that with the advent of religious liberty and the separation of church
and state, most Americans would become Unitarians, the Baptists
were just as confident that freeing the human mind and soul from the
weight of religious authority would open the path for the work of God
2 17
and result in the triumph of Baptist revivalism.
C. Other Voices
While the Court has tended to focus on leading supporters of
strict separationism in the founding era, these were not the only
voices in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century America.
Most Americans in the founding era probably held a "centrist" 21 8 position that favored limited government support for religion.2 1 9 The
type of "mild"220 establishment that they envisioned typically included
laws protecting Sabbath observance; the proclamation of days of
thanksgiving, prayer and fasting, and other public acknowledgments
of the country's dependence on God; legislative and military chap216
217

LELAND, supra note 4, at 123.
See LELAND, supra note 49, at 192; BACKuS, supra note 145, at 425; see also McLOUGHLIN, supra note 42, at 186, 224, 229; McLoughlin, supra note 44, at 63.
218 This is the term that Arlin M. Adams and Charles J. Emmerich use for the
proponents of limited government support for religion. See ADAMS & EMMERICH,

supranote 28, at 26.
219 See id.
220 John Adams uses the term "mild and equitable" to describe the New England
establishments in the late 18th century. John Adams, Diary (Oct. 14, 1774), in 2 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 399 (Charles F. Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1850-56).
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lains; laws punishing blasphemy; and support for religious education. 22 1 Scholars have pointed out that the strict disestablishment
position implemented in Virginia was an anomaly in the late eighteenth century, 22 2 and that most state practices, in fact, included numerous forms of cooperation between church and state. 223
The reasons for the division between strict separationists and
those who supported mild establishments cannot be explained with
simple labels. Supporters of the establishments included those who
were deeply influenced by Enlightenment thought,2 24 as well as New
Light ministers2 25 who kept the evangelical piety of the Great Awakening alive in the established churches of New England.2 26 However,
the most significant reasons for their split were, nevertheless, theological. Most of those who supported mild establishments opposed the
221 SeeJoHN WRIT, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ExPERIMENT:
ESSENTIAL RiGHTS AND LIBERTIES 34-36 (forthcoming 1999); ANTIEAu, supra note 31,
at 62-63; ADAMS & EMMERICH, supra note 28, at 26-28. A letter by "David" in the
Massachusetts Gazette in March of 1788 expresses this position well:
The practice of our own country has been uniformly in favour of a limited
power of this kind in the government. We have from the beginning had laws
in favour of a learned and able clergy, and have provided means for their
education and support. We have had and still have laws for a due observance of the Sabbath; and our annual fasts and thanksgivings are not only
uniform proofs of the exercise of such a power; but are instances of the
propriety of our conduct in making frequent and publick acknowledgments
of our dependence upon the Diety.
Letter by David in the Massachusetts Gazette (Mar. 7, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 30, at 246, 247.
222 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
at 427 (1969).
223 See ANTIEAu, supra note 31, at 62-63.
224 See ROBERT T. HANDY, A CHRIsTAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORicAL REALITIES 18 (1971).
225 See NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE SACRED CAUSE OF LIBERTY: REPUBLICAN THOUGHT
AND THE MILLENNIUM IN REVOLUTIONARY NEW ENGLAND

7-9 (1977); 1

McLouGHLIN,

supra note 41, at 609. One of the most significant divisions between New Light ministers who stayed in the standing order and the revivalists who left the established
churches was over the principle of voluntarism. As discussed above in supranote 164,
New Light ministers in the established order generally envisioned a greater role for
the church in preparing the sinner for grace, and they did not reject state support of
their endeavors.
226 While New Light ministers, or New Divinity men, as they were also called, defended an evangelical form of piety in the established churches, it was not until the
Second Great Awakening began in the closing years of the 18th century that their
ministry was blessed with a resurgence of religious revivals. See AHLSrROM, supranote
43, at 415-16. The Baptists, by contrast, kept the flames of revival going continuously
after the first Great Awakening throughout the 18th century, both in New England
and the south. Id. at 375-76.
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"spiritual tyranny" they associated with state control over churches, 2 27
and they were also generally eager to protect the rights of conscience
for dissenters. 2 28 However, unlike strict separationists, they were not
willing to let religion shift for itself without any government support.
Behind their middle position lay profoundly different ideas about how
religious faith is formed and sustained and the role of the community
in this process. Those who supported mild establishments lacked Jefferson's faith in the power of reason to discover religious truth on its
own as well as Madison's optimistic belief that humans are naturally
religious. They also lacked the Baptists' faith that God would produce
conversions directly without the mediating role of the institutionalized church. Enlightened and evangelical alike shared a strong sensitivity to the weakness of human nature and believed that the nurture
and support of religious communities is essential to foster and sustain
229
or "multitudes."23 0
faith, particularly among the "common man"

One of the most ardent groups supporting a mild establishment
of religion was the New England clergy. The New Light, moderate
Calvinist, and liberal wings2 3 ' were united in their belief that religion
227 See HATCH, supra note 225, at 73, 155-56, 165-66.
228 For example, John Adams drafted the provision in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 which protected the rights of conscience, and he also supported the
section that provided tax support for churches. For a discussion of Adams's role in
the formation of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, see John Witte, Jr., "A Most
Mild and EquitableEstablishmentof Religion':John Adams and the MassachusettsExperiment,
41 J. CHURCH & ST. 213 (1999).
229

See, e.g., WrrHERSPOON, supra note 124, at 213 (favoring public provision for

the worship of God "so instruction may be provided for the bulk of common people,
who would many of them neither support nor employ teachers unless they were
obliged"); see also McLouGHLIN, supra note 44, at 294.
230 See, e.g., PHILLIPS PAYSON, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE HONORABLE COUNCIL, AND THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OF THE STATE OF MASSACHU-

MAY 27, 1778, reprinted in THE PULPIT OF THE
1776, at 323, 340 (John
W. Thornton ed., Burt Franklin 1970) (1860) ("Let the restraints of religion once be
broken down, as they infallibly would be by leaving the subject of public worship to
the humors of the multitude, and we might well defy all human wisdom and power to
support and preserve order and government in the state.").
231 The theological distinctions between the New Lights, moderate Calvinists, and
liberals are discussed in AHLSTROM, supranote 43, at 403-05, and MAY, supra note 63,
at 57-61. The moderate Calvinists or "Old Lights" were the heirs of the New England
theology and traditions as they had gradually adjusted to changing circumstances in
the late 17th and 18th centuries, and they opposed the revivalism of the Great Awakening which had challenged these developments. The New Lights, or New Divinity
SETTS-BAY, IN NEw-ENGLAND, AT BOSTON

AMERICAN REVOLUTION: PoLrriCAL SERMONS OF THE PERIOD OF

men or Neo-Edwardsians as they were also called, were the heirs of the Great Awaken-

ing in the established churches, and they based their doctrine on the thought of
Jonathan Edwards, who was the chief apologist for the Awakening's experiential piety.
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is essential to support republican government and that religion cannot survive without government support. 232 As they defended the
challenges of the Baptists, even the most enlightened revealed a
profound distrust of human nature and a belief that men were too
sinful to support religion on their own. 23 3 For example, Phillips Pay-

son, a liberal minister selected by the Massachusetts legislature to deliver the election sermon in 1778, defended the state's establishment
on the grounds that the "restraints of religion" which are essential to
preserve "order and government" would be "broken down... by leav34
ing the subject of public worship to the humors of the multitude." 2
Payson and the other supporters of the establishment were convinced
that religion could not exist without public worship, religious instruc23 5
tion, and the supporting structures of the institutional churches,
and they were certain that the common man would not attend to
The liberals or rationalist party dominant in Boston was heavily influenced by Enlightenment currents and made the greatest departures from the original Calvinism of the
Puritan churches. The liberals were often called "Arminians" because of their belief
in free will, and their assimilation of English rationalism gradually led them down the
path to Unitarianism and Universalism. It is important to note that the moderate
Calvinists were also influenced by Enlightenment thought, but not to the degree of
the liberal wing.
232 See HATCH, supranote 225. Hatch argues that New England clergymen shared
a common perspective on civil government, including the relationship between
church and state. See id. at 7-9, 19; see also 1 McLouGHLJN, supra note 41, at 609
(stating that "New Lights and Old Lights, Neo-Edwardsians and incipient Unitarians"
all supported the continued tax support for religion in Article Three of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780).
233 See 1 McLoUGHIIN, supra note 41, at 597, 619; McLoUGHLIN, supranote 42, at
63-64.
234 PAYSON, supra note 230, at 340. The religiously liberal Reverend Samuel West
made a similar argument in defense of the tax support for religion provided for in
Article 3 of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: "If there is no law to support
religion, farewell meetinghouses, farewell ministers, and farewell all religion." 1 McLOUGHLIN, supra note 41, at 619 (quoting Letter by Reverend Samuel West in the
Independent Ledger (Apr. 17, 1780)).
235 See MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 42, at 152-53; see also 1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note
41, at 593 (stating that New Englanders "had an inbred respect for the learned ministry and for the importance of religious training and worship which made them unwilling to risk their continued existence on the unenforceable goodwill of voluntarism").
For theological liberals like West and Payson, "the Christian worked out his salvation in society and not by some supernatural thunderbolt from heaven, some miracle
which could transform a drunken wastrel into a saint instantly." 1 McLouGHLiN,
supra note 41, at 623. Even New Light ministers in the standing order did not completely reject the role of institutional means and religious education in preparing the
sinner for conversion, and this was one of the points of disagreement between the
New Lights and the revivalists who left the standing order. See supra notes 164, 225.
The moderate Calvinists were the heirs to the New England theology of the first half
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these ministrations on his own. Supporters of Patrick Henry's general
assessment bill in Virginia had a similar belief in the essential role for
churches in forming faith and the unwillingness of the multitudes to
support churches without external compulsion. As discussed above,
the Virginia Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian
Religion stated that "the general diffusion of Christian knowledge . . . cannot be effected without a competent provision for
learned teachers, who may be thereby enabled to devote their time
and attention to the duty of instructing such citizens, as from their
circumstances and want of education, cannot otherwise attain such
knowledge." 23 6 Voicing his support for the general assessment in a
letter to James Madison in 1784, Richard Henry Lee argues that
[r]efiners may weave as fine a web of reason as they please, but the
experience of all times shews Religion to be the guardian of
morals-And he must be a very inattentive observer in our Country,
Who does not see that avarice is accomplishing the destruction of
religion, for want of a legal obligation to contribute something to its
23 7
support.

In these sentiments, Lee and Henry were joined by numerous AntiFederalists throughout the states who argued strenuously that the
opinions of the people need to be "form[ed] ... in favour of virtue
of the 18th century, which had emphasized the role of the churches in nurture and
training in preparation for grace. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
This belief that the religious community plays a critical role in shaping and sustaining faith is reflected in Article Three of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.
The Massachusetts Constitution continued tax support for parish ministers although
the elected ministers no longer needed to be members of the standing order and
dissenters could apply their taxes to support ministers of their own choosing. See
McLoUGHLIN, supra note 42, at 146-48, for a discussion of the old establishment and
the new system under Article 3. The preamble to Article 3 states that religion and
morality can only be "generally diffused through a community.., by the institution of
the public worship of God and of public instructions in piety, religion, and morality ."
MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. III, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONsTITUTIONS 92, 93 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975). Many leading statesmen in New England followed the clergy in believing that public support for religion
was necessary for forming and sustaining the faith of the people. For example, Rob-

ert Treat Paine was a strong supporter of Article 3, see 1 McLOUGHLIN, supranote 41,
at 604, and John Adams voted for the Article, see id at 602 n.21. While Adams authored most of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, see id. at 602, he did not author Article 3, see id. However, he did support this provision. See id. at 607.
236 Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, supranote
130.
237 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1784), in 2 THE
LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 304, 304 (James Curtis Ballagh ed., 1914).
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and religion" 238 and that in this process religion cannot be left "to
240
shift wholly for itself' 23 9 without "publick protection."

Benjamin Rush, a leading citizen of Philadelphia, celebrated physician and social and political theorist, is a particularly good example
of how religious views which emphasized the weakness of human nature and the role of the community in shaping faith led naturally to
the support of mild establishments in the founding era. As the comparison between Madison and his teacher Witherspoon has illustrated,
differences in theological outlook on these points can make a critical
difference for views on church and state even among public figures
who otherwise shared a great deal in their religious and political perspectives. Like Madison and Jefferson, Rush's religious views were influenced deeply by the Enlightenment. 241 In his letters and writings,
Rush favors a "spirit of inquiry" 2 42 in religion, and "an enlightened
and inquiring Christian[ity]."243 However, unlike Jefferson, Rush
does not believe that reason is sufficient to attain religious truth on its
own, 244 and unlike Madison, Rush emphasizes the importance of reli-

gious communities in forming faith. 24 5 In a letter to John Armstrong
written in 1783, Rush argues that "[r] eligion is necessary to correct
the effects of learning" and that religious education under the "pa238 Letter by David in the Massachusetts Gazette, supra note 221, at 247.
239 Id.at 248.
240 Id.On Anti-Federalist views regarding the relationship between church and
state, see HerbertJ. Storing, What the Anti-FederalistsWereFor,in THE COMPLETE ANTIsupra note 30, at 3, 22-23, 64.
See MoRALs, supra note 60, at 17.

FEDERALIST,

241

242 Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Adams (Apr. 5, 1808), in 2 LETrERs OF
BENJAMIN RUSH

962, 962 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1951).

243

BEINJAMIN RUSH, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN RUSH: HIS "TRAvELs
THROUGH LIE" TOGETHER WITH His COMMONPLACE BOOK FOR 1789-1813, at 340

(George W. Comer ed. 1948) [hereinafter RUSH, AUTOBIOGRAPHY]. In many respects,
Rush's religious views resemble those of Madison. While Rush favors a spirit of inquiry in religion, he remains a Christian, albeit a liberal one. Rush describes his religious views as a "compound of the orthodoxy and heterodoxy of most of our
Christian churches." Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Adams, supra note 242, at
963. He continued to believe in the necessity of Christ's atoning death for salvation,
see BENJAMIN RUSH, THE BIBLE AS A SCHOOL BOOK (1791) [hereinafter RUSH, BIBLE AS
A SCHOOL BOOK], reprinted in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 117, 125
(Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1947), but was also a universalist, see Letter from Benjamin

Rush toJohn Seward (Dec. 28, 1796), in 2

LETrERs OF BENJAMIN RUSH,

supranote 242,

at 783, 783.
244 See RUSH, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 243, at 334-35; RUSH, BIBLE As A SCHOOL

BOOK,supra note 243, at 127; Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Adams (Jan. 23,
1807), in 2 LETrERS OF BENJAMIN RUSH, supra note 242, at 936, 936.
245 See Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Armstrong (Mar. 19, 1783), in 1 LETTERS OF BENJAMIN RUSH, supra note 242, at 294, 294-95.
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tronage of particular [religious] societies" is "the surest way of produc2 46
ing a preference and constant attachment to a mode of worship."
According to Rush, "[t] he weaknesses of human nature require" such
2 47
education.
The influence of these religious views on Rush's conception of
the relationship between church and state can be seen in his proposals for free public education. Rush was a fervent supporter of free public schools as a means of promoting the knowledgeable and virtuous
populace required for free government. 248 Rush was also convinced
that Christianity was the best teacher of virtue, 249 and given his views
of how faith is formed, it is not surprising that he argued that "the
only foundation for a useful education in a republic is to be laid in
Religion." 250 Rush's proposals for free public schools in his own state
provide for religious instruction under the auspices of particular religious societies, 25 1 and he advocated the use of the Bible as a school
253
book in order to form a religious "habi '2 52 and "attach [ment]"
among the students. Rush expressly rejected Jefferson's view that religious study should be left to an age when reason is mature enough to
make ajudgment on its own, 25 4 as well as Jefferson's position that the

inculcation of religious dogmas in state-supported schools infringes
on religious liberty. 255 According to Rush, formation in a specific reli-

gious system is the best foundation for free inquiry in religious matters. 25 6 The government supports for religion that Rush envisioned

were very limited.2 57 However, they are significant when compared
with the strict separationist positions ofJefferson and Madison, as are
the theological differences which account for their disagreement.
246 Id., in 1 LETIERs OF BENJAMIN RUSH, supra note 242, at 294, 294-95.
247 Id., in 1 LETlERS OF BENJAMIN RUSH, supra note 242, at 294, 295.
248 See BENJAMIN RUSH, OF THE MODE OF EDUCATION PROPER IN A REPUBLIC (1798),
reprinted in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMN RUSH, supra note 243, at 87, 96.
249 See id. at 88-89.
250 See id. at 88.

251 I& at 88.
252 RUSH, BIBLE AS A SCHOOL BOOK, supra note 243, at 118.
253 Id.
254 See RUSH, supra note 248, at 89.
255 On Jefferson's views, see HEALEY, supra note 78, at 207. Jefferson was also a
fervent supporter of free public education. See id. at 179.
256 See RUSH, supra note 248, at 89.
257 Indeed, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1800, Rush writes that "I agree with
you likewise in your wishes to keep religion and government independent of each
Other.... Christianity disdains to receive Support from human Governments." Letter from Benjamin Rush to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 6, 1800), in 2 LErRs OF BENJAMIN RusH, supra note 242, at 824, 824.
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As will be discussed below, when the accommodationists on the
contemporary Court look to history to support their position, it is the
numerous examples of government encouragement of religion in the
founding era that they point to. On the federal level, they point to a
number of practices that had also been followed by the states. For
example, the accommodationists note that most of the nation's early
presidents issued proclamations announcing days of thanksgiving,
prayer, and fasting,258 and that the first Congress allocated funds for
legislative chaplains. 25 9 They also note that the first Congress readopted the Northwest Ordinance, which had been passed initially by
the Continental Congress in 1787 and included a provision stating
that in the Northwest Territory, "[r] eligion, morality, and knowledge,
being necessary to good government shall forever be encouraged." 2 60
As will be discussed further below, there are similarities between the
theological assumptions underlying the contemporary accommodationist position and the religious views of those who supported limited
government assistance for religion in the founding era. The most significant continuity is a recognition of the role of community, especially the public community, in shaping and fostering faith.
II.

THEOLOGY

When the theological assumptions underlying the disagreements
on the Court regarding religious expression by the state are examined
below, there will be clear continuities between these assumptions and
the views underlying similar positions in the founding era. For example, when separationists on the Court adopt the Jeffersonian or Baptist statement that religion thrives best where it is kept strictly separate
from government, they often also affirm a similarly individualistic understanding of the nature of religious belief. Likewise, contemporary
accommodationists who point to examples of government support for
258 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633-35 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 671 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675-76
(1984) (Burger, CJ.).
259 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92
(1983).
260 Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States NorthWest of the River Ohio, art. III (July 13, 1787), readopted and reprintedinAct to Provide
for the Government of the Territory North-West of the River Ohio, I Stat. 50, 52
(1789). For opinions noting this provision of the Northwest Ordinance, seeLamb's
Chapel v. CenterMoriches Union Free School District,508 U.S. 384, 400 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment), and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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religion in the founding era share the views of those who supported
these mild establishments that community plays a critical role in forming and sustaining faith.
However, it would be a mistake to simply align the theological
assumptions underlying separationist and accommodationist positions
on the current Court with the assumptions underlying similar positions in the founding era. Two hundred years separate the contemporary situation from Jefferson's Enlightenment belief in the power of
reason to discover the truths of religion on its own or Madison's view
that the existence of God and a future state are self-evident propositions shared by all humans. While many of the Justices embracing
separationist and endorsement positions have expressed an individualistic understanding of the nature of religious belief, it is not because
they believe that reason provides a direct link between the individual
and God. Nor do many of the Justices look to God to preserve religion through direct and miraculous conversion experiences. Similarly, while accommodationists recognize a critical role for the
community in shaping and sustaining faith, it is not because they distrust a weak and sinful human nature, and they do not go as far as
those who supported mild establishments in the founding era in affirming a pro-active role for the state in inculcating religion.
Examination of contemporary debates in academic theology regarding the nature of religious belief and how religious faith is
formed and sustained will help to develop a fuller picture of the theological divisions on the Court. As noted in the Introduction, I am not
claiming that there is a causal connection between these theological
developments and the underlying theological views of the Justices. Indeed, the focus in this Part will be on theological developments in the
Christian tradition, which is a viewpoint the Justices may or may not
share. However, these contemporary theological debates can help to
clarify shifts in religious viewpoint that have taken place in both the
legal and theological spheres of thought, and the correlation between
these shifts reflects the fact that both jurists and theologians exist in
the same cultural milieu. Some of these shifts in thought tend to reinforce the theological assumptions underlying the strict separationist
position in the founding era while other developments strongly challenge these assumptions and bear greater affinity with the assumptions of those who opposed separationism in the founding era.
Examining contemporary theological debates will also help to
clarify the theological assumptions underlying the third strain in the
Court's contemporary case law, which is the endorsement approach
developed by justice O'Connor. While a number of the Justices who
have embraced the endorsement test have expressed support for the
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individualistic conception of religion which underlies the strict separationist position, this is not uniformly the case. Rather, the chief concem behind the endorsement test is that the protection of religion
requires a recognition of the deeply pluralistic character of faith in
modem American society and respect for all of the forms that religious faith can take as well as for those who do not adopt any religion.
Many theologians in the 1990s have also emphasized the pluralistic
character of religion, and for the growing number of theologians who
embrace this perspective, the unity that they seek among religious
viewpoints is one that respects and preserves their differences.
A.

The Turn to the Subject in Modern Theology

The watershed that initiated the modem era in theology took
place in the late eighteenth century when Immanuel Kant's revolutionary turn to the subject in philosophy cut off human reason from
the knowledge of transcendent realities such as God. Whereas the
rationalist Christians and deists of the eighteenth century believed
that reason could discover at least the basic outlines of a natural theology, including the existence of a wise and beneficent God and a future state of rewards and punishments, Kant argued that any
speculative knowledge regarding a sphere that transcends the world
of space and time is impossible. 261 According to Kant, our knowledge
is limited to the realm of experience or "phenomena," which is necessarily shaped and structured by a priori categories of the human
mind.262 Knowledge of "noumena," or things-in-themselves, is beyond
2 63
human understanding as are supersensible objects such as God.

For Kant, God becomes a regulative concept of the mind that helps to
guide scientific inquiry by promoting the conception of nature as a
systematic and unified whole,2 64 and God also functions as a postulate
261 Kant develops these ideas in IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman K Smith trans., St. Martin's Press 1965) (1781). For Kant's critique of speculative theology, see id. at 495-531. For a good summary of Kant's arguments and their
implications for later theology, see JAMES C. LrvINGSTON, MODERN CHRISTIAN
THOUGHT FROM THE ENuGHTENMENT TO VATICAN II, at 63-76 (1971).
262
263

See KANT, supranote 261, at 173-74; see also LIVINGSTON, supra note 261, at 65.
See KANT, supra note 261, at 82-83, 292-94, 529-30; see also LrVINGSTON, supra

note 261, at 65. For Kant's use of the terms "noumena" and "phenomena," see
supra note 261, at 257-75, 292-94.

KANT,

264 Kant's understanding of God as a regulative idea of the mind is developed in
his "Transcendental Dialectic" in the Critiqueof PureReason. See, e.g., KANT, supranote
261, at 550 ("[T]he concept of a highest intelligence is a mere idea, that is to say, its
objective reality is not to be taken as consisting in its referring directly to an object
(for in that sense we should not be able to justify its objective validity). It is only a

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 75:2

of moral reason. 265 In neither case, however, is God something that

2 66
we can know in Himself.
Kant's major contribution to modem theology was not the reduction of the idea of God to a regulative concept of the mind or a postu-

late of moral reason but, rather, the impact of his thought on later
theology. As Kant's turn to the subject in philosophy demolished the
foundations for speculative knowledge about God, he generated an
equally revolutionary turn to the subject in theology. 2 6 7 Friedrich

Schleiermacher, who wrote a generation later and is widely regarded
to be the "father" of modem theology, 268 was the first to make this

turn. Instead of conceiving of religion as a matter of speculative
2 69
knowledge about God or even primarily a matter of ethics,
Schleiermacher recast the essence of religion as "intuition,"2 70 "feeling,"27 1 or "experience. '272 At the root of all religious traditions,

Schleiermacher found a common pre-reflective, pre-linguistic feeling
of absolute dependence.2 73 This feeling of absolute dependence is
located deep within the structures of the self 274 and is an essential
aspect of the human constitution. 275 Schleiermacher describes this
feeling as the consciousness that all our existence and all our activity is
schema ... which serves only to secure the greatest possible systematic unity in the
empirical employment of our reason."); see also LIVINGSTON, supra note 261, at 68.
265 Kant develops his understanding of God as a postulate of moral reason in his
CRrrIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1997) (1788). See, e.g., id. at 103-05, 115-19; see also LIVINGSTON, supra note 261, at
68-70.
266 See KANT, supra note 265, at 114; KANT, supra note 261, at 550; LIVINGSTON,
supra note 261, at 70.
267 See GEORGE A. LINDBECK, THE NATURE OF DOCTRINE: RELIGION AND THEOLOGY
IN A POSTLIBERAL AGE 20-21 (1984); RONALD F. THIEMANN, REVELATION AND THEoLoy- THE GOSPEL AS NARRATED PROMISE 25 (1985).
268 See AHLSTROM, supra note 43, at 590; THIEMANN, supra note 267, at 25; see also
LINDBECE, supra note 267, at 21; RONALD F. THIEMANN, CONSTRUCTING A PUBLIC THEOLOGY. THE CHURCH IN A PLURALISTIC CULTURE 128 (1991); FRANCIS SCHUSSLER
ORENZA, FOUNDATIONAL THEOLOGY. JESUS AND T=E CHURCH 276 (1985).

269

Fi-

See FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, ON RELIGION: SPEECHES TO ITS CULTURED DE-

SPISERS

98-99, 102 (Richard Crouter ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)

(1799)

[hereinafter SCHLEIRMACHER, SPEECHES]; FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, THE

CHRISTIAN FATH 81-83, 111, 122, 126 (H.R. Mackintosh &J.S. Stewart eds., T. & T.
Clark Ltd. 1928) (1830) [hereinafter SCHLEIERMACHER, CHRISTIAN FArrH].
270 SCHLEIERMACHER, SPEECHES, supra note 269, at 102.
271 Id.; SCHLEIERMACHER, CHRISTIAN FArrH, supra note 269, at 5-6, 11.
272 SCHLEIERMACHER, CHRISTIAN FAITh,
supra note 269, at 67.
273 See id. at 16-17.
274 For Schleiermacher, religion proceeds from our "innermost" nature.
SCHLEIERMACHER, SPEECHES, supra note 269, at 135, 144, 164.
275 See SCHLEIERMACHER, CHRISTIAN FAITH, supra note 269, at 26.
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dependent on a source outside ourselves.2 76 While for some individuals this experience is more pronounced than for others, it accompanies all of our activity and is never zero.2 7 7 Humanity is, therefore,
fundamentally in relation to God.2 78 While different religious tradi-

tions express different "modifications of that common consciousness," 279 as the experience of absolute dependence is combined with
different sensory experiences to produce different religious emotions, 28 0 underlying them all is the same experience of what
28
Schleiermacher calls "God-consciousness."
Schleiermacher's location of the source of religion in a fundamental aspect of human experience exerted a dominant influence
over academic theology for nearly two centuries as a host of theologians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have followed him in
2 82
seeking to uncover a religious dimension to human experience.
While contemporary theologians have referred to this tradition in theology by different names such as "experiential-expressivism," 28 3 "correlation" theology,2 8 4 and "revisionist" theology,2 85 I will simply refer

to it as "modem theology" to distinguish it from the "postmodem" or
276 See id. at 16.
277 See id.
278 See id at 16-18.
279 FRIEDRICH D.E. SCHLEIERMACHER, ON THE GLAUBENSLEHRE: Two LErERs TO
DR. LucKE 76 (James Duke & Francis Fiorenza trans., Scholars Press 1981) (originally
published in 1829 in Theologische Studien und Kritiken).
280 See ScHLEIEmAcHER, CHinsriA FAIrH, supra note 269, at 28-29, 40, 46-47.
281 Id at 47.
282 See THI-mMu', supra note 268, at 128 (stating, in 1983, that "[n]o theologian
has had a greater influence on the development of modem theological method than
Friedrich Schleiermacher. Most 20th century theologians have followed his methodological lead, and those who have resisted his influence have, nonetheless, been absorbed in criticizing him"); INDBEcK, supra note 267, at 21 (stating that the
"experiential-expressivist" tradition that derives from Schleiermacher continues to exert dominant influence over theology in 1984); FIORENZA, supranote 268, at 276-77
(asserting that the "correlation" method which has its roots in Schleiermacher is the
dominant method in contemporary theology).
Schleiermacher's thoughts also had a formative influence on the field of phenomenology of religion, and Rudolf Otto's analysis of religion as originating in the
experience of the holy, see RUDOLF Orro, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY (John W. Harvey
trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1950) (1917), has had an important influence on a
number of theologians who have followed in Schleiermacher's footsteps, see, e.g.,
PAUL TILUCH, DYNAMICS OF FArrH 13 (1957) (drawing on Otto); DAVID TRACY, BLESSED
RAGE FOR ORDER: THE NEv PLURALSM IN THEOLOGY 92-93 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1996) (1975) (noting his debt to Otto).
283 LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 21.
284 FIOPNZA, supranote 268, at 276-77; KATHRYN TANNER, THEORIES OF CULTURE:
A NEW AGENDA FOR THEOLOGY 65-66 (1997).
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"postliberal" critique that will be discussed in the following Section.
The most influential of the modem theologians in the twentieth century include the Roman Catholics Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan,
and David Tracy, and the Protestants Paul Tillich and Schubert
Ogden. These theologians have argued for the essential religiousness
of humanity and have identified what they believe to be a common
religious experience shared by all individuals.
For example, in Blessed Rage for Orde,,28 6 Tracy locates the religious dimension of human existence in certain "limit" experiences
common to all humans. According to Tracy, in boundary situations
such as anxiety, sickness, and death, and in ecstatic experiences such
28 7
as intense joy and love, we experience a "limit-to" our existence,
and these "limit" situations disclose an "ultimate horizon of meaning"
or "limit-of' our existence which is gracious and trustworthy in character.28 8 For Tracy, the religious dimension of human existence is this

"basic faith in the worthwhileness of existence, in the final graciousness of our lives," 2 89 and this faith is "primordial and unconquerable."290 Tracy draws on the work of Schubert Ogden, who also
argues that human existence is characterized by an "ineradicable confidence in the final worth of our existence, '29 1 and both argue that
the objective ground of this basic faith corresponds to the theistic con29
cept of God.

2

For Rahner and Lonergan, the fundamental religious experience
is not just a basic faith in God but, rather, the experience of God
Himself. According to Rahner, human existence is characterized by a
"transcendental experience" of subjectivity: at all moments of consciousness, we are present to ourselves and able to reflect on our finite
285

William C. Placher, Revisionist and PostliberalTheologies and the Public Characterof

Theology, 49 THOMIST 392, 392 (1985).

286 TRACY, supra note 282. As discussed below, Tracy's thought has developed significantly since he published Blessed Rage for Order,and it would no longer be correct
to fit his thought neatly into what I am calling modem theology. See infra note
451-57 and accompanying text.
287 TRAcv, supra note 282, at 105-06.

288 Id. at 106.
289 Id. at 119.
290 Id. at 186.
291 SCHUBERT M.

OGDEN, THE REALITY OF GOD AND OTHER

EssAYS 37 (Southern

Methodist Univ. Press 1992) (1963).
292 See id. at 37, 42-43; TRACY, supranote 282, at 183-87. Thus, for Ogden, belief
in God is "inescapable at the deeper level of our actual existence." OGDEN, supra note
291, at 42; see also TRACY, supra note 282, at 186.
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existence. 293 At the same time, this transcendental experience of
human subjectivity opens us up to the infinite horizon which grounds
our being. 294 Humanity is, thus, existentially "oriented" to the "ineffa-

ble mystery" which is God,295 and God communicates Himself in the
mode of closeness. 296 For Lonergan, too, humanity's "thrust to selftranscendence," 29 7 which lies in its ability to "question[] the significance of its own questioning" 298 and "reflect on the nature of reflection,"299 opens up humanity to the divine. 30 0 The fulfillment of this

capacity for self-transcendence is "being in love with God"30 1 or "being
in love in an unrestricted fashion," 30 2 and God makes this fulfillment
a possibility by giving the "gift of love for him"30 3 in a gracious experience available to all humans. 30 4 For Tillich, as well, humans are
"grasped by and turned to the infinite"30 5 by virtue of their ability to
transcend their concrete existence and contemplate the infinite that
lies beyond them.30 6 All individuals experience a "longing"30 7 for
what is ultimate or an "infinite passion"30 8 for the infinite, and Tillich
calls this universal state of being ultimately concerned "faith."30 9
What is significant about these theologians for the purposes of
this discussion is not their different variations on the religious dimension of human experience but the fact that all of them argue that
293

KARL RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRIsTIAN FAITH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE

IDEA OF CHRISTIANY 20-21 (William V. Dych trans., Crossroad 1989) (1976).

294

See i&. at 58-61.

295

I& at 52-53.

296

See id. at 119.

297

BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 115 (Univ. of Toronto Press

1990) (1971).
298 Id.at 103.
299 I. at 101.
300 See id at 103 ("There lies within [our] horizon a region for the divine, a shrine
for ultimate holiness.... The contemporary humanist will refuse to allow the questions to arise. But their negations presuppose the spark in our clod, our native orientation to the divine.").
301 Id-at 105.
302 1I
303 Id.at 109.
304 See id. ("God is good and gives to all men sufficient grace for salvation."); id at
361-62 ("God can be counted on to bestow his grace ...
305

TILIUCH, supra note 282, at 16.

306

See id. at 9, 17.

307
308

1 PAUL TILucH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 14 (1951).

TILLICH, supra note 282, at 9, 17.
309 Id.at 1. It is important to note that for Tillich, unlike Rahner and Lonergan,
this experience does not contain an immediate awareness of the nature of the infinite
which lies beyond us, and giving content to the ultimate is always a matter of "risk"
requiring "courage." Id. at 17.
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humanity is innately religious and locate the origins of this religiousness in a universal experience deep within the individual self. Tracy
31
310
calls the experience of basic faith "primordial" and "immediate," '
3
12
and Ogden finds it present "at the center.., of selfhood."
Rahner
speaks of God's self-communication as something which occurs in the
"ultimate depths of human existence,"3 1 3 and for Lonergan it takes
place in the "depth of [the] heart[ ]."314 Because the religious dimension of human existence is something which originates deep within
the self, the religious experience begins as something "pre-reflective," 315 "pre-conceptual," 3 16 and "pre-thematic,"3 17 and language and
community flow from this prior experience rather than create it. One
of the central roles of the religious community is to express what begins first within the interiority of the individual. For example, Tracy
and Ogden both speak about religious communities as "re-presenting"
3 18
in language and ritual the basic faith that is part of human nature.
While both believe that the story of'Jesus Christ is the best expression
of this faith,3 19 other religious traditions also express the same
faith. 320 For Rahner and Lonergan, the history of religion is conceived of as a history of humanity's expression and interpretation of
3 21
God's original revelation within the interior of the self.

310 TRA-cY, supra note 282, at 66.
311 Id
312 OGDEN, supra note 291, at 194.
313 RAHNER, supra note 293, at 24; see also id. at 12, 17, 57, 139.
314 LONERGAN, supra note 297, at 113.
315 See, e.g., TRAcv, supranote 282, at 47; Schubert M. Ogden, The Task of Philosophical Theology, in THE FuTuRE OF PHILOSOPHIcAL THEOLOGY 55, 57-58 (Robert A. Evans
ed., 1971); OGDEN, supranote 291, at 40; RAHNER, supra note 293, at 44, 52, 132.
316 See, e.g., TRAcy, supranote 282, at 47; OGDEN, supra note 291, at 57-58; see also
LONERGAN, supra note 297, at 107 ("God's love first is described as an experience and
only consequently is objectified in theoretical categories.").

317

See, e.g., TRAcv, supra note 282, at 47; Ogden, supra note 315, at 57-58;
supra note 293, at 52. Lonergan writes,

RAHNER,

Before it enters the world mediated by meaning, religion is the prior word

God speaks to us by flooding our hearts with his love. That prior word pertains, not to the world mediated by meaning, but to the world of immediacy,
to the unmediated experience of the mystery of love and awe.
LONERGAN, supra note 297, at 112.
318 See OGDEN, supra note 291, at 202-03; TRAcy, supra note 282, at 221.
319 See OGDEN, supra note 291, at 202-03; TRAcY, supra note 282, at 222-23.
320

Ogden writes that the various religions of humanity are "one and all expres-

sions or re-presentations of a yet deeper faith that precedes them." OGDEN, supranote
291, at 33-34.
321 See RAHNER, supra note 293, at 140-41, 153-54; KARL RAHNER, Christianityand
the Non-ChristianReligions, in 5 KARL RAHNER, THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 115, 131
(Karl-H. Kruger trans., Darton, Longman & Todd 1966) (1962); Karl Rahner, Observa-
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In many respects, the turn to the subject in modern theology
marks a dramatic shift from the understandings of religion that lay
behind the strict separationist position in the founding era. Religion
is no longer conceived of primarily as knowledge which can be attained through reason as Jefferson and Madison believed, nor does
God reach down and enlighten the mind through an experience of
supernatural grace. Kant cut off these connections between God and
the individual (at least as far as academic theologians were concerned) and the locus of the divine-human connection shifts to an
experience deep within the self.322 However, while this shift changed

the theological landscape dramatically, it does not undermine the theological assumptions underlying the strict separationist position but,
rather, reinforces them. Religion remains in its origins a matter between God and the individual although now the direct encounter between God and humanity is built into the structures of the self.
Religious communities are not necessary to form faith but, rather,
flow naturally from the religious dimension in common human experience. The forms of religious expression may change and may be
more or less accurate, but humanity is at all times "homo
3 23
religiosus."
Indeed, one of the early critiques in the "postliberal" challenge to
modern theology324 is the privatized, individualistic view of religion

that it supports. 3 25 When the origins of religion are located in individual experience, religious communities take on secondary importance
and can be viewed as merely "optional aids in individual self-realization"3 26 or multiple "purveyors"3 27 of "symbols of transcendence" 328 to
tions on the Concept ofRevelation, in KARL RAHNER &JOSEPH RATZINGER, REVELATION AND
9, 14 (W.J. O'Hara trans., Burns & Oates 1966) (1965); LONGERAN, supra
note 297, at 113-14.
322 See LNDBECK, supra note 267, at 20-21; FIORENZA, supra note 268, at 276-77.
323 Ronald Thiemann has used this term to describe modem theology's understanding of the innately religious character of human nature. See THmEMANN, supra
note 268, at 91; THIEMANN, supra note 267, at 3.
324 The postliberal challenge will be discussed more fully in the following Section.
See infra Part II.B.
325 See IaNDBECK, supra note 267, at 22-23, 77, 126; see also STANLEY HAUERWAS,
AGAINST THE NATIONS: WAR AND SuRvIvAL IN A LIBERAL SociETY 4 (1992) (citing
Lindbeck's argument); HANS W. FREi, TYPES OF CHRSIAN THEOLOGY 74 (1992) (criticizing modem theologians for conceiving of religion as a "solo flight"). Although not
a postliberal, Gordon Kaufman made a similar critique in the 19 7 0s. See GORDON D.
KAUFMAN, AN ESSAY ON THEOLOGICAL METHOD 6 (Scholars Press 3d ed. 1995) (1975).
326 LINDBEcK, supra note 267, at 23.
327 Id. at 126.
328 IdTRADrrION

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:2

meet what begin as individual religious quests. 32 9 Religious communities, in this view, become essentially the voluntary associations of likeminded individuals envisioned by strict separationists in the founding
era.

330

Actually most modem theologians have a far more nuanced understanding of the role of religious communities than the postliberal
critique would suggest. On the one hand, many modem theologians
emphasize that the social nature of humanity requires the outward
331
expression of faith and intercommunication within a community:
those who respond to their native religious orientation naturally seek
fellowship with one another, 332 and the essence of Christianity also
demands a corporate form.3 33 Furthermore, communities not only
express the inner religious experience in outward form, but they also
play an important role in reinforcing this religious dimension. For
example, Tracy and Ogden speak of the role of religious language in
"reassuring" 33 4 faith in those times when the "fleeting" 335 nature of
religious experience or the challenge of difficult circumstances may
lead this faith to be "forgotten"3 36 or "threatened." 33 7 Tracy goes even
further to suggest that particular religious stories, symbols, or images
may also provide individuals with tangible and concrete possibilities
329 See id. at 22, 126.
330 See id. at 22 (stating that "the structures of modernity" that experiential expressionism reflects "press individuals to meet God first in the depths of their souls and
then, perhaps, if they find something personally congenial, to become part of a tradition or join a church"). Kaufman writes,
A three-staged model seems to be presupposed. First, there is the raw experience of the individual as the foundation of all speaking, thinking and acting. Second, the individual reflects upon or thinks about this experience.
And, third, he or she may finally choose to communicate that experience
and reflection to other persons through language, participate in a ritual, or
take up a role in an institution. We have here a picture of the completely
private self living out and experiencing its life, with language and other
forms of social interaction indispensable only at the third stage of communication ....

KAUvMAN, supra note 325, at 6.
331 See RAHNER, supranote 293, at 323, 347;

RAHNER, supranote 321, at 120; LONERcAN, supra note 297, at 113.
332 See LONERGAN, supra note 297, at 113, 118; SCHLEIERMACHER, SPEECHES, supra
note 269, at 163-66; SCHLEIERMACHER, CHRISTIAN FAITH, supra note 269, at 27, 30,
532-33.
333 See RAHNER, supra note 293, at 330, 343; SCHLEIERMACHER, CHRISTIAN FAITH,
supra note 269, at 359-61, 478.
334 OGDEN, supra note 291, at 32; TRACY, supra note 282, at 135.
335 TRACY, supra note 282, at 134.
336 Id at 215; see also OGDEN, supra note 291, at 32.
337 TRACY,supra note 282, at 135; see also OGDEN, supra note 291, at 32.
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for living in accordance with faith that they might not have been able
to imagine if left to themselves. 338 For Rahner and Lonergan, God's
revelation of Himself is not limited to an inner experience of the self
but is also present in God's outward word in the history of Israel and
especially in Jesus Christ, whose life, death, and resurrection makes
explicit what is implicit in God's inward call. 339 Insofar as the church

is the bearer of this outward word3 40 and the historical continuation
and representation of Christ,3 4 1 it cannot be understood solely as an
association of like-minded individuals. 3 42 Rather, the church also has
a critical role in "communicating"3 43 a message that cannot be fully
understood without God's special revelation and in providing an authoritative "norm" 344 for humanity's religious dimension.
Perhaps the greatest role for religious communities in supporting
faith is envisioned by Schleiermacher himself. While Schleiermacher
argues that the same feeling of absolute dependence underlies all
forms of piety, particular religious experience varies from religion to
religion as this feeling attaches to different sensory experiences to
produce different religious emotions,3 4 and religious communions
arrange and organize these religious emotions in different ways. 3 46 In

Christianity, all emotions are related to the redemption accomplished
byJesus; 3 47 for Schleiermacher, this means that Christians experience

the influence and communication of Jesus's sinless perfection as relieving the obstruction of their God-consciousness, which is an evil
condition that all individuals feel to some degree.3 48 The Christian
experience of redemption is not possible without the influence of
Jesus, and after His death, the role of communicating Jesus's sinless
perfection is taken on by the church. The church not only hands on
338 See TRACY, supra note 282, at 208-09. Similarly, Lonergan speaks of the importance of the "word of tradition that has accumulated religious wisdom." LONERGAN,
supra note 297, at 113.

339 See LONERGAN, supra note 297, at 113, 119;
RAHNER,

RAHNER,

supra note 293, at 157-58;

supra note 321, at 118, 131; Rahner, supra note 321, at 14-15.

340 See LONERGAN, supra note 297, at 361.
341

See RAHNER, supra note 293, at 322, 348.

342 Rahner expressly rejects such an understanding of the church. See id at 345,
347-48.

343
344

LONERGAN,

345

See

346

See id at 29, 50.

RAHNER,

supra note 297, at 361-62.
supra note 293, at 344; see also RAHNER, supra note 321, at 125-26.

SCHLEIERMACHER, CHRISTIAN

FAITH, supra note 269, at 28-29, 46-47.

347 See id at 52.
348 See id. at 54-57. By Jesus's "sinless perfection," Schleiermacher means that
Jesus had an "absolutely potent" and unobstructed God-consciousness. Id at 367.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 75:2

the "picture" of Jesus that is found in the Bible,3 4 9 but also communicates His sinless perfection in the new corporate life of grace that His
influence makes possible.3 5 0 Thus, for Schleiermacher, the specifically Christian experience of piety is not possible without the mediation of the Christian community, and for Tillich as well, the
experience of ultimate concern needs language and community to
3 51
give it specific content.
However, even for Schleiermacher and Tillich, as for the others,
the role that communities play in fostering and sustaining faith is very
different from the type of formation envisioned by supporters of mild
establishments in the founding era. Religious communities do not
form a weak and sinful human nature in favor of religion. Rather,
human nature begins with a divine orientation which will inevitably
express itself in communal forms without external prodding or support. While religious communities, in turn, reinforce humanity's religious potential and some can even elevate it to levels that could not be
achieved alone, the process is not one of formation so much as evocation. Schleiermacher speaks of the church as "arous [ing],"352 "awakening,"3 5 3 or "stimulating"35 4 faith. For Rahner, the church does not
proclaim something "absolutely unknown" or new but expresses
"something which [the] person has already attained or could already
5 55
It communihave attained in the depth of his rational existence."
cates, in Lonergan's words, a word "congruent" with the gift of love
already "within us." 3 56 In Tillich's terminology, it proclaims a message
whose power lies in its ability to provide the "answers" to the "questions" implied in human existence. 357 Thus, as for Madison, humanity
has an innate propensity to religion which naturally seeks social forms,
and all individuals have within themselves the capacity to recognize
what is true in the messages that they hear. Religion will thrive when
349

Id. at 363.

350 See id. at 364-65. Schleiermacher emphasizes that "since Christian piety never
arises independently and of itself in an individual, but only out of the communion
and in the communion, there is no such thing as adherence to Christ except in combination with adherence to the communion." Id. at 106.
351 See TiL.ICH, supra note 282, at 23-24, 118, 121. For Tillich, the truest form of
faith is the one whose symbols most closely express what is truly ultimate while also
containing a self-negating element that recognizes that no concrete symbol can be
confused with the ultimate. See id. at 97.
352 SCHLEIERMACHER, CHsusriA', FAITH, supra note 269, at 69.
353 Id. at 71.
354 Id. at 367.
355 RAHNER, supra note 321, at 131.
356 LONERGAN, supra note 297, at 113.
357 See 1 TILLICH, supra note 307, at 64.
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it is kept strictly separate from government because individuals will
naturally seek and be able to identify on their own whatever support
they need for religious inclinations that are an inescapable and everpresent part of their existence.
B.

The Primacy of the Community in the PostliberalChallenge

While the modem approach to theology that has its roots in the
work of Schleiermacher remained the dominant approach in academic theology throughout most of the twentieth century, this
method came under vigorous attack beginning in the 1980s. This
challenge has become known as "postliberal" theology, and postliberal
theologians have argued that modem theology fundamentally misunderstands the nature of religion and the relationship between individual experience and communities in fostering and sustaining faith. For
postliberal theologians, religion is not something which originates
deep within the self as an experience common to all humans. Rather,
religion is essentially a communal phenomenon, and it is religious
communities that make religious experience possible by socializing
their members into particular traditions and world views.
George Lindbeck and Hans Frei are two of the leading figures in
postliberal theology, and they played the greatest role in developing
the postliberal position as it emerged in the 1980s. 35 8 In his seminal
book on The Nature ofDoctrine,35 9 Lindbeck draws upon scholarship in
cultural anthropology, sociology of knowledge, and philosophy3 60 to
358 See Placher, supra note 285, for a good discussion of their work and the
postliberal challenge to modem theology as it developed in the 1980s. For further
discussion, see also WmLM C. PLAcHER, UNAPOLOGETIC THEOLOGv A CmusmN
VOICE IN A PLURALISTIC CONVERSATION

18-20, 161-63 (1989).

359 LINDBECC, supra note 267.
360 See id. at 20. The scholarship that Lindbeck drmws upon includes Clifford
Geertz's work on cultural anthropology, see CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES (1973) (especially chapters on "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture" and "Religion as a Cultural System"), Ludwig Wittgenstein's
philosophy and, in particular, his understanding of "language games," see LUDwIG
WrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSoPmCAL INvESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed.
1968); the work of the philosopher Peter Winch, see, e.g., PETER WINCH, ETHICS AND
ACTION (1972) (especially his essay on Understandinga PrimitiveSociety); PETER WINcH,
THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY (1958); Peter Winch,
Language, Belief and Relativism, in 4 CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PmLosoPnY. PERSONAL
STATEMENTS 322 (H.D. Lewis ed., 1976), and Peter Berger's work on the sociology of
knowledge, see, e.g., PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPI. ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION (1967); PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LuCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REAI.
A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966). For
further discussion of the sources that postliberals draw upon, see Placher, supra note
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argue that religions resemble languages or cultures and their correlative ways of life. 361 Lindbeck describes religions as "comprehensive
interpretive schemes" or "cultural and/or linguistic framework[s]"
which "shape[] the entirety of life and thought." 62 These schemes
usually include myths or narratives and rituals, 363 and like an "external word," 364 these practices "mold" the experience of the self and its
world rather than reflect a pre-existing experience.3 65 Thus, people
do not become religious by tapping into a religious dimension that
exists as a pre-reflective or pre-thematic experience in the depths of
the self. Rather, people become religious by being "socialized"3 66 into
a religious community and by "interioriz[ing] a set of skills by practice
and training." 367 There is, for Lindbeck, no primordial religious experience without this process of socialization, 3 68 and because religions
have different interpretive frameworks, religious experience will vary
369
from religion to religion.
Many theologians have followed Lindbeck in understanding religion as a cultural-linguistic system that makes religious experience
possible rather than as something which grows out of an innate relationship to the divine.3 70 Frei's work in the 1980s was deeply influenced by Lindbeck's approach, and one of his most significant
285, at 394, and see also FREI, supranote 325, at 22 (noting the influence of sociology
and cultural anthropology on his understanding of religion).
361 See LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 18, 33.
362 Id. at 32-33.
363 See id. at 32.
364 Id. at 34.
365 See id. at 32-34.
366 Id. at 40, 132.
367 Id. at 35.
368 See id. at 36, 39.
369 See id. at 40-41.
370 See, e.g., FREI, supra note 325, at 74 ("Our Christian experience is not a solo
flight but our experience within the linguistic network, the changing and yet recognizably continuous language structure, the worshiping and moral pattern of the
Christian community."); THEMANN, supranote 268, at 152 (quoting Lindbeck); Hans
W. Frei, The "LiteralReading" of Biblical Narrativein the Christian Tradition:Does It Stretch
or Will it Break?, reprinted in THEOLOGY AND NARRATIvE: SELECTED EssAys 117, 147-48
(George Hunsinger & William C. Placher eds., 1993) [hereinafter THEOLOGY AND
NARRATIVE] (drawing expressly on Lindbeck); Kathryn E. Tanner, Theology and the
PlainSense, in ScRIPTURAL AUTHORITY AND NARRATIVE INTERPRETATION 59, 61 (Garrett
Green ed., 1987) (describing religions as "sociocultural frame [s] within which individuals are socialized; as ... communal structure [s] that shape[] the experience, beliefs,
expectations, and behaviors of individuals as participants"). As will be discussed below, Tanner's position has developed since the 1980s, and her recent views have departed significantly from those of Lindbeck. See infra notes 428-32 and
accompanying text. The work of William Placher has also been deeply influenced by
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contributions to the development of postliberal theology was his integration of a similar understanding of religion with his earlier work on
Biblical hermeneutics to produce an account of the way that the Biblical texts function in the Christian community.3 7 ' According to Frei,
in the Christian framework, the Biblical texts are the central element
around which the rest of its features are organized.3 72 Historically
most theologians read the Bible as a "realistic narrative":37 3 in other
words, the meaning of the Bible was equivalent with the story itself,
and the narrative world depicted in the Bible was understood as the
only real world in which the reader must "fit himself' and his experiences.3 74 While this changed for theologians in the eighteenth century,3 7 5 Frei argues that the narrative reading of the Bible continues to

be the customary way that the text is interpreted in the Christian community.3 76 Modem theologians misunderstand the function of the

text when they search for its meaning in some common religious experience underlying its language.3 7 7 For members of the Christian
community, it is the text itself which gives the content for their religious life and shapes their world, not an innate religious experience
which is only secondarily expressed in the words of the text.3 78 In
postliberal thought. See PLACHER, supra note 358, at 20, 155 (noting his sympathies
with postliberalism); Placher, supra note 285, at 416 (same).
371 Lindbeck and Frei both exerted a mutual influence on each other's work.
While Frei's later work on Biblical hermeneutics and theology was heavily influenced
by Lindbeck, his earlier work on Biblical hermeneutics was one of the chief inspirations for Lindbeck's method. See William C. Placher, Introduction to THEOLOGT AND
NARRATivE, supra note 370, at 3, 3.
372 See Frei, supranote 370, at 147-48; see also LINDBECa, supra note 267, at 80, 84,
116.
373 HANS W. FREI, THE EcLnsE OF BIBLICAL NARRATrvE: A STUDY INEIGHTEENTH
AND NINETEENTH CENTURY HERMENETrICS 6 (1974).
374 See id. at 1-3; see also Hans W. Frei, Theology and the Interpretationof Narrative:
Some Hermeneutical Considerations, in THEOLOGY AND NARRATIW, supra note 370, at 94,
103-04.
375 For an account of why this change occurred, see FREI, supra note 373. Especially with the influence of the Enlightenment in the 18th century, the meaning of
the Bible became detachable from the story itself. See id. at 6. Modem theology continues this trend by locating the meaning of the Bible in the religious experience it
represents. See Frei, supra note 370, at 127-29.
376 See Frei, supra note 374, at 110; Frei, supra note 370, at 118, 144-45, 147-48.
377 See Frei, supra note 370, at 124-30.
378 See id. at 145-47. As discussed above, most modem theologians have a more
nuanced understanding of the role of language and community in shaping and supporting faith than the postliberal critique would suggest. Religious language and
communities not only express a prior religious experience, but they reinforce it, and,
for some modem theologians, they may also provide the proper norm for under-
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Lindbeck's words, the "text... absorb[s] the world, rather than the
3 79
world the text."
Frei emphasizes that the narrative reading of the Bible is not the
only possible interpretation of the text,3 80 nor does the authority of

Scripture derive first of all from some "mysterious inherent properties" of the text.3 81 Rather, the authority of the Bible derives from the

central function that it plays within the religious community, 382 and
the meaning that it has for the reader will depend upon the sense that
3 8s3
has become "second nature to the members of the community.
Thus, the Bible cannot provide a vehicle for a direct encounter between God and the individual as it did for Backus and Leland. Meaning is not something in the text which is illuminated by the Spirit of
God in a personal conversion experience, nor is it something that can
be extracted by autonomous rational faculties as for Jefferson.
Rather, the community is necessarily involved as it directs the individual to read the Bible and provides critical guidance regarding its
meaning. For postliberal theologians, access to God always involves
the mediation of the community.
The postliberal understanding of religions as communally shaped
frameworks for understanding reality has led to the charge that
postliberal theologians are "radical relativists. '3 8 4 One form that this
standing the meaning of this experience. See supra notes 331-51 and accompanying
text.
379 LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 118.
380 See FRExI, supra note 325, at 86; Frei, supra note 370, at 122.
381 FREi, supra note 325, at 57.
382 David Kelsey, another theologian in the postliberal tradition, was the first to
develop this argument in DAVID H. KELSEY, THE USES OF SCRIPTURE IN RCENr THEOLocx 97-98 (1975). Frei adopts a similar position in his later work, see, e.g., FREI, supra
note 325, at 57, as do a number of other postliberals, see, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, A
COMMUNIrY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD A CONSTRUCrIVE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC 55
(1981) (drawing on Kelsey); Tanner, supra note 370, at 62 (drawing on Kelsey). As
will be discussed further below, Tanner's recent work has recently departed in significant ways from postliberalism. See infra notes 426-32 and accompanying text.
383 FREI, supra note 374, at 104 (quoting CHARLES M. WOOD, THE FORMATION OF
CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING 43 (Trinity Press 1993) (1981)). Frei follows Wood on this
point, see Frei, supranote 374, at 104, 115 n.13; FREI, supranote 325, at 15, as do other
postliberal theologians, see, e.g., Tanner, supra note 370, at 62-63 ("Similarly, the
plain sense of scripture is not [an inherent] property of those texts that happen to
function as scripture for the Christian community.... The plain sense... [is] what a
participant in the community automatically or naturally takes a text to be saying on its
face insofar as he or she has been socialized in a community's conventions for reading
that text as scripture.").
384 See PLACHER supra note 358, at 163-66, for a discussion of this charge.
Lindbeck also discusses and defends postliberal theology against the charge of relativism. See LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 128-32.
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charge has taken is the accusation of "Wittgensteinian fideism."3 8 5 If
each religion is a separate cultural-linguistic system or, to use Wittgenstein's terminology, a separate "language game, 3 8 6 then there can be

no way to judge between them, and truth can only be something internal to the particular religious system. 3 8

7

While postliberals do draw

upon Wittgenstein's understanding of language games in developing
their understanding of religion as cultural or semiotic systems,3 88 and
some of the other scholars who have influenced them tend in the direction of Wittgensteinian fideism, 3 8 9 postliberals are not themselves
Wittgensteinian fideists.3 90 All of the central figures in postliberal theology have asserted the compatibility of their views with making truth
claims about the Christian world view.3 91 They argue that the mistake
of their critics is to believe that truth can be found through universal
standards of rationality or experience that are independent of particu385 See Placher, supra note 285, at 408, 411. Placher discusses "Wittgensteinian
fideism" in PLACHER, supra note 358, at 57-61.
386 For a brief discussion of Wittgenstein's understanding of "language games,"
see PLACHER, supra note 358, at 58.
387 Kai Nielsen articulated this critique in his famous article WittgensteinianFideism,
42 PHImosoPHY 191 (1967). See PLAcHER, supra note 358, at 57-61, for a good discussion of Nielsen's description of Wittgensteinian fideism as well as some of the scholars
who have been identified by Nielson and others as Wittgensteinian fideists.
388 Indeed, both Lindbeck and Frei use the term "language game" to describe
religious systems. See FREI, supra note 325, at 13; LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 33.
389 For example, Lindbeck draws upon the work of Peter Winch, see LiNDBECaK,
supranote 267, at 20, who was the object of Nielsen's critique, see PLAcHER, supranote
358, at 57-61 (discussing Winch's work and Nielsen's critique), and he also draws on
Paul Holmer's work on theology and Wittgenstein, see L-DBEC, supra note 267, at 28
n.28, which has strong affinities with the Wittgensteinian fideist position, see Placher,
supra note 285, at 408 n.35.
390 See Placher, supra note 285, at 408-10, for a defense of postliberalism against
this charge. Frei distinguishes the position of Karl Barth, whose theology was a formative influence on his own thought, from the Wittgensteinian fideist position in FREI,
supra note 325, at 46-55.
391 See, e.g., LiNDBECK, supra note 267, at 68-69 ("[N] othing in the cultural-linguistic approach ... requires the rejection (or the acceptance) of the epistemological
realism and correspondence theory of truth, which, according to most of the theological tradition, is implicit in the conviction of believers that when they rightly use a
sentence such as "Christ is Lord" they are uttering a true first-order proposition.");
Frei, supra note 370, at 144 (stating that postliberal theology does not "preclude inquiry into either the fact or the character of possible truth claims involved in the
literal reading of the Gospels"); THrm~AuN, supra note 267, at 93-94 (asserting that
postliberal theology is consistent with making historical and ontological truth claims);
PLAcHER, supranote 358, at 117 ("Those who admit they argue out of a tradition-as I
have been claiming Christians should-can nevertheless believe in the truth of their
claims: truth not just for them but for everyone.").
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lar historical communities. 392 For postliberals, humans all "stand
within traditions,"

393

and truth is something which can be attained

only in and through particular religious communities. People do not
reason to religion as Jefferson envisioned, nor do they find it deep
within the self or as the result of a direct revelation from God to the
individual. Rather, they learn it, and thus, it is only in the context of
particular religious communities that it makes sense to talk about reli394
gious truth.
Postliberals do not exclude a role for "ad hoc apologetics" 395 in
defending the truth of religious claims. 396 For example, Lindbeck argues that religions can be tested for their "assimilative powers" or, in
other words, their "ability to provide an intelligible interpretation in
[their] own terms of the varied situations and realities adherents encounter," and some may be found wanting. 39 7 However, religions can392 See, e.g., LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 129-30; PLACHER, supra note 358, at 19,
34-35, 55, 123.
393 PLACHER, supra note 358, at 12.
394 Lindbeck writes that religious sentences "acquire enough referential specificity
to have first-order or ontological truth or falsity only in determinate settings,"
LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 68, and truth claims "cannot be made except when
speaking religiously, i.e., when seeking to align oneself and others performatively with
what one takes to be most important in the universe by worshiping, promising, obeying, exhorting, preaching," id. at 69. For additional information, see also RONALD F.
THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY 171 (1996) ("The
important fact to note here is that all moral reflection finds its natural home in particular communities of practice and discourse. .. ."), STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: A PRIMER IN CHRisTIAN ETHICS 1 (1983) ("All ethical reflection occurs
relative to a particular time and place."), and id at 62 ("There is no point outside our
history where we can secure a place to anchor our moral convictions. We must begin
in the middle .... ).
395 Frei introduced this term in an essay on Karl Barth. See Hans W. Frei, Eberhard
Busch's Biography of KarlBarth, reprinted in FREI, supra note 325, at 147, 161. The term
reappears throughout postliberal thought with its meaning varying somewhat depending upon the particular context and user. See, e.g., LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 131;
PLACIER, supranote 358, at 167; William Werpehowski, Ad Hoc Apologetics, 66J. RELIGION 282 (1986).
396 Most, however, give greater emphasis to the role of theology in "redescribing"
the faith, see, e.g., FREI, supranote 325, at 81; THIEMANN, supranote 267, at 72, and for
some of those who share postliberal inclinations, redescription is the best form of
apologetics, see PLACHER, supra note 358, at 134-35.
397 LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 131; see also Bruce D. Marshall, Absorbing the World:
Christianityand the Universe of Truths, in THEOLOGY AND DIALOGUE: ESSAYS IN CONVERSATION WITH GEORGE LINDBECK 69, 78-79 (Bruce D. Marshall ed., 1990) [hereinafter
THEOLOGY AND DIALOUGE] (expanding on Lindbeck's discussion of "assimilative powers"). According to Marshall, one of the virtues of using "assimilative powers" as a
criterion of truth is that this criterion can be acceptable to both Christians and those
outside the Christian community. See id.Many postliberals argue that it is only possi-
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not be constructed through reason or experience, and apologetics
must always begin with a particular tradition. 3 98 Similarly, postliberals
do not deny that God may play an active role in shaping religious
identity and drawing people to faith. 399 However, God accomplishes
this by working in and through religious communities not outside of
400
or prior to them.
The implications of postliberal theology for thinking about the
proper relationship between religion and government are potentially
diverse. Certainly postliberal theology undercuts the theological assumptions that supported strict separationism in the founding era as
well as the assumptions that continue to reinforce it in modem theology. Religion for the postliberal is an essentially communal phenomenon, and socialization into a religious community is how faith is
formed and sustained. There is no direct link between God and the
individual in either reason or converting grace which can be counted
on to sustain faith without the support of religious communities. Nor
is there an innate religious dimension to human experience which
will ensure that individuals will seek whatever communal support they
do need. To be sure, humans will probably always require interpretive
frameworks to give meaning and direction to their lives, but these
frameworks could be secular and there is no inherent relationship between the individual and God that will guarantee a religious
perspective.
It does not follow, however, from the essentially communal nature of religious faith that state aid or recognition is needed to supble to give reasons internal to one's own tradition, see THiEMANN, supra note 267, at
155; PLACHER, supra note 358, at 117, but these reasons may derive from concepts or
beliefs shared with other traditions, see THIEMANN, supra note 267, at 155; PIAcH-ER,
supra note 358, at 105-07.
398 See LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 131-32.

399 See THiEMANN, supranote 267, at 147-48 (stating that God offers His promise
of salvation in the Bible and the theologian can celebrate the movement from unbelief to faith as a "miracle of grace"); THiEMANN, supra note 268, at 136 (asserting that
God "molds... Christian identity" through the Gospel and the Christian community
that interprets it).
400 See THiEMANN, supra note 267, at 147-49 (stating that God's promise of salvation in the Bible calls forth the Christian community which is created in response to
God's narrated promise; it is in this setting that individuals are called to faith, and
God works through the Christian community to shape individual and collective identity); see also HAUERVAS, supra note 394, at 6 (asserting that God has "willed to be
known through a very definite and concrete history"). Frei draws heavily on Karl
Barth, who argued that it is in His Word, directly present in Jesus Christ and indirectly
in Scripture, that God chooses to communicate Himself. See FREI, supranote 395, at
147, 156, 159. Thus, Scripture has an incarnational or sacramental quality. See Frei,
supra note 370, at 142.
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port religious communities. Those who defended mild establishments in the founding era not only believed that faith requires formation in a religious community, but they also tended to believe that
human nature was too sinful and weak to sustain religious communities without state assistance. By contrast, some of the leading figures
in the postliberal tradition have argued that religious communities
can thrive well, and even better, where church and state are completely separate. For example, Stanley Hauerwas, who is a religious
ethicist in the postliberal tradition, 40' argues that a "sense of separateness" 40 2 from the state and larger society is necessary to preserve the
"distinct"40 3 identity of the church as an "alternative polity"40 4 to modem liberal culture. Hauerwas believes that too close a union between
church and state endangers the integrity of the Christian community,
and he expressly rejects the view that the church should seek to justify
itself by what it can do for state and society.40 5 In Hauerwas's view, the

church should not reject the world,40 6 but it can best serve society
where it maintains its independence as a "'contrast model' for all polities that know not God.

'40 7

Lindbeck has argued that a sense of separation, or what he calls
"sociological sectarianism," 40 8 is inevitable if the church is to survive in
an increasingly secular society. 40 9 According to Lindbeck, as society
401 Hauerwas expressly adopts the label "postliberal" and extends Lindbeck's
methodology to the field of religious ethics. See HAUERWAS, supra note 325, at 1.
402 HAuERWAs, supra note 382, at 2.
403 Id. at 1.
404 Id. at 86.
405 See id. at 1, 74, 83.
406 See id.at 10, 85; see also HAUERWAS, supra note 325, at 1.
407 HAuERWAS, supra note 382, at 84; see also HAuERWAS, supra note 325, at 12
("[T]he church's social ethics is first and foremost found in its ability to sustain a
people who are not at home in the liberal presumptions of our civilization and
society.").
408 George A. Lindbeck, Ecumenism and the Future of Belief, UNA SANCrA, Michaelmas 1968, at 3, 4 [hereinafter Lindbeck, Ecumenism]; George A. Lindbeck, The Sectarian Future of the Church, in THE GOD EXPERIENCE: EsSAYS IN HOPE 226, 227 (Joseph P.
Whelan ed., 1971) [hereinafter Lindbeck, Sectarian Future].
409 The following discussion will be based largely on a series of articles that
Lindbeck wrote in the 1960s and 1970s as well as The Nature of Doctrine. In these
articles, Lindbeck predicted the thorough secularization of society, see Lindbeck,
Ecumenism, supra note 408, at 4-7; Lindbeck, SectarianFuture, supranote 408, at 228,
and he argued that the sociological sectarianism that would be necessary for Christianity to survive in such an environment would be good for the churches as well as
society at large, see infra notes 413-15 and accompanying text. As discussed in infra
note 415, Lindbeck has had second thoughts about whether the end of cultural Christianity will be good for society even if society will benefit from revitalized Christian
communities. Lindbeck now also holds out the possibility that society will not become
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becomes more thoroughly secularized and religious beliefs and language are banished from the public realm, people who do hold religious views will have to separate themselves sociologically from the
surrounding culture and form close-knit groups of mutual support
and fellowship. 4 10 Lindbeck is optimistic about this development for
Christianity, and he envisions a future in which Christianity thrives as
a "strongly deviant minority, unsupported by cultural convention and
prestige,"4 11 but nourished from within by strong "communal enclaves." 41 2 Like Hauerwas, Lindbeck does not believe that separation
WIl be harmful to religion. To the contrary, he expects that it will
revitalize Christian communities 4 13 and provide a model for the rest
of society. 4 14 Thus, for both Hauerwas and Lindbeck, religion will not
only survive where there is a strict separation of church and state, but
4 15
it will thrive.
thoroughly secularized. See George A. Lindbeck, Confession and Community: An IsraelLike View of the Church, 107 CImISTIAN CENTURY 492, 495 (1990).
410 See Lindbeck, Ecumenim, supra note 408, at 5, 8; Lindbeck, Sectarian Future,
supra note 408, at 229; LINBFCK, supra note 267, at 78, 133-34.
411 Lindbeck, Sectarian Future, supra note 408, at 227.
412 Lindbeck uses the term "communal enclaves" in The Nature of Doctrine.
LiNDBEcK, supra note 267, at 127. In his earlier work, he speaks of "sectarian enclaves." Lindbeck, Ecumenism, supra note 408, at 15. For Lindbeck's optimism that
Christianity will survive in this form, see id. at 5-6, and Lindbeck, Sectarian Future,
supra note 408, at 237.
413 See LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 134; Lindbeck, SectarianFuture, supranote 408,
at 237, 239. Lindbeck's hope is for an interdenominational, transcultural fellowship
of Christian groups that will cross national boundaries. See Lindbeck, Ecumenism,
supra note 408, at 16-17; Lindbeck, Sectarian Future, supra note 408, at 239. For a
discussion of Lindbeck's most recent work on these "intercontinental and interconfessional communal networks," see Lindbeck, supra note 409, at 496. Lindbeck speaks of
this vision as an "Israel-like view of the church." Id.
414 See LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 127; Lindbeck, Ecumenism, supra note 408, at
15-17. See David H. Keisey, Church Discourseand PublicRealm, in THEoLocy AND DIALOGUE, supra note 397, at 7, for a refutation of the charge that the sectarianism envisioned by Lindbeck is equivalent to isolationism. According to Keisey, Lindbeck sees
the Christian sects of the future as engaged in the public realm as "creative minorities." Id. at 14 (quoting iUndbeck, Ecumenism, supra note 408, at 9); see also id. at 19,
28. For an example of this charge, see James M. Gustafson, The Sectarian Temptation:
Reflections on Theology, the Church and the University, in 40 CATHOuC THEOLOGICAL SociETY OF AMERICA, PRocuxmn GS OF THE ANNUAL CONVENTION 83 (George Kilcourse ed.,
1985)
415 It is important to note that in his most recent writings on this issue, Lindbeck is
no longer so optimistic that the end of cultural Christianity will be good for society.
Lindbeck worries that even if the church will thrive in such an environment, he
"find s] [himself] thinking that traditionally Christian lands when stripped of their
historic faith are worse than others." Lindbeck, supra note 409, at 495.
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Not all postliberals share Lindbeck or Hauerwas's view that the
separation of the church from the larger culture is good for religion
or good for society. For example, Ronald Thiemann argues that
Christians and others with strong religious convictions should view
themselves as full participants in public life and bring their particular
traditions to bear in this engagement. 416 While William Placher approves of a "modest dose of sectarianism," 4 17 he also believes that it is
important for Christians to seek common ground with nonchristians
on public issues, 418 and for both Placher and Thiemann, those with
strong religious convictions should recognize that they may have
something to learn as well as to give to the larger society. 419 Others
have criticized Lindbeck and Hauerwas's position for resting on the
false assumption that it is even possible to separate religious belief
systems from larger cultural influences. 420 Because religious individuals interact with those who do not hold strong religious views in a
variety of settings, they are constantly exposed to alternative ways of
construing reality, and sociological separation from the larger culture
is not possible. 421 In this view, religious and nonreligious world views
422
will necessarily influence one another.
If, in fact, separation of religious belief systems from larger cultural influences is neither possible nor desirable, then the postliberal
understanding of the nature of religious belief and how faith is
formed and sustained suggests that a strict separation of church and
state will harm religion. In the postliberal view, the survival of religion
depends on healthy religious communities whose symbols, rituals, and
values can function as an integral part of the individual's conduct and
thought. If religious belief systems no longer function as the central
interpretative schemes within which individuals understand their lives,
then religion will wither and die. A strict separation of religion from
416 See THIEMANN, supranote 268, at 19, 23-25; see also THIEMANN, supranote 394,
at 169-73.
417 PLACHER, supra note 358, at 169.
418 See id. at 167.

419 See id. at 147 (" [A] nother reason for pursuing serious discussion on any topic is
the possibility that I might be wrong, and the discussion might help me to recognize
my error."); see also THIEMANN, supra note 268, at 23 ("[E]ntrance into the public
sphere is filled with genuine risk, including the possibility that some of the [religious]
community's most basic convictions might have to be reformed or even jettisoned.").

420 Gustafson made this argument in one of the early critiques of postliberalism.
See Gustafson, supra note 414, at 90-91. As will be discussed further below, other
theologians with roots in postliberal theology have been voicing a similar criticism in
recent years. See infra notes 426-50 and accompanying text.
421 See Gustafson, supra note 414, at 90-91.

422

See id
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government should not harm religion where the state is small. In that
case, religious beliefs and values can still permeate and shape the bulk
of one's existence even if religious symbols and language are removed
completely from the governmental sphere. However, as the state
grows larger and occupies a greater space within the individual's
larger cultural universe, the removal of religion from this aspect of
public life may threaten the survival of religion by reducing its relevance to one's life. To use Lindbeck's phrase, in that case, the Bible
will no longer "absorb the world" but the world will absorb the Bible. 42 3 Even if religion survives, it will become increasingly secular-

ized, as permitting secular, but not religious, messages in the
governmental sphere unfairly weights the inevitable exchange and
mutual influence of religious and nonreligious belief systems in favor
of the secular.
Lindbeck argues that religions will not be harmed by their exclusion from the public sphere as long as religious individuals receive the
support that they need through close-knit fellowships of mutual support. Lindbeck might be correct if religious communities were physically separated from the rest of the populace as the Amish or Hasidic
Jews, but neither Lindbeck nor Hauerwas envisions such physical isolation. 424 In other cases, however, the boundaries between religious
and nonreligious belief systems will necessarily be porous, and if religion is excluded from a significant portion of the individual's life, its
continuing relevance will be threatened. This is especially the case
where the state assumes a role in transmitting values to and forming
the character of the next generation as in the operation of public
schools. However, it will also be true where the state plays a role in
celebrating the important events in the lives of its citizens but can only
celebrate those events, or those portions of events, which are secular
in nature. The argument developed here is not that the state must
play a pro-active role in supporting religious communities; few theologians would take the position of those in the founding era who expected government to affirmatively aid religion. Rather, the claim is
that without some acknowledgment or recognition in the governmental sphere of the central role that religion plays within many people's
423 See LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 118, for this famous phrase. See also text
accompanying note 379, for further discussion of Lindbeck's use of this phrase.
424 See Lindbeck, SectarianFuture, supra note 408, at 231 (stating that "ghetto-like
enclosures similar to those of the Pennsylvania Amish or HasidicJews" are incompatible with the Christian mission to serve all nations); see also HAuRtwAs, supranote 325,
at 1 ("I have no interest in legitimating and/or recommending a withdrawal of Christians or the church from social or political affairs.").
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lives, the exchange that will inevitably take place between religious
and nonreligious belief systems will not be a fair one.
C. Theology in the 1990s
The debates between those in the modem tradition of theology
and the postliberals took place largely in the 1980s. The aftermath of
these debates has been a very different theological landscape in which
the modem perspective has diminished in importance and some of
the fundamental insights of the postliberal theologians have been
taken in new directions. While the 1980s generated discussion on a
wide range of issues over the past decade,4 25 this Section will discuss
two developments which are especially significant for the issues in this
Article.
The first of these developments has been in the area of
postliberal theology. While the postliberal understanding of religion
as a fundamentally communal phenomenon has gained an increasing
number of adherents, a number of theologians in the 1990s are criticizing the first generation of postliberals for what they believe is a far
too static understanding of religion. These theologians agree with the
basic postliberal insight that religions are like cultures which shape
life and thought and give structure to human experience. However,
they argue that neither religions nor cultures are self-contained or coherent wholes into which individuals are simply socialized or trained
in a passive way.42 6 Rather, religious systems are constantly undergo-

ing a process of change and development as their members struggle
over different possible interpretations of their basic texts, symbols,
and practices, and as religious systems interact with outside influences. 4 27 For example, Kathryn Tanner, whose work grows out of the
postliberal tradition, has emphasized the essential "porousness" of
religious systems. 4 28 According to Tanner, religions are always in in425 For example, one of these issues has been the nature and task of theology,
including both its relevance to the larger cultural environment in which it takes place
and its connection to the traditions out of which it speaks.
426 See, e.g., DELWIN BROWN, BOUNDARmIS OF OUR HABITATIONS: TRADITION AND
THEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION 62-63 (1994); TANNER, supra note 284, at 50-51, 161.

427 See BROWN, supra note 426, at 66-67; LINELL E. CADY, RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND
AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 134-35 (1993); TANNER, supra note 284, at 56-58, 113-14,
124-25.
428 See, e.g., TANNER, supra note 284, at 152 (stating that boundaries between
Christian and nonchristian ways of life are "fluid and permeable"); id. at 108 (asserting that there can be no "sharp cultural boundary" between religious and other ways
of life).

1999]

FOSTERING HARMONY AMONG

THE JUSTICES

teraction with one another and with nonreligious ways of life, 4 29 and

thus, the identity of a religious community will necessarily be "impure
and mixed, the identity of a hybrid that always shares cultural forms
with its wider host culture and other religions." 430 While Lindbeck
has argued that there is an enduring doctrinal "core" to the Christian
faith that remains constant even as other elements within the framework change, 43 1 Tanner argues that there is no unchanging core and
that even a religion's most central beliefs are open to outside influ43 2
ence and development.
For Tanner, the fact that one cannot separate or preserve Christian beliefs from change is a good thing. Tanner is concerned that
any attempt to preserve an enduring core of Christian beliefs and
practices from change may lead to a confusion of what is necessarily a
human product with the truth that it endeavors to witness to. 433 Tan429 See id at 113.
430 Id at 114.
431 See IaNDBEcK, supra note 267, at 82. iUndbeck and other postliberal theologians have always recognized that religions undergo change and development. They
have, however, tended to believe that there is an underlying doctrinal "core" or "internal logic" to the Christian faith that remains constant even as the first order beliefs
and practices these doctrines regulate change. See, e.g., i&. (stating that the "doctrinally significant grammatical core" of a religion stays the same even as the first order
claims which these doctrines regulate will change as the system interacts with "the
shifting worlds that human beings inhabit"); FREI, supra note 325, at 2 (advocating a
"descriptive" method in theology that seems to "articulate the 'grammar,' or 'internal
logic,' of first-order Christian statements"); Frei, supra note 374, at 96 (stating that
Christianity is a "community held together by constantly changing yet enduring structures, practices, and institutions"); TH mAANN, supra note 267, at 72 (advocating a
"conception of theology as primarily a descriptive activity, a second-order mode of
reflection which displays the logic inherent in Christian belief and practice"); id (explaining that descriptive theology "requires the assumption that there is a Christian
conceptual frame supported by specific conventions and practices"); THnEMANN, supra
note 268, at 22 (asserting that the goal of theology is to "understand more fully and
more critically the Christian faith in order that the community might better exemplify
the Christian identity to which it has been called"); PLACHER, supra note 358, at 135
("Christian theology needs to take the form that Frei sees in Barth: a description of
the world as seen from a Christian perspective that draws what persuasive power it has
from the coherence and richness of the whole.").
While basic beliefs may change, such change should be slow if the basic frame-

work is to remain stable. See

TInEMANN,

supra note 394, at 134; cf

PLACHER,

supra

note 358, at 149 ("Serious dialogue indeed requires openness to change, but it also
demands a sense of how significant changing one's faith would be."). For Tanner, by
contrast, change is part of the very essence of religious and other cultural systems, and
she envisions Christianity more as a "community of argument" than a relatively stable
set of beliefs and practices. See TANNER, supra note 284, at 154.
432 See TANNER, supra note 284, at 114-15, 138-39.
433 See i& at 136-38, 149-51.
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ner does believe that Christians and members of other religions can
proclaim truths of universal significance,4 3 4 but truth should not be
identified with any particular historical practice or formulation. 435 All
religious claims must be provisional, 436 and truth is better served
where communities remain open to correction from outside 43 7 as well
43 8
as to diverse points of view within the community.

Other theologians from outside the postliberal tradition have also
found the postliberal insight into the communal nature of religion
and its resemblance to a cultural system to be valuable, but they have
done so with Tanner's reservations. For example, Delwin Brown de'439
scribes religious traditions as one type of "cultural negotiation.
Cultures are not static, coherent wholes but processes of "negotiation"
in which identities are "constantly sought, achieved, threatened, subverted, revised, and... replaced. ' 440 Religious traditions are the negotiation of identity within a canon of stories, myths, doctrine,
symbols, and rituals, 4 41 and like Tanner, Brown emphasizes that the
border separating a religious tradition from surrounding cultures is
"exceedingly porous" 4 42 and that even the canon itself is open to
change. 44 3 According to Brown, change and development within religious traditions are good things because without them the traditions
44 5
would suffer from "stifling uniformity"444 and become a "tomb."
For Linell Cady, openness to change is also necessary to ensure that
religious communities and traditions best reflect truth. Cady approves of Lindbeck's understanding of religion as a cultural-linguistic
framework, 446 and she also agrees that the historically and socially
conditioned character of all human reflection means that truth is not
something which can be achieved by the individual alone but is,
rather, something which is found through communities. 44 7 However,
like Tanner, Cady emphasizes that truth should never be identified
434
435
436
437
438
439

See id. at 69.
See id. at 136.
See id. at 150.
See id. at 150-51.
See id. at 154-55, 174-75.
BROWN, supra note 426, at 67, 114.

440

Id at 66.

441
442
443

See id. at 77.
Id. at 26; see also id. at 116.
See id. at 78.

444 Id. at 87-88.
445 Id. at 116. Brown writes that "creativity, imagination, construction [are] inescapable, and ... [they are] good. . . ." Id. at 141.
446 See CADY, supra note 427, at 59.
447 See id. at 78.
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with any particular communal consensus. 448 All such consensuses are
necessarily limited and provisional," 9 and thus, the pursuit of truth
requires a commitment to inquiry and debate which is open to all
perspectives. 45 0
The work of Tanner, Brown, and Cady builds on the earlier arguments of those who have criticized Lindbeck and Hauerwas for believing that it is possible or desirable to preserve the separateness of
religious belief systems from infiltration by the surrounding secular
culture. If the boundaries of religious belief systems are inherently
permeable, the separation of religion from the larger culture is not
possible, and if truth is better served by an openness to outside influence, separation is not desirable. This exchange between religious
and nonreligious world views is to be welcomed, but the exchange
must presumably be a fair one. To the extent that a strict separation
of religion from government unfairly weights the process of exchange
in favor of the secular, it can lead to the dominance of the religious by
the secular and, furthermore, can impede the progress of truth by
marginalizing religious points of view.
Another development in the 1990s which is significant for the
issues in this Article has been the decreasing influence of the modem
perspective in theology together with its claim that all humans share a
common religious experience which places them in an innate relationship to the divine. In the debates in the 1980s over the nature of
religious experience, postliberalism was the victor.45 1 Even the heirs
of the modern tradition now place an increasing emphasis on the particularity of religious experience, 45 2 and most theologians would
agree with the postliberals that human experience and knowledge is
shaped in significant ways by the traditions and cultures within which
people live. 455 Tracy's more recent work reflects this "post-modern"
shift among theologians outside the postliberal camp. While Tracy
has not expressly repudiated his claim in Blessed Rage for Order that
448 See id.
449 See id. at 80.
450 See id at 79-80.
451 See THIEMANN, supranote 394, at 162 (asserting that nonfoundationalism "has
gained widespread acceptance in both philosophical and theological circles"); Marshall, supra note 397, at 88 (stating that foundationalist approach underlying modem
theology is "being increasingly repudiated in contemporary theology, not only by the
postliberals, for whom it is clearly uncongenial, but also among theologians with
strong revisionist or liberal commitments as well").
452 SeeW. CLARK GIPIN, A PREFACE TO THEOLOGY 156-57 (1996).
453 See id
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theology can investigate common religious experience, 454 his focus in
455
recent years has been on the particularities of religious traditions,
and he now argues that it is through these particularities that truth is
found. 45 6 Tracy also places a new emphasis on the fundamental differences among religious traditions, and he has argued that there is
"no single essence, no one content of enlightenment or revelation, no
one way of emancipation or liberation, to be found in all that
plurality."

45 7

Many other contemporary theologians have gone even further
than Tracy in rejecting the notion of a common religious experience
and emphasizing the diversity of religious experience and traditions.
For these theologians, religious experience and traditions are "radically" pluralistic. 45 8 For example, Sallie McFague argues that all
human experience is "embodied,"4 59 which means that it is "radically
concrete 4 60 and varies with the particularity of one's own physical
existence as well as with one's cultural, economic, racial, and gender
situation. 4 61 Gordon Kaufman's recent work also emphasizes the
454 See PLAcHER, supra note 358, at 155. Indeed, Tracy has expressly claimed that
he has not abandoned his prior position. See David Tracy, Defending the Public Character of Theology, 98 CHRIsTIAN CENTuRY 350, 352 (1981).
455 Tracy's more recent focus has been on what he calls "systematic" as opposed to
"fundamental" theology. While fundamental theologies seek to "provide arguments
that all reasonable persons .. . can recognize as reasonable," systematic theologies
"have as their major concern the re-presentation, the reinterpretation of what is assumed to be the ever-present disclosive and transformative power of the particular
religious tradition to which the theologian belongs." DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL
IMAGINATION 57 (1981). Blessed Ragefor Order,Tracy argues, was an exercise in fundamental theology, see Tracy, supra note 454, at 352, and his later work focuses on systematics, see id.
456 See, e.g., David Tracy, ParticularClassics, Public Religion, and the American Tradition, in RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE: INTERPRETATIONS AND Ex'LORArIONS 115, 118-21,
123-24 (Robin W. Lovin ed., 1986) (arguing that classic works of religion are highly
particular in both origin and expression, but have public effects); Tracy, supra note
454, at 353.
457 DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUr. HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 90
(1987).
458 See, e.g., GORDON D. KAUFMAN, IN FACE OF MYSTERY' A CONSTRUCTIVE THEOLOGY
xiii (1993) (affirming the "radically pluralistic" character of human life and religious
perspectives); SALLIE MCFAGUE, THE BODY OF GOD: AN ECOLOGICAL THEOLOGY 50
(1993) (describing the "radical particularity" of human life and the larger cosmos).
Tracy rejects "radical pluralism." See Tracy, supra note 456, at 117; see also Tracy, supra
note 454, at 355.
459

McFAGuF, supra note 458, at 86.

460
461

Id.
See id. at 87.
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"magnificent diversity" of human life. 4 62 For Kaufman, religious tradi-

tions are "imaginative constructions" 46 3 by which humans seek to orient themselves to the "ultimate mystery within which our existence
falls., 46 4 The different traditions which humans have constructed are
"enormously diverse and diffuse." 465 Kaufman sees no common perspective that underlies them all,46 6 and he recognizes that not all

4 67
world views need be religious.
Theologians who emphasize the radical particularity of religious
experience do not necessarily reject efforts to seek unity among these
different perspectives, but the unity that they seek is one that respects
and retains difference. For example, Kaufman argues that the recognition of diversity should lead to a deep "respect for every expression
of the ultimate mystery of things," 4 68 and he develops a model of theology as an open conversation which includes all interested voices and

the great diversity of perspectives that they bring.469 McFague also

advocates a "spirit of collegiality" 4 70 in theology that is inclusive of a
broad range of perspectives and experiences, 471 and in her recent
book on The Body of God,472 she promotes her model of the universe as
the body of God as furthering a sense of commonality and unity that is
not characterized by sameness but by respect for difference and diversity.4 73 For Walter Lowe, the application of deconstructionism to theology and the insights it brings can also help to "set [us] on a
common footing with our fellow human beings," 47 4 open space for
the "free play of human activity in all its creaturely variety," 475 and free
creation to be what it is: "various, many-faceted, a festival of innocent
4 76
difference."
This shift in contemporary theology to emphasizing the particularity and diversity of religious experience can, but does not need to,
462 KAUFMAN, supra note 458, at xiii.
463 Id. at 31.
464 Id. at 30; see also id. at 28-31, 37, 41.
465 Id. at 26.
466 See id. at 37, 100-01.
467

See id. at 28, 53 (indicating that other orientations to the ultimate mystery in-

clude
468
469
470
471

the Marxist, secular humanist, Freudian, and positivist).
Id-at xiii.
See id. at 64-69.
MCFAGuE, supra note 458, at 67.
See id at 68.
472 McFAGUE, supra note 458.
473 See id- at 96-97, 206, 211.
474 WALTER L.OWE, THEOLOGYAND

475 Id.
476 Id. at 143.
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support an individualistic understanding of religion and, thereby, reinforce the theological assumptions underlying strict separationism in
the founding era. The more important implication of this development for understanding the relationship between religion and government lies, however, in its recognition of the pluralistic character of
religion. As will be further developed in the following section, a similar understanding of religion as inherently pluralistic lies behind the
endorsement approach advocated by Justice O'Connor and embraced
by a number of other Justices. Where religious experience is seen as
necessarily diverse and equal respect for all perspectives is an important goal, it is natural to followJustice O'Connor in limiting religious
expression by the state to those forms of expression which do not unfairly endorse one religion over another or religion over nonreligion.
III.

DMSIONS ON THE COURT

In this Part, the historical analysis and contemporary theological
debates discussed above will be used to help clarify the differing theological assumptions which underlie the divisions in the Court's recent
jurisprudence regarding religious expression by the state. As noted in
the Introduction, the Court's currentjurisprudence in this area began
to take shape in 1983 with its decision in Marsh v. Chambers,477 and
since that time, three general positions have emerged among theJustices. They include a separationist position, the endorsement approach, and accommodationism. Disagreements among the Justices,
particularly among separationists and supporters of the endorsement
approach, on the one hand, and accommodationists on the other,
have often been bitter and intense, and one of the most important
sources of disagreement is over which approach is best for religion.
All of the Justices defend their position as best for religion, and while
their opponents suspect them of disingenuousness and the Justices
repeatedly accuse one another of hostility to religion or religious liberty, their opinions make clear that each faction does, in fact, care
deeply about religion. What they disagree about is their theological
assumptions regarding the nature of religious belief, how it is formed
and sustained, and what is required for its protection. This Part will
endeavor to promote greater understanding of the divisions on the
Court by laying out where the Justices' theological differences lie.

477

463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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The Positions of theJustices

In order to clarify the theological divisions which underlie the
Court's disagreements, it is first necessary to begin with a brief overview of the case law in this area and the different positions that have
emerged among the Justices. Over the past sixteen years, the Court
has decided four cases directly addressing the scope of permissible
religious expression by the state. The first of these cases was Marsh,
which addressed the constitutionality of legislative chaplains paid by
the state. The plaintiff in Marsh was a member of the Nebraska Legislature who objected to the legislature's practice of opening its sessions
with a prayer by a chaplain compensated with public funds. 478 In an
opinion written by Justice Burger, the Court held that the practice of
the Nebraska Legislature did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Justice Burger's opinion reflects an accommodationist approach
which he andJustice Kennedy elaborate more fully in later cases. Justice Brennan wrote a separationist dissent joined by Justice Marshall,
and Justice Stevens also wrote a short dissenting opinion.
A year later, in Lynch v. Donnelly,4 79 the Court decided the first of
its holiday display cases. At issue in Lynch was the constitutionality of a
creche which the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, included as part of
its annual Christmas display.48 0 The City's display also included a variety of secular symbols of Christmas, such as a Santa Claus house, reindeer, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, as-well as a clown,
an elephant, and a teddy bear. 48 ' In another opinion written byjustice Burger, the Court found that the inclusion of the creche in the
holiday display did not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion laying out her endorsement
approach. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion reflecting both
separationist and endorsement elements, and he was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Blackmun wrote a
short dissenting opinion joined byJustice Stevens.
Two additional holiday displays were considered by the Court five
years later in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.48 2 Both displays were located on public property in the downtown area of Pittsburgh. 483 The
first was a creche donated by a Roman Catholic organization and dis478 See id at 784-85.
479 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
480 See id. at 670-71.
481 See id at 671. The display also included hundreds of colored lights and a large
banner reading "SEASONS GREETINGS." Id.
482 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
483 See id- at 578 (plurality opinion).
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played on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse. 484 No other figures or decorations were included in the
display except for the County's addition of poinsettia plants around
the fences surrounding the display and its placement of two small
Christmas trees behind each of the two endposts of the fence. 48 5 The
second display was a Chanukah menorah placed outside the City48 6
County Building next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty.
The menorah was owned by a Jewish organization but was stored and
erected annually by the City. 487 The Court held that the creche vio-

lated the Establishment Clause but the menorah was constitutional.
Justice Blackmun wrote a part majority, part plurality decision relying
primarily on Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. Justices Marshall,
Brennan, O'Connor, and Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's opinion
regarding the creche. Justice O'Connor joined the judgment of the
Court regarding the menorah, but she disagreed with Justice Blackmun's application of the endorsement test and defended her own interpretation in a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan wrote an
opinion arguing that both displays were unconstitutional. His opinion combined both separationist and endorsement elements and was
joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens. Justice Stevens also wrote an
opinion with both separationist and endorsement elements, and he
was joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan. Justice Kennedy defended accommodationism in an opinion dissenting from the Court's
decision regarding the creche and concurring in the judgment regarding the menorah, and he was joined by Justices Rehnquist, White,
and Scalia.
The Court's final case addressing religious expression by the state
was Lee v. Weisman48 8 in 1992. Weisman addressed the constitutionality
of inviting clergy members to deliver prayers at public school graduation ceremonies. 489 The accommodationists were divided in Weisman.
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion arguing that the practice
placed impermissible coercive pressures on students to participate in
the prayers. 490 Justice Scalia wrote a dissent arguing that the prayers
484

See id. at 578, 579, 580.

485 See id. at 580.
486 See id at 578. The sign included the
Liberty." Id. at 582. Beneath the title were
season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes liberty.
are the keepers of the flame of liberty and
487 See id at 587.
488 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
489 See i& at 580.
490 See id. at 592-98.

Mayor's name and was entitled "Salute to
the following words: "During this holiday
Let these festive lights remind us that we
our legacy of freedom." Id.
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were a permissible accommodation of religion, and he was joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and White. Justice Blackmun wrote a
concurring opinion with strong separationist elements and was joined
by Justices Stevens and O'Connor. Justice Souter wrote a concurrence
using the endorsement test and was joined by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor.
1. Separationism
The separationist strain in the Court's jurisprudence appears in
all of these cases. The chief exponent of the separationist position in
the first three of the Court's cases was Justice Brennan. In his opinions, he was joined consistently by Justice Marshall, usually by Justice
Stevens, and sometimes by Justice Blackmun. Justice Stevens's own
opinions in this area also reveal consistently separationist views,
though he has never articulated his position with the level of detail
and elaboration present injustice Brennan's opinions. While Justice
Blackmun was not a consistent separationist, he joined Brennan's separationist dissent in Lynch and also authored a concurrence with
strong separationist elements in Weisman. Justice Ginsburg is relatively new to the Court and did not participate in any of the Court's
cases addressing religious expression by the state, but a short dissenting opinion in CapitolSquareReview and Advisory Boardv. Pinette491 suggests that she would also support the separationist position.
While there are certainly nuances which distinguish the views of
these Justices from one another, there are unifying themes among
their opinions which mark the general contours of the separationist
position. Like the separationists in the founding era whom they draw
upon for historical support, the separationists on the Court view reli492 or "functions"493
gion and government as two separate "spheres"
491

515 U.S. 753 (1995). The question in Capitol Squarewas whether an adminis-

trative agency of the State of Ohio had violated the Establishment Clause by permitting the Ku Klux Klan to erect an unattended cross on a state-owned plaza
surrounding the Statehouse. See id. at 757-59. Justice Ginsburg argued that in the
absence of a sturdy disclaimer, the cross violated the Establishment Clause. See id. at
817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She left open the question of whether a cross with
a sturdier disclaimer could withstand Establishment Clause challenge. See id. at 818.
In her opinion, Ginsburg cited Everson for the principle that the "aim of the Establishment Clause is... to uncouple government from church." Id. at 817 (citing Everson

v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)). Ginsburg also cited with approval Kathleen
Sullivan's argument that the Establishment Clause requires the "affirmative establishment of a secular public order." Id. at 817 (citing Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and
LiberalDemocracy, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 195, 197-214 (1992)).
492 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 808 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 601 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The Amend-
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which should
not be permitted to "interfere 494 with each other or be
"mixed"49 5 together. The separationists also frequently invoke
Thomas Jefferson's famous metaphor of a "wall of separation" between church and state, 49 6 and they repeat the statements of Madison,
Jefferson, and the Baptist separationists that religion will thrive better
where church and state are kept strictly separate. 497 Most of the
separationists on the Court have mixed their commitment to separationism with other principles as well. For example, Justice Brennan
has affirmed the importance of both strict separation and neutrality as
the two underlying principles of the Establishment Clause. 498 Furthermore, all of the separationists have also combined their separament's purpose... was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres
of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of
public aid or support for religion." (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting))); Weisman, 505 U.S. at 606 n.8 ("l[T] he First Amendment rests upon the
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if
each is left free from the other within its respective sphere." (quoting McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948))).
493 See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Our fathers seem to
have been perfectly sincere in their belief that the members of the Church would be
more patriotic, and the citizens of the State more religious, by keeping their respective functions entirely separate." (quoting JEREMIAH S. BLAcK, Religious Liberty, in EsSAYS AND SPEECHES OFJEREMIAH S. BLACK 51, 53 (Chauncey F. Black ed., New York, D.
Appleton & Co. 1885))); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 806 (BrennanJ., dissenting) (stating that
religious "function [s]" should be left to "the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance" (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
435 (1962))); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 653 n.14 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
494 See, e.g., Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 645 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
495 See, e.g., Weisman, 505 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The mixing of
government and religion can be a threat to free government, even if no one is forced
to participate.").
496 See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 600-01 (BlackmunJ., concurring); Marsh, 463 U.S. at
802 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 797, 814 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
497 See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 608-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring); School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[T]he Establishment Clause embodied the Framers' conclusion that government
and religion have discreet interests which are mutually best served when each avoids
too close a proximity to the other."); see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 821-22 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "strict separation of religion and state" does not "rob[ ] the
nation of its spiritual identity"; it "invigorate[s] both the 'spirit of religion' and the
'spirit of freedom'").
498 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 698 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 803 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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test discussed

below.4 99

However, what unites these Justices and defines their separationist approach is the belief that one of the central purposes of the Establishment Clause is, injustice Ginsburg's words, to "uncouple government
'50 0
from church.
The separationists on the Court recognize that the separation of
church and state cannot be absolute and that some contact is necessary "if government is not to adopt a stilted indifference to the religious life of the people."50 1 However, separationists define the
permissible forms of contact very narrowly. For example, in his dissent in Marsh, Justice Brennan argues that the permissible involvements are "quite specific" and that separationism is the baseline rule
where these exceptions do not apply.5 0 2 In both Marsh and Lynch,
Brennan lists some permissible forms of involvement between religion
and government. 50 3 In the area of religious expression by the state,
government may recognize the religious beliefs and practices of the
American people as an aspect of the country's history and culture by
teaching about religion in comparative religion classes in public
schools, 50 4 including religiously-inspired materials in classes on history
and literature, 50 5 and displaying religiously-inspired artifacts in a museum setting.50 6 In addition, religious practices or symbols which have
lost any significant religious meaning may be used by government to

499 See infra text preceding note 535.
500 Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)). Justice Brennan also expresses the position
well when he states that government has "no role" in safeguarding America's religious
heritage. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

501

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 809

(Brennan, J., dissenting).
502 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 809 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
503 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 714-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marsh, 463 U.S. at
809-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While Brennan suggests in Marsh that his list is
exhaustive, see Marsh, 463 U.S. at 809 (Brennan, J., dissenting), in Lynch Brennan
states that he does not intend to offer a "comprehensive approach" for addressing the
extent to which government may permissibly acknowledge religion in its activities,

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 715 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
504 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 811 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 300 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).

505

See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 712 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at

300 (Brennan, J., concurring).

506

See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 712-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 811

(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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serve secular purposes. 50 7 As possible examples of such practices,
Brennan gives the designation of "In God We Trust" as our national
motto, references to "God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, and the celebration of Thanksgiving. These practices, Brennan argues, serve to
solemnize public occasions, inspire commitment to meet national
challenges, or otherwise serve patriotic goals, and they do so without
retaining any significant religious content or meaning.5 0 8 According
to Brennan, neither the legislative prayers in Marsh nor the cr6che in
Lynch fit within any of these categories. Legislative prayer is a religious act which retains its religious significance, 50 9 and the clergy who
offer these invocations are "not museum pieces." 510 Likewise, the
creche in Lynch is a religious symbol, 5 11 and it has neither lost its religious meaning 5 12 nor is it being displayed in a museum setting as a
religiously-inspired artifact. 5 15 In Allegheny, the fact that both the
creche and menorah are religious symbols was enough, in Brennan's
view, to decide the case: government display of religious symbols in its
holiday displays necessarily violates the separation of church and state
even if other secular symbols are included in the display. 514 For Brennan, government may celebrate the secular aspects of a holiday with
both religious and secular meaning, but it may not celebrate the reli51 5
gious aspects.
Justice Stevens defends a similar position in Allegheny when he
argues that the Establishment Clause should be construed to create a
strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public
property.5 1 6 As for Brennan, the baseline rule for Stevens is separation: religion and government both do better when there is a wall of
separation between them and each is confined to its respective

507 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 818
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 303-04 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
508 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 715-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
509 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797, 811, 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
510 Id. at 811.
511 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 711 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
512 See id. at 708.
513 See id. at 712-13.
514 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 637, 643 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
515 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 710-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
516 See Alegheny, 492 U.S. at 650 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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sphere. 51 7 It would, however, be "absurd" to exclude all references to
religion from government expression, and Stevens cites Brennan's example of religious paintings in a museum.5 18 The presumption is,
however, one of unconstitutionality, and religious symbols may only
51 9
be used in contexts where the message conveyed is a secular one.

2.

The Endorsement Test

The second approach that the Justices have used for evaluating
religious expression by the state is the endorsement test. Justice
O'Connor was the first to articulate this approach in her concurrence
in Lynch,5 20 and she has elaborated upon this approach in a number
of later cases. 5 2 ' ForJustice O'Connor, the purpose of the Establishment Clause is not to make a complete separation between religion
and government. In a country with large numbers of religious people,
the interests of church and state will frequently intersect, 522 and the
Establishment Clause does not preclude government from recognizing the role that religion plays in the lives of Americans and taking it
into account in making laws and policy.5 2 3 What it prohibits is making
adherence to religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community.52 4 The Establishment Clause is violated whenever government practices "endorse" one religion over another, religion over nonreligion, or nonreligion over religion. 525 According to
O'Connor, such endorsement "sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
517 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 814 (1995)
(Stevens,J., dissenting); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 653 n.14 (Stevens,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
518 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 652-53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Stevens also uses the example of a depiction of Moses with the Ten Commandments on a courtroom wall. Such a depiction would be permissible if Moses was
surrounded by other great lawgivers but not if he was surrounded by other great
proselytizers. See id.
519 See id. at 652-53.
520 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
521 For example, O'Connor further explained her approach one year after Lynch
in Wallace v. Jafree 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985), and she also provided further clarification in her concurrences in Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 623-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment), and Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 772-83
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
522 See Jafifree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
523 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
524 See Jafree 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J. concurring in the judgment); Lynch,
465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
525 See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. '526 Government violates the Establishment Clause when its purpose is to endorse religion or when its
practices have that effect regardless of purpose. 52 7 Government policies which have the effect of advancing religion are permissible as
528
long as the intent or effect is not to endorse.
For O'Connor, the endorsement test is compatible with religious
expression by the state as long as the purpose and effect of the expression are not to endorse religion. Thus, government may include symbols with religious significance in holiday displays as long as the
setting and context of the overall display makes clear that the government does not intend to endorse the religious significance of the symbol.5

29

O'Connor argues that the creche in Lynch was constitutional

because its inclusion with numerous other purely secular symbols of
Christmas makes clear that the purpose of the display is not to endorse Christianity but, rather, to "celebrat[e] ... a public holiday with
traditional symbols." 530 Likewise, O'Connor approves of the menorah
in Allegheny because its placement next to the Christmas tree and sign
saluting liberty conveys a "message of pluralism and freedom of belief
during the holiday season. '53 1 Although the menorah is a religious
symbol which retains its religious significance, the setting of the menorah in the overall display does not endorse Judaism but, rather,
conveys a message of tolerance and freedom to choose one's belief,
religious or not.5 32 The problem with the creche in Allegheny was that
the central religious symbol of Christmas was placed alone in the
county courthouse, and in this setting, the effect of the creche was to
endorse Christianity.
For O'Connor, other forms of religious expression which do not
endorse religion over nonreligion are also permissible. According to
O'Connor, while the legislative prayers at issue in Marsh were undeniably a religious exercise, they serve the largely secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions and expressing confidence in the future,
and their longstanding existence and nonsectarian nature negates any
526 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
527
528

See id. at 690.
See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
529

See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

530

Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

531

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 635 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-

ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
532 See id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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message of endorsement.5 3 3 Similarly, the longstanding "history and
ubiquity" of other government acknowledgments of religion in American life, such as the printing of "In God We Trust" on our coins, the
celebration of Thanksgiving, and the opening of court sessions with
"God save the United States and this honorable Court," negate any
message of endorsement. 53 4 Unlike Brennan, O'Connor does believe
that these longstanding practices must have an entirely secular meaning in order to pass constitutional muster as the government does not
endorse the religious significance that they retain.
While Justice O'Connor argues that her endorsement test is consistent with government use of symbols or other forms of expression
which retain a religious meaning as long as the overall context does
not endorse, other Justices who have adopted her endorsement approach have interpreted this test much more strictly to exclude most,
if not all, such forms of religious expression. The endorsement test
has had broad appeal on the Court, and it has been adopted by a
number of other Justices. Justice Souter uses the endorsement approach in his concurrence in Weisman, Justice Blackmun used it in his
opinion in Allegheny, and consistent separationists such as Brennan
and Stevens have also used it in conjunction with their separationist
approach. While Justice Breyer has never authored an opinion using
the endorsement analysis, and he did not participate in any of the
Court's cases addressing religious expression by the state, he has
joined opinions using the endorsement test in other areas of the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 53 5 Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Allegheny illustrates well a narrower interpretation of the
endorsement test. WhereasJustice O'Connor emphasizes that government speech need not be stripped of all religious significance to be
constitutional, Justice Blackmun argues that the endorsement approach demands a "secular state." 53 6 According to Blackmun, govern-

ment expression which is not confined to the secular necessarily
discriminates among citizens on the basis of their beliefs. 53 7 Thus,
Justice Blackmun agrees with Justice Brennan that the government
533 See id. at 630-31; see also id. at 625; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J,
concurring).
534 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630-31, 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
535 Justice Breyerjoined two opinions using the endorsement test in Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). They were written by Justices
O'Connor and Souter. See infranotes 756-76, for a discussion of the issues in Capital
Squar.

536 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610.
537 See id. at 610-12.
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cannot celebrate the religious aspects of a holiday with religious and
secular meaning but must limit its celebration to the secular aspects.5 38 For Blackmun, the menorah in Allegheny is constitutional because its setting next to a secular symbol of Christmas and a sign
saluting liberty confines the celebration of Chanukah to its secular
aspects.

539

While Blackmun recognizes that the menorah is a reli-

gious symbol, he argues that the City did not have available a purely
secular symbol for Chanukah, 540 and that in its context, the meaning
of the menorah was secular. 54 1 Both Christmas and Chanukah are
celebrated as secular holidays, and the symbols represent "a secular
celebration of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of
5 42
Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative tradition."
While O'Connor's interpretation of the endorsement test leaves
considerable room for religious expression by government, the trend
among many of the Justices has been in favor of a stricter interpretation of the test. In addition to Blackmun, Justice Souter has also indicated that he favors a narrow interpretation of the test. In his
concurrence in Weisman, he suggests that the logic of the endorsement test requires striking down not only obvious endorsements of
religion like graduation prayers, but also longstanding acknowledgments of religion such as presidential religious proclamations and the
religious invocations at Thanksgiving that O'Connor approves of.543
According to Justice Souter, these traditions are "pallid zone worlds
apart" from official prayers at graduation, but they are, nevertheless,
endorsements of religion. 544 Justice Souter's suggestion that even
these ubiquitous and minor acknowledgments of religion violate the
Establishment Clause seems to fulfill Justice Kennedy's prophecy in
Allegheny that the endorsement test, if "applied without artificial exceptions for historical practice," 545 would invalidate most traditional
government practices recognizing the role of religion in American
538

See id. at 611-12.

539

See id. at 617-20 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).

540 See id. at 618.
541 See id. at 617-20.
542 Id. at 618. By contrast, O'Connor argues that Chanukah need not be characterized as a secular holiday or the menorah given a secular meaning to avoid govern-

ment endorsement. See id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
543 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630-31 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
544 Id. It is unclear whether Souter would actually favor striking down such longstanding acknowledgments of religion. He suggests that he might permit such "triv-

ial" practices to stand regardless of their religious import. Id.
545 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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life, from Thanksgiving Day proclamations, to references to God in
the Pledge of Allegiance and the use of "In God We Trust" in the
546
national motto.
Justices Souter and Blackmun's approach to the endorsement test
moves very close to that of the separationists on the Court, for whom
the application of the endorsement test becomes almost indistinguishable from their separationist position. For example, in Lynch, Justice
Brennan argues that any use of symbols which retain a religious meaning in a holiday display makes minority groups feel like outsiders, 547
and thus, he reaches the same result with the endorsement approach
that he does with his separationist arguments. Justice Stevens adopts a
similar position in Allegheny. While Stevens does not deny that the
menorah may convey a message of pluralism and freedom, this possibility is not enough to overcome the strong presumption of unconstitutionality which attaches to the government display of religious
symbols on public property.548 For Stevens, where the government
uses an unquestionably religious symbol like a menorah in a holiday
display, the effect is almost certainly to be endorsement. 549 He and
Justice Brennan both share the view that it is the menorah which gives
religious significance to the tree rather than the tree which secularizes
550
the menorah.
3. Accommodationism
The third position that has emerged in the Court's case law is
accommodationism. 551 Whereas several Justices have supported both
separationism and the endorsement approach, accommodationists
consistently object to both of these positions, and the most bitter debates on the Court have taken place between accommodationists, on
the one hand, and those who support separationism or the endorsement test on the other. The accommodationist approach began to
emerge with Justice Burger's opinions in Marsh and Lynch, but was
5 52
laid out most clearly by Justice Kennedy in his opinion in Allegheny.
Accommodationists argue that both the endorsement test and separa546 See id. at 670-73.
547 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 701, 711, 713 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
548 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 654-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
549 See id. at 654.
550 See id.; id. at 641-42 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
551 See supra note 11 on the use of the term "accommodationism."
552 Accommodationism has antecedents in some of the Court's earlier case law.
Both Burger and Kennedy draw support for the accommodationist position from the
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tionism afford too narrow a scope for religious expression by the state.
The Establishment Clause does not erect a wall of separation between
church and state, 553 nor does it prohibit all government speech endorsing religion. 5 54 According to Justice Kennedy, religious expression by the state
which "recogniz[es],"5 5 5 "accommodat[es],"5 5 6
"acknowledges," 5 57 "take[s] note"5 58 of, and even "support [s]" 559 the
central role that religion plays in American society is permissible as
long as the government does not coerce individuals to participate, 5 60
engage in proselytizing, 56 1 or give direct aid to religion in such a degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so."' 562 Permissible acknowledgments include
"celebrat[ing]" the religious as well as the secular aspects of the holiday season with the type of displays in Lynch and Allegheny. 5 63 While
the permanent display of a large Latin cross on the roof-top of a city
hall would be an impermissible form of proselytizing, 5 64 none of the
displays considered by the Court "represent an effort to proselytize or
are otherwise the first step down the road to an establishment of religion." 565 Burger makes a similar point about the legislative prayers in
Marsh. They do not represent an effort to proselytize, 566 but are,
rather, "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
among the people of this country."567 While separationists on the
Court trace their approach to the separationist principles of James
Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and the Baptist tradition, accommodationists point to the numerous historical practices and longstanding
traditions which are consistent with their views, and they emphasize
that many of these practices can be traced back to the founding
Court's decisions in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), and Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
553 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
554 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
555 Id. at 657.
556 Id.
557 Id.; see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677.
558 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 686.
559 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
560 See id. at 659.
561 See id. at 661.
562 Id. at 659 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
563 Id. at 663.
564 See id. at 661.
565 Id. at 664.
566 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983).
567 Id. at 792.
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era.5 68 Kennedy cites Thanksgiving Day proclamations and the employment of legislative chaplains, both of which can be traced to the
First Congress, as well as references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance
and national motto. 569 Burger also includes presidential proclamations of a "National Day of Prayer" each year and the commemoration
5 70
of Jewish Heritage Week.
In Weisman, the accommodationists divided over whether prayers
offered in connection with official public school graduation ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause. The central dispute was over
whether the prayers impermissibly coerced participation of the graduates. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion arguing that coercive pressures were present. 571 Justice Scalia wrote a dissent joined by the
other accommodationists emphasizing the longstanding tradition of
prayers at public school graduations, 57 2 and arguing that only pressures backed by threat of penalty violate the Establishment Clause's
prohibition against state coercion.5 7 3 It is significant to note that Kennedy's opinion uses some separationist language that appears to be at
odds with his opinion in Allegheny.57 4 While Weisman is the Court's
most recent decision addressing religious expression by the state, such
separationist language has not reappeared in any of Kennedy's later
opinions under the Establishment Clause, which are generally consistent with the accommodationist approach.
B.

An Individualistic Conception of Religious Belief

For the separationists on the Court, the confidence that religion
will thrive best where it is kept separate from government can be explained in part by a recurring tendency to understand religion in individualistic terms. When the Justices repeat Madison's statement that
religion flourishes best where it is separate from government, 575 they
568 See Allegheny,
part and dissenting
569 See Allegheny,
part and dissenting

570

492 U.S. at 670-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
in part); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674-77 (1984).
492 U.S. at 671-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
in part).

See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677.

571 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-94 (1992).
572 See id. at 635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
573 See id. at 640-42.
574 For example, Kennedy states that the Establishment Clause is designed to protect religion from "government interference," id. at 589 (Kennedy, J.), and "state intervention," id at 591, and that "[t]he design of the Constitution is that preservation
and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice com-

mitted to the private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pursue that mission,"
id at 589.
575 See, e.g., id. at 608 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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rarely examine the theological assumptions upon which Madison's
statement rests. Nor do they examine the theological foundations of
Baptist separationism when they cite Roger Williams's view that strict
separation protects religion as well as government. 576 There are, however, significant continuities between the theological assumptions
which underlie the separationist views of the founding era and the
separationist position on the modern Court. Like the separationists in
the eighteenth century, the opinions of the Court's separationists are
laced with statements that suggest an individualistic understanding of
religion.
Justice Brennan expresses this understanding well in Marsh when
he describes religion as a "private matter for the individual, the family,
and the institutions of private choice." 577 This statement, which Brennan repeats a year later in a funding case under the Establishment
Clause, 5 78 echoes the view of Jefferson, Backus, and Leland that religion is a matter between the individual and God and that religious
communities are best understood as organizations of like-minded individuals rather than as formative institutions. Many of the early
separationists on the Court from Everson through the 1960s expressed
a similarly individualistic understanding of religion. Religion is for
'5 79
Justice Rutledge the "kingdom of the individual man and his God,
forJustice Douglas "an individual experience,"58 0 and forJustice Clark
an "intensely personal"58 1 matter. Justice Black is quoted most frequently in the Court's recent case law. In both Marsh and Lynch, Justice Brennan repeats Justice Black's statement that "religion is too
personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion'
by a civil magistrate." 5 2 Most of the separationists on the Court recognize a role for the guidance and instruction of religious communities, but like Madison, their statements frequently envision these
communities as flowing from rather than forming the religious
576 See, e.g., id. at 608 n.11; School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 259-60 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
577 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)).
578 See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 398 (1985) (striking
down funding for community education and shared time programs offered to nonpublic school students on the premises of nonpublic schools), overruled by Agostini v.

Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
579 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 57-58 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
580 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
581 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).

582 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (quoting

MADIsON,

supra note 1, at

301), quoted in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 725 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
and in Marsh, 463 U.S. at 804 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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choices of individuals. Justices Stevens and Brennan express this view
well when they repeatJustice Black's description of religion as something which is best left "to the people themselves and to those the
5 83
people choose to look to for religious guidance."
These recurring statements in the Court's contemporary jurisprudence and their antecedents in earlier separationist opinions depict
an understanding of religion as something which has its origins in the
individual and is sustained primarily through individual choices
rather than community formation. Churches and other religious
communities are "institutions of private choice" and their leaders individuals whom the "people choose to look to for guidance," not vehicles for socialization. Consistent with this view is the emphasis among
separationists that what is most essential for protecting religion is not
reinforcing its communal manifestations in the public sphere through
government-sponsored symbols or other acknowledgments of religion
but, rather, protecting the religious choices of individuals. In an opinion frequently noted for its individualistic understanding of religion,58 4justice Stevens argues in Wallace v. Jaffree5 85 that the purpose
of the First Amendment is "to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual'sfreedom to believe, to worship and to express
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience";58 6 it is
the "individual's freedom of conscience [that is] the central lib-7
58
erty ... unif[ying] the various Clauses in the First Amendment."
Stevens repeats the familiar argument in the founding era that the
only "religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and
voluntary choice by the faithful."5 8 8 Stevens recognizes that some peo583 Enge; 370 U.S. at 435, quoted in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
653 n.14 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and in Marsh,
463 U.S. at 806 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
584 See Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in Am=TIS OF
FAIm, ARTIcLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC

PHILosopHY 74, 85-86 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990); Mary Ann

Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, StructuralFree Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 547 & n.335
(1991). Glendon and Yanes also discuss the Court's tendency to conceive of religion
in individualistic terms. See id. at 485, 542-47; see also HaroldJ. Berman, Religion and
Law: The FirstAmendment in HistoricalPerspective, 35 EMoRY LJ. 777, 789-90 (1986).
585 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
586 Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
587 Id at 50 (emphasis added).
588 Id. at 53. For similar arguments in the founding era, see BACKUS, supra note
160, at 198 ("[1]n Christ's kingdom each one has an equal right to judge for himself... [The church's jurisdiction] is only by voluntary consent; for Christ will have

no pressed soldiers in his army."); Jefferson, supranote 45, at 77; MADISON, supranote
1, at 299.
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ple may not choose religion and that religious faith is not inevitable. 58 9 However, he certainly does not expect religion to disappear or
be harmed when it is left to the individual, and in his view, individual
religious freedom is the only foundation for authentic religious faith.
Other separationists on the Court have also emphasized the central role of the First Amendment in protecting the religious choices of
individuals. While Justice Stevens is not among them, many of the
separationists on the Court have argued that the Free Exercise Clause
should be construed to provide affirmative protection for individual
religious freedom not only where laws intentionally infringe on religious practices but also where the burden is the result of a neutral law
of general applicability. 590 The debate about whether the Free Exercise Clause should be construed to require individual exemptions
from neutral laws of general applicability or whether it is only a guarantee against intentional discrimination has been a central issue in
591
Free Exercise Clause case law and in constitutional scholarship.
Prior to its decision in Employment Division v. Smith592 in 1990, the
Court had routinely interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to require
individual exemptions from neutral laws where these laws prohibited
conduct compelled by religious belief (or prescribed conduct prohibited by religious belief) 5 93 or where a law conditioned the receipt of
589 See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 52-53.
590 Justice Ginsburg's vote with the majority in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), suggests that she sharesJustice Steven's opinion that the Free Exercise Clause
does not require exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability which burden
individual free exercise. Most of the supporters of the endorsement approach have

joined the other separationists in arguing that the Free Exercise Clause does require
such exemptions. The exception is Justice Souter, who is undecided on the issue, see
id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting), but has indicated that he is leaning in favor of exemptions, see id. ("I have serious doubts about the precedential value of the Smith

rule and its entitlement to adherence."); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 575-76 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment) (arguing that there appears to be a strong historical argument for
exemptions).
591 For some of the contributions to the debates among constitutional law scholars, see William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled FreeExercise
Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1990), and Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685
(1992), and Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1990). For debates over the historical aspects of
this question, see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409 (1990), and Philip A. Hamburger, A
ConstitutionalRight of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 915 (1992).
592 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
593

See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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an important benefit on conduct prohibited by an individual's reli-

gion (or denied the benefit because of conduct mandated by religious
belief).594 Where such a burden was present, enforcement of the law
against the individual religious objector was only permissible if the
government justified the application of the law as the least restrictive
means of achieving a compelling state interest.5 95 Many of the separationists on the Court have been the most eloquent defenders of the
Court's pre-Smith case law, and while the pre-Smith Court rejected
most claims for exemptions outside of the unemployment compensation context,5

96

it was usually over strong dissents by Marshall, Bren-

nan, and Blackmun, who repeatedly emphasized the critical role of
the First Amendment in protecting individual religious liberty.59 7 Ac-

cording to these Justices, the First Amendment is designed to give religious beliefs and practices special protections that other personal
preferences do not receive,5 98 and in Lynch and Marsh, Brennan argued that one of the few permissible involvements between church
and state is to facilitate the opportunities for individuals to practice
their religion even when such accommodation is not required by the
Free Exercise Clause. 59 9 When the Court reversed its course in Smith,
most of the Court's separationists joined Justice O'Connor in condemning the Court's reversal as "incompatible with our Nation's fun594 See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
595 See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718; see also Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
406.
596 In Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398, the Court held that the South Carolina Employment Security Commission violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied unemployment compensation to a Seventh-Day Adventist who had lost her job because she
refused to work on Saturdays. Prior to Smith, the Court followed Sherbert in all of its
cases addressing claims for unemployment compensation. Similar exemptions were
upheld in Frazee, 489 U.S. at 829, Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 136, and Thomas, 450 U.S. at 707.
597 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 525 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 514, 523-24 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
598 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 525 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("If the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment means anything, it must mean that an individual's
desire to follow his or her faith is not simply another personal preference, to be accommodated by government when convenience allows."); id. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Mere personal preferences in dress are not constitutionally protected. The
First Amendment, however, restrains the Government's ability to prevent an Orthodox Jewish serviceman from, or punish him for, wearing a yarmulke."); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("Under the Free Exercise Clause, religiously motivated claims of conscience may give rise to constitutional
rights that other strongly-held beliefs do not.").
599 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 715 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 812 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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damental commitment to individual religious liberty"60 0 and
inconsistent with the "preferred position" 60 1 that religious liberty occupies in the Constitution.
While accommodationists frequently accuse separationists of hostility to religion, 60 2 the opinions of the Court's separationists make
clear that the accusation is not true. The accommodationists and
separationists do not disagree over the importance of religion and its
protection; the disagreement is over the nature of religious belief and
what is required for its protection. Separationists see no harm where
religious expression is removed from the government sphere. Religion and religious communities will thrive on their own. The state's
role is to protect independent religious choices and to permit individuals to build and support religion on their own. It is by protecting the
rights of minorities "against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions" 60 3 that religion is preserved, not by acknowledging, taking
note of, or otherwise supporting the beliefs of the majority through
government expression.
While the discussion above reveals considerable continuities between the understanding of religion prevalent among separationists in
the founding era and the views of contemporary separationists, there
are also significant differences between their views, and recognizing
these differences is critical for fully understanding why contemporary
separationists have tended to view religion as an individual or personal matter and why they believe that government interference with
religious matters is not only unnecessary but inappropriate. For Jefferson and Madison, religious belief was understood primarily as a
matter of knowledge, and the link between God and the individual
was located in humanity's rational faculties. For Backus and Leland, it
is not reason that provides the link between God and the individual,
but the direct action of God. Religion remains in significant part a
matter of knowledge, but it is the Spirit of God that enlightens the
mind to understand the truths of Scripture. For most contemporary
separationists, on the other hand, religion has its source neither in
reason nor in the direct action of God, and it is not fundamentally a
matter of knowledge. For example, Justice Stevens describes religion
as "the realm .

.

. where knowledge leaves off, and where faith be-

600 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 891 (1990) (O'Connor,J., concurring
in the judgment).
601 Id. at 895.
602 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (Burger, C.J.).
603 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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gins," 604 and Justices Brennan and Blackmun have also argued that
religion is not a matter of reason but faith. 60 5 Thus, unlike Jefferson,
contemporary separationists do not expect religion to thrive without
state support because the human mind will be freed to discover truth
through reason, nor do they believe like Madison that the basic truths
of religion are self-evident propositions shared by all humans. While
separationists on the Court speak of religion as a matter of faith, their
understanding of religion also differs in significant ways from the
views of the evangelical Baptists. Unlike the Baptists, they tend to see
religion as something distinct from knowledge, and they do not expect religion to thrive without state support because they envision the
separation of church and state paving the way for the direct work of
God in personal conversion experiences. Thus, while many of the
statements made by the Court's separationists emphasize the individualistic nature of religious belief and the secondary role of religious
communities in the formation of faith, the origins of religion, in their
view, are neither rational nor evangelical. Likewise, while separationists on the Court repeatedly draw upon separationists in the founding
era as historical support for their confidence that religion thrives best
where it is separate from the state, the reason for their confidence lies
neither in the strength of humanity's rational faculties nor in the
power of God.
When the statements of contemporary separationists supporting
an individualist conception of religion are examined in light of the
developments in modem theology discussed above, it becomes clear
that what they have in mind when they think of religion is less the type
of knowledge envisioned by eighteenth-century separationists than

604 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd.v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 812 n.19 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Clarence Darrow, Transcript of Oral Argument at 7,
Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927) (on file with Clarence Darrow Papers,

Library of Congress)); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).

605 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (asserting that religious faith is distinct from rational deliberation); Serbian Eastern Or-

thodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714-15 (1976) (Brennan, J.).
Indeed it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are

reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or
measurable by objective criteria. Constitutional concerns of due process, involving secular notions of "fundamental fairness" or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical

cognizance.

Id. (footnote omitted).
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the kind of religious experience envisioned by modern theologians. 60 6
Experiential language describing religion is prevalent in the opinions
of the Justices. As noted above, Justice Brennan quotes twice from
Justice Black's statement that religion is "too personal, too sacred, too
holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate." 607
Brennan also refers to religion as "sacred matters," 608 and Blackmun
describes it as a "sacred enterprise. ' 60 9 Early separationists used similar language. According to Black, religion is a "holy field, '6 10 a "sacred area, ' 611 and religious choice should be as "free as the choice of
those who answered the call to worship moved only by the music of
the old Sunday morning church bells." 6 12 These statements suggest

that for today's separationists, religion is a capacity for the sacred built
into human experience, something related more to feeling than to
knowledge as well as something deeply personal and individual in its
origins. As for the modern theologian, religion is not a product of
rational investigation or the miraculous work of God, but rather a dimension of human existence that begins within the self but can be
expected to express itself naturally in religious communities. While
the Justices occasionally speak of these communities as merely associations of like-minded individuals or the "optional aids in individual selfrealization" 6 13 criticized by postliberals, more often they recognize, as
606 It is interesting to note that the period of ascendancy of modernism in theology corresponds roughly to the period when separationist views had their greatest

influence on the Court. The separationist position held the greatest sway among the
Justices from the time of the Court's decision in Everson until the 1980s. In the 1980s,
the strength of separationism on the Court began to wane, and in the early 1990s, a
number of the Court's leading separationists retired from the bench. See Ira C.
Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994), for a
discussion of the decreasing influence of separationism on the Court beginning in
the 1980s. As noted above, modernism in theology was the dominant approach in
theology until the 1980s when it was challenged by posfliberalism and its influence
among theologians diminished significantly. While it is possible that this correspondence is just a coincidence, it is more likely that both separationists and modern theologians were influenced by similar trends of thought regarding religion that were
prevalent in American society during this period.
607 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (quoting MADISON, supra note 1, at
301), quoted in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 725 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
and in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
608 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997).
609 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 640 n.10 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
610 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
611 Id.
612 Id. at 319.
613 LINDBECK, supra note 267, at 23.
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most modem theologians do, that religious communities play a role
in reinforcing faith and guiding the faithful. However, like modem
theologians, they are confident that humanity's natural religious orientation will ensure that individuals will seek whatever communal guidance or support they need without external prodding.
The similarities between the separationist understanding of religion and modem theology extend to the language that they use to
describe religious experience. The Court's description of religion as a
"holy field" or "sacred enterprise" which is deeply "personal" in origin
resonates with 6Schleiermacher's
early reference to religious feelings as
"holy feelings" 14 arising from a "holy instinct ' 615 located in the "innermost part of humanity."6 16 Phenomenologists of religion who
have followed Schleiermacher in understanding religion as something
which originates in experience have also described this religious dimension to human existence as an experience of the "sacred"617 or
the "holy,"61 8 and both Lonergan and Tillich have drawn in particular
upon Rudolf Otto's discussion of religious experience as an experience of the holy.6 19
It is clear that the separationists on the Court do not expect every
individual to follow a religious path, and they probably would not
agree with modern theologians that religious experience is an essential aspect of the human constitution and present in all individuals.
Furthermore, with the exception of a single decision embracing Til620
lich's understanding of religion as "ultimate concern" in the 1960s,
there is no evidence that the Justices envision a common form of religious experience underlying the various religious traditions. Certainly they do not attempt the type of precise definition of religious
experience that has been the work of modern theologians. However,
they do view religion as something which is, in its essence and all its
forms, sacred, holy, personal, and special, and it is for this reason that
government intervention in religious matters is inappropriate. Mixing the holy with mundane matters of government and politics is an
614

SCHLEIERMACHER, SPEECHES, supra note 269, at 92, 168.

615

Id at 86.

616

Id at 164.

617 See MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION 15
(Willard R. Trask, trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1959) (1957).
618

See Orro, supra note 282, at 4-7.

619 See TmuCH, supra note 282, at 12-16; LONERGAN, supra note 297, at 106.
620 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (construing the conscientious objector provision of the Universal Military Training and Service Act) (Clark, J.)
(quoting PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948)).
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"unhallowed perversion" of religion, 6 21 an "intrusion into sacred matters,"622 that "risk[s] secularizing and demeaning the sacred enterprise" 62 3 and "degrad[ing] religion. ' 624 State involvement in religion

does not harm religion because it blocks the progress of reason, frustrates the work of God, or even impedes the discovery of truth; rather,
its harm is that it demeans and compromises the sacred dimension of
human life. Thus, Brennan objects to the legislative prayers in Marsh
because they trivialize what for many is "serious theological business." 625 Similarly, government appropriation of the menorah in Allegheny for a secular celebration of the holiday season or to send a
message of pluralism or freedom is "offensive to those whose religious
beliefs are not bound up with their attitude toward the Nation" and
an "interference in religious matters precluded by the Establishment
Clause. '62 6 Stevens argues that devout Christians may be offended by
the "commercialization" 627 of the creche in Allegheny, and in Lynch, he
joins Blackmun in calling the use of the creche in the Pawtucket display a "misuse of a sacred symbol." 628 Nor do contemporary separationists believe that religion requires government support or
recognition. While religious experience may not be a universal experience present in every individual, it is prevalent enough to ensure
that religion will be an ever-present characteristic of human existence
and societies in general. None of the separationists view any danger
to religious faith by its separation from the governmental sphere but,
rather, expect separation to "reinvigorate" it.629 In Justice Stevens's
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962) (quoting MADISON, MEMORIAL AND
supra note 1, at 301), quoted in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 725
(1984) (Brennan,J., dissenting), and in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
622 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997).
623 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 640 n.10 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
624 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (stating that the Establishment
Clause's "first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion"), quoted
in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606 n.8 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring), and in
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
625 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 819 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
621

REMONSTRANCE,

626 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 645 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
627 Id. at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
628 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 712 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Many Christian commentators have voiced strong objections to
what they consider to be the debasement and trivialization of Christmas through too
close a connection with commercial and public celebrations.").
629 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 821-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan writes,
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words, religion "never has needed the arm of the State for support,
and wherever it has received it, it has harmed both the public and the
63s0
religion that it would pretend to serve.
C.

The Separated Community

The discussion above examines the recurring statements in separationist jurisprudence which emphasize an individualistic understanding of religious belief. It is certainly true that part of what
accounts for the separationist confidence that religion thrives best
where it is kept distinct from the state is a tendency to view religion as
something deeply personal in its origin rather than as something
shaped and formed in religious communities. There are, however,
other currents in separationist thought which do emphasize the importance of communities in shaping faith. Justice Brennan is an example of a separationist who is highly sensitive to both the individual
aspects of religious faith as well as its corporate dimensions. Justice
Blackmun also acknowledges the critical role of religious communities
in sustaining faith in his concurrence in Weisman, and several of those
who have followed a strict interpretation of the endorsement test also
share this view. However, while these Justices are aware of religion's
important communal dimensions, like Lindbeck, they do not believe
that religious communities require government aid or recognition for
support, and like Hauerwas, they argue that religious communities
thrive best where they are separated from the state.
Recognition of the important role that religious communities
play in forming and shaping faith is seen most clearly injustice Brennan's opinions. While Justice Brennan frequently describes religion
in terms that are very individualistic, at other times he manifests a
deep awareness of the communal aspects of religion, and nowhere is
this more evident than in his opinion in Corporation of the Presiding
Bishap of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos. 63 1 In a
The argument is made occasionally that a strict separation of religion and
state robs the nation of its spiritual identity. I believe quite the contrary.....
If the Court had struck down legislative prayer today, it would likely have
stimulated a furious reaction. But it would also, I am convinced, have invigorated both the "spirit of religion" and the "spirit of freedom."
Id
630 Capitol Square Review &Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 812 n.19 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Clarence Darrow, Transcript of Oral Argument at 7,
Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927) (on file with Clarence Darrow Papers,
Library of Congress)); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977) (Stevens,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
631 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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concurrence joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan expressly
states that for many individuals, religion has indispensable communal
elements and that these elements further the religious development
of individuals by forming the context within which they realize and
exercise their faith. 632 Citing Karl Barth, a Swiss theologian whose
work in the first half of the twentieth century was one of the most
influential theological sources for postliberal theology, 63 3 Brennan
states that "[f] or many individuals, religious activity derives meaning
in large measure from participation in a larger religious community.
Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs,
an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals."' 634 Thus, religious communities are not just associations of like-

minded individuals that grow secondarily from the choices of autonomous individuals, nor do they merely reinforce or evoke a religious
experience that is already present deep within the self. Rather, they
can also function as the source of shared traditions and shared beliefs
which give content to the individual's religious life that could not be
achieved alone. The question in Amos was whether the exemption of
religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition against religious
discrimination in employment violated the Establishment Clause. 6 35
According to Brennan, Amos involved the rights of both individuals,
whose religious freedom is burdened by the exemption, as well as the
rights of religious organizations, whose ability to define their own mission is furthered by the exemption. 63 6 While these rights are in tension, they are also deeply related because the important communal
dimension to religious belief and practice means that the "furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individ632 See id. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
633 See Placher, supra note 285, at 394.
634 Amos, 483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). As support
for this statement, Brennan cites Karl Barth, The Christian Community and the Civil
Community (1946), reprintedin COMMUNITY, STATE, AND CHURCH 149 (1960), Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreward:Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4
(1983), and Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of
Constitutional"Interpretation,"58 S. CAL.L. REV. 551, 558 (1985).

635 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Civil Rights Act of 1964
§ 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Section 702 of the Act provides that Title VII

"shall not apply to... a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a).
636 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 340-42 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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ual religious freedom as well." 637 Brennan's answer to the question in
Amos was to balance these rights and permit a limited exemption for
religious organizations in the nonprofit context, where employment
decisions are most likely to involve religious activities essential for
638
community self-definition.
In Amos, Brennan agreed with the majority that permissible involvements between church and state include not only endeavors to
relieve burdens on individual free exercise but also efforts to protect
religious communities from state interference. Brennan's solicitude
for the protection of religious organizations is also clear from his decisions in the Free Exercise context and in cases addressing intrachurch
disputes. In the Free Exercise context, Brennan has joined with Marshall and Blackmun in arguing that the First Amendment not only
permits, but sometimes requires, exemptions from neutral laws that
burden religious communities. Brennan makes this argument most
forcefully in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAss'n.639 Lyng
involved a Free Exercise challenge to the federal government's plan to
build a road through a portion of a national forest held sacred by
three Indian tribes and used by them as an integral part of their religious worship and rituals. 6 40 Brennan emphasized that religion for
these Native Americans is not an individual matter but an inherently
communal and site-specific enterprise. 64 1 According to Brennan, the
Free Exercise Clause protects not only the religious choices of individuals whose beliefs and practices are burdened by neutral government
laws, but also communal ways of life which are threatened by government action. 642 In Brennan's view, the government's road violates the
Free Exercise Clause because it would make the practice of the Indians' religion impossible and destroy their way of life. 643 In support of
his argument, Brennan cites the Court's earlier decision in Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 644 which exempted the Amish from Wisconsin's compulsory
education laws 645 on the grounds that the application of the laws
would threaten the survival of their religious community and way of
637 Id. at 342.
638 See id. at 342-46.
639 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
640 See id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
641 See id. at 460-61.
642 See id. at 466.
643 See id. at 460-61, 466-68.
644 See id. at 466-67 (drawing support from Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972)). Brennanjoined the Court's decision in Yoder.
645 Yoder exempted Amish children from compulsory school attendance after the
completion of the eighth grade.
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life64 6 without being justified by a sufficiently compelling state
647

interest.
In cases dealing with intrachurch disputes, Brennan has also argued that the government must be careful not to interfere with the
practices of religious communities. When courts resolve these disputes, they must do so in a way that does not involve them in questions of church doctrine or polity, 648 and when a case turns on a
question of church doctrine, courts must defer to the highest tribunal
in the church organization. 649 According to Brennan, government interference into religious controversies presents "the hazards . . .of

inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. 6 50
646 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218, 235 (discussing the threat to the Amish
communities).
647 See id. at 214-36 (discussing lack of a sufficiently compelling government interest to justify the threat); see also id. at 237-38 (White, J., with Brennan & Stewart, JJ.,
concurring) ("Ijoin the opinion and judgment of the Court because I cannot say that
the State's interest in requiring two more years of compulsory education in the ninth
and tenth grades outweighs the importance of the concededly sincere Amish religious
practice to the survival of that sect.").
648 See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (Brennan, J.).
649 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976)
(Brennan, J.); see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (Brennan, J., joining
Blackmun).
650 Hul4 393 U.S. at 449; see also Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710 (quoting Hull 393
U.S. at 449); Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (same). For
some of the Justices, Brennan's opinions in the intrachurch dispute area are not sufficiently protective of religious communities. In the Court's most recent case involving
an intrachurch dispute, see Jones v. Wolf, 442 U.S. 595 (1979), the Justices divided
sharply over whether courts must defer to the resolution of the dispute reached by the
highest tribunal in the church to consider the controversy or whether the First
Amendment also permits courts to resolve intrachurch disputes using "neutral principles of law." In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justice Brennan, the Court held that while courts must always defer to the highest tribunal of a
hierarchical church on questions of church doctrine or polity, courts may resolve
property disputes using ordinary principles of trust and property law where doing so
would not involve the court in ecclesiastical controversies. See id. at 602-04. According to the Court, the virtues of the neutral-principles approach are that courts will not
become entangled in ecclesiastical questions and churches can use the appropriate
trust provisions and reversionary clauses to specify what will happen to church property in the event of an internal dispute. See id. at 603-04. While Justice Brennan had
spoken approvingly of the neutral-principles approach in his opinion in Hul4 393
U.S. at 449, and supported the approach in his concurrence in Sharpsburg,396 U.S. at
370, prior to Wolf, the Court had always resolved the disputes it addressed by deferring to the highest tribunal of the church to consider the matter. See, e.g., Milivje-
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Justice Brennan is not the only justice with separationist leanings
who has recognized the importance of the communal dimension of
faith and sought to protect this dimension from state interference.
While Brennan's opinions certainly contain the most developed discussions of religious community and probably also the greatest sensitivity to the role of community in religious life, Justice Blackmun has
also expressly recognized that religious communities play an important role in sustaining faith, and like Brennan, he has argued that one
of the purposes of the First Amendment is to protect the religious
community. In his concurrence in Weisman, Blackmun argues that
"strong religious communit[ies]" are crucial for the survival of religion as well as religious liberty, 65 1 and that the Establishment Clause

"guarantees" such communities.6 5 2

vich, 426 U.S. 696; Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church,
344 U.S. 94 (1952); Waston v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). The dissent in
Wolf argued that the First Amendment requires such deference and that the neutralprinciples approach would result in impermissible state interference with church polity and undermine the right of church members to establish their own forms of
church governance to settle internal disputes. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 610-14, 616-18
(Powell, J., dissenting). The majority disagreed and argued that the neutral-principles approach facilitates the autonomy of church organizations by permitting
churches to specify in legally cognizable terms how they would like intrachurch disputes resolved. See id. at 603-04, 606. While the dissent accused Justice Brennan and
other supporters of the neutral-principles approach of not being sufficiently protective of religious communities, Douglas Laycock has correctly observed that all of the
Justices in Wolf "agreed unanimously on the goal of church autonomy"; what they
disagreed about was how best to achieve this goal. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 1373, 1395 (1981).

651 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also
id. at 609.
652 Id. at 606. On the other hand, in Board of Education of Kiryasjoel Village School
District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), Justice Blackmun joined Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg in a concurrence that appears to place limits on their concern for the welfare of religious communities.
The question in KiryasJoelwas whether the state of New York had violated the
Establishment Clause by creating a special school district for the village of KiryasJoel.
See id. at 690. All of the residents of Kiryas Joel are members of a strict form ofJudaism known as Satmar Hasidim. See id. at 690-91. With the exception of children requiring special education services, all of the Satmar children attend private religious
schools. See id. at 691. Prior to the Court's decisions in School District of GrandRapids
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), and
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203, disabled
children received special education services at an annex to one of the community's
private schools. See KiryasJoe 512 U.S. at 692. When this type of arrangement was
held unconstitutional in Ball and Aguilar, Satmar children who needed special education services were forced to attend public schools, and they experienced considerable
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However, for both Brennan and Blackmun, the way that the state
protects religious communities is not to give them aid or recognition
but, rather, to stay out of their affairs and allow them to develop on
their own free from government interference. While Brennan is very
solicitous to protect religious communities from outside interference, 6 53 he countenances very little government aid for these communities either in the form of monetary support or supportive religious
expression by the state. Brennan's opposition to proactive state support for religious organizations is illustrated well by his decision in
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.65 4 Texas Monthly involved an Establishment Clause challenge to a provision in the Texas Tax Code which
exempted religious publications from the payment of sales tax but not
emotional trauma and fear in adjusting to the non-Satmar world. See id. The state
legislature created the special school district for KiryasJoel to address these problems,
and the function of the district was to provide secular special education services to
Satmar children. See id. at 693-94. While the Court recognized that the Constitution
permits states to relieve burdens on free exercise, see id. at 705-06, it held that, in this
case, the method chosen by the New York legislature violated the Establishment
Clause principle of neutrality, see id. at 703-07. According to the Court, the New York
legislature had provided the Satmar community with a special benefit without guaranteeing that similarly situated religious groups would receive the same relief. See id. at
703-04; see also id. at 716-17 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
In a concurrence joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg, Justice Stevens also
argued that the special school district impermissibly provided "affirmative[] support[ ]" for the self-segregation of the Satmar community and their children from the
outside world. Id. at 711 (StevensJ, concurring). Rather than merely exempting the
community from a burdensome general rule as the Court did for the Amish in Yoder,
the New York law was "[a]ffirmative state action in aid of segregation." Id. at 711-12.
Justice Stevens's argument that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government
from affirmatively supporting religious separatism does not necessarily imply a lack of
concern for the welfare of these types of religious communities. As discussed further
below, Justice Brennan believes that the state is prohibited from proactively aiding
religious communities even while it has a strict constitutional duty to refrain from
interference with them. See infra text accompanying notes 653-56. However, while
Justice Brennan's opinions reveal a strong concern with protecting minority religious
communities and their distinctive ways of life, Justice Stevens's opinion seems far less
sympathetic to those communities where they adopt a process of community formation and education that minimizes contact with outsiders. Justice Stevens uses strong
words to describe the effort of the Satmar community to "isolat[e]" and "shield" its
children "from associating with their neighbors" and, thereby, to "cement" their attachment to the faith and "increase[] the likelihood that they would remain within
the fold, faithful adherents of their parents' religious faith." Id. at 711.
653 For an argument that Brennan and others on the Court have not gone far
enough in recognizing and protecting the communal dimensions of religion, see
Glendon & Yanes, supra note 584.
654 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality).
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similar nonreligious publications. 655 The Court struck down the provision and Brennan wrote a plurality opinion joined by Marshall and
Stevens. According to Brennan, because the sales tax did not place a
significant burden on religious organizations, the special benefit that
the exemption conferred on religious organizations was an "unjustifiable award [ ] of assistance to religious organizations." 65 6 Justice Blackmun made a similar argument about the creche in Allegheny.
According to Blackmun, the placement of the creche in the Allegheny
County Courthouse did not relieve a government burden on individual Christians or Christian communities. 657 Christians "remain free to
display creches in their homes and churches." 658 Likewise, in his concurrence in Weisman, Souter argues that prayers at official public
school graduations are not necessary to relieve a government burden
on religious individuals and communities. 659 Those who "invest this
rite of passage with spiritual significance ... may express their religious feelings about it before and after the ceremony," 660 and they
"may even organize a privately sponsored baccalaureate" with others
who share their views. 661 Souter does not dispute the importance of
community expressions of faith at graduation time, nor does Blackmun deny the importance of communal displays of religious symbols
during the holiday season. What they object to is the government becoming involved in such expression. When there is no specific burden on religious activity, government support for religious
communities becomes impermissible endorsement at the expense of
662
religious minorities and nonbelievers.
Thus, while separationists such as Brennan and supporters of a
strict interpretation of the endorsement test such as Souter and Blackmun have recognized that religious communities play an important
role in fostering and sustaining faith, the religious community that
they envision is essentially a separated community. It is a strictly private organization whose independence and autonomy are protected
against state interference, but whose activities receive no other recognition or support from the government. For accommodationists, re655

See id. at 5.

656 Id. at 15 (quoting Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
657 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 n.51 (1989).
658 Id
659 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 629 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
660 Id
661 Id.
662 See id at 629-30; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 612.
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moving religion from the government sphere and relegating it to a
strictly private realm evidences hostility to religion. 663 For the separationist and the strict interpreter of the endorsement test, "nothing
could be further from the truth."664 Like Lindbeck, they do not believe that religious communities need support or recognition from the
state in order to flourish. In Justice Souter's words, the graduation
prayers at issue in Weisman were a "gratuitous largesse." 6 65 Students
and families with strong religious commitments "have no need for the
machinery of the State to affirm their beliefs." 6 66 Similarly, for Blackmun, the creche in Allegheny served only to "gratif[y]" the "desire" of
Christians who "wish to see the government proclaim its allegiance to
Christianity in a religious celebration of Christmas." 667 It was not nec-

essary to protect religion. Neither Blackmun nor Souter sees any
harm to religion from restricting religious communities and their expressions to a private sphere.
Furthermore, separationists and strict interpreters of the endorsement test are convinced that religious communities will not only
survive without support or recognition from the state but that they will
thrive better without such assistance. Like Hauerwas, they argue that
too close a union between government and religion compromises the
integrity of the religious community and threatens its independence.
In Brennan's words, "too close a proximity" between church and state
"creates real dangers of 'the secularization of a creed."' 668 Justices
Blackmun and Souter speak of the "taint" of a "corrosive secularism.

' 66 9

For Justice Stevens, there is a risk of "compromis[ing] [the]

religious mission. '670 In Weisman, Blackmun explains that the way
that the Establishment Clause guarantees strong religious communi67 1
ties is precisely by ensuring that they are separate from the state.
663 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655, 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).

664 Id. at 610 (Blackmun, J.).
665

Weisman, 505 U.S. at 629 (Souter, J., concurring).

666 Id.
667

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 612.

668 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 649 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
669 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 608 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting School Dist. of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (Brennan, J.), overruled by Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 243 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Weisman, 505 U.S. at 608 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
670 Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

671

See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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He argues that "[w]e have believed that religious freedom cannot
thrive in the absence of a vibrant religious community and that such a
6' 72
community cannot prosper when it is bound to the secular.
D.

The Importance of the Public Community

When separationists speak of religion, they often describe it in
individualistic terms. While many separationists do recognize a role
for communities in shaping and forming faith, and this recognition is
shared by strict interpreters of the endorsement test, it is a separated
community that they envision. Both assumptions support their view
that a secular state will not harm religion but, rather, will protect religion by ensuring its independence and autonomy from the "demeaning effects of [the] governmental embrace." 673 When accommodationists accuse their opponents of hostility to religion, it is because
they disagree with these underlying theological assumptions about the
nature of religion and what is required for its protection. For accommodationists, religion is something deeply communal in nature, and
they believe that it will be harmed, not helped, if it is separated from
the state in a private sphere.
In his dissent in Weisman, Justice Scalia directly challenges the
individualistic conception of religion. According to Scalia, religion is
not, "as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal
avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in
the privacy of one's room." 674 Scalia's characterization of the position

of his opponents is certainly overdrawn. None of the Justices believe
that religion is an entirely solitary affair. However, Scalia's objections
to his opponents and the discussion that follows do reveal an important difference between them. While separationists have tended to
see religion as something deeply personal in nature, and they have
joined strict interpreters of the endorsement test in viewing religious
communities as something which can and should be separated from
the concerns of government, Scalia argues that religion cannot be
confined to a distinct compartment in the individual's life. Nor is it
something which begins in the individual and only expresses itself secondarily in communal forms. Rather, for Scalia, as for the postliberal
theologian, religion is an essentially communal phenomenon which
functions as a comprehensive framework or world view that shapes the
entirety of one's life and thought. As a communal framework for
viewing all aspects of life, religions necessarily will involve matters that
672 IR.at 609.
673 Id at 627 (Souter, J., concurring).
674 Id at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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concern the governmental sphere, and expressions of religion in
"public culture," 675 such as public worship at graduations, are a natural part of religious life. According to Scalia, public worship reflects
the fact that
[f] or most believers [religion is not a purely private matter]. Religious men and women of almost all denominations have felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God as a people,
and not just as individuals, because they believe in the "protection
of divine Providence," as the Declaration of Independence put it,
not just for individuals but for societies; because they believe God to
be, as Washington's first Thanksgiving Proclamation put it, the
676
"Great Lord and Ruler of Nations."
Thus, public expressions of religious faith, including religious expression by government bodies, are essential if religion is not to be
677
stunted by being artificially confined to a private sphere.
In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy argues that government acknowledgment and recognition of the central role that religion plays in
American life is not only a natural reflection of the religiosity of its
citizens, as well as a pervasive part of American history and traditions,
but also essential for the survival of religion. According to Kennedy, if
government cannot recognize and take note of the important place
that religion plays in the lives of its citizens, "acknowledg[ment] [of]
only the secular, to the exclusion" of the religious will work a "detriment" to religion. 678 Justice Kennedy's discussion in Allegheny provides the most detailed explanation for why the accommodationists
believe that the exclusion of religious symbols and language from the
government sphere harms religion. However, Kennedy's discussion
remains very brief, and examining his statements in light of
postliberal theology and the developments that have grown out of
675 Id. at 646.
676 Id. at 645.
677 It is interesting to note that while accommodationists are very sensitive to the
communal dimension of religion, they seem less sensitive to its more individual aspects. Whereas most of the Court's separationists and supporters of the endorsement
test have argued that the Free Exercise Clause should be construed to require exemp-

tions from neutral laws which burden individual free exercise, all of the Court's current accommodationists have taken the opposite position. They argue that the
Court's pre-Smith case law "court[ed] anarchy," Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 888 (1990), and that exemptions from neutral laws should be left to the political

process, see id. at 890. For further discussion of this issue and the positions of the
other Justices, see supra notes 590-601 and accompanying text.
678 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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postliberal theology in the 1990s can help to clarify where his concerns lie.
According to Kennedy, if government expression can acknowledge only the secular, the removal of symbols and language with religious meaning from the government sector will "send[] a clear
message of disapproval" of religion. 679 The harm to religion will be
especially great where there is a large public sector. As the "modem
administrative state" expands to occupy an ever-growing place in the
lives of its citizens, "it is difficult to maintain the fiction that requiring
government to avoid all assistance to religion can in fairness be viewed
as serving the goal of neutrality."680 With respect to Justice Blackmun's position that government should be permitted to celebrate
only the secular aspects of a holiday with both religious and secular
meaning, Kennedy argues that such "enforced recognition of only the
secular aspect would signify ... callous indifference toward religious
faith.., not neutrality but a pervasive intent to insulate government
from all things religious."'68 1 The separationists and strict interpreters
of the endorsement test do not intend a message of disapproval or
hostility towards religion when they argue that the state should be secular and that the role of safeguarding America's religious heritage belongs solely to religious individuals and their communities and not to
government. However, Kennedy is arguing that the absence of religious language from the government sphere will send such a message,
and that the effect of this message will be to disadvantage religious
views and beliefs. Removing religion from government expression
will not, in Kennedy's view, serve to strengthen its independence and
authority but, rather, to unfairly weaken its influence and role in
American life.
Behind Kennedy's claims that removing religion from government expression sends a message of disapproval of religion and unfairly weakens its role in American life are a number of assumptions
that he shares with the postliberals. Like the postliberals, Kennedy
sees religion as an essentially communal phenomenon. Religious
faith is not guaranteed by an innate capacity for the sacred or any
other direct connection between the individual and the divine which
can be expected to sustain faith without the supporting language and
traditions of religious communities. Rather, faith depends upon religious communities and on the vitality and relevance of their symbols
and traditions. Where the vitality of religious language and its rele679 I.
680 Id. at 657-58.
681 I& at 663-64.
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vance to the lives of believers is undermined, religion will be harmed.
Secondly, Kennedy agrees with theologians in the 1990s who argue
that religious belief systems cannot be separated from the influences
of the surrounding culture but, rather, are open to change from the
outside, including from the messages sent by government. Religious
communities are necessarily part of the larger public community
within which adherents live, and what happens in the larger public
culture will have an effect on religion. For Kennedy, these two assumptions mean that the exclusion of religion from an ever-growing
government sector will harm religion. Justice Kennedy's position is
similar to the argument developed above in Part II regarding the implications of postliberal theology for church-state relations. As a pervasive public sector touches the lives of its citizens in numerous ways
and occupies a significant part of the individual's larger cultural universe, removing religious expression from this aspect of public life will
send a message of disapproval or indifference to religion, and the effect will be to marginalize the role of religion in the lives of adherents
and undermine its central place in American life. Religious symbols
and language, which only have a place within the private sphere of
home and church and receive no reinforcement from the larger public community which also shapes the individual's experience and beliefs, lose their relevance for the lives of believers. It is difficult for
religious belief systems to function as the central interpretative
frameworks for understanding the world and for guiding one's life
and decisions where the religious community and its language and
symbols are separated and compartmentalized in a private sphere.
Permitting only secular and not religious messages in the government sphere can also have the effect of secularizing as well as
marginalizing religion. For example, where the government celebrates only the secular and not the religious aspects of a holiday that
has both meanings, the effect will be to advance the secular interpretation over the religious one. For separationists and strict interpreters
of the endorsement test, it is the inclusion of religious symbols in government holiday displays that risks secularizing the religious dimensions of the holiday and commercializing what should remain sacred
and holy and, thus, distinct from the mundane sphere of government.
For accommodationists, on the other hand, it is the absence of these
religious symbols that risks eclipsing the religious aspects of the holiday season and secularizing the celebration of the holiday.
It is of no comfort to Kennedy that separationists and strict supporters of the endorsement test allow a narrow place for religious symbols in government expression where these symbols have a secular
import, such as the display of religious symbols in a museum setting or
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the use of religious language which has lost its religious meaning. To
the contrary, allowing government to use religious symbols and language only where they have lost significant religious meaning or
where they are used for nonreligious purposes is to disadvantage
those for whom religion is not just a matter of history or culture but
also a way of life. Because Kennedy believes that a consistent interpretation of the endorsement test will lead inevitably to the secular state
envisioned by Justice Blackmun, he does not address Justice
O'Connor's vision of a limited place for language with religious meaning which does not endorse religion. However, Kennedy clearly believes that the Establishment Clause is consistent with language that
endorses religion as long as it does not proselytize or coerce participation, and his objections to Justice O'Connor's position would be similar to those he makes against separationism and the strict
interpretation of the endorsement test. To permit the government to
endorse secular events and traditions in American culture but not religious ones is to disadvantage religion, and to permit the government
to celebrate events with a dual meaning in a way that negates any endorsement of their religious significance is to risk eclipsing this religious significance and secularizing their content.
Thus, Kennedy clearly disagrees with Lindbeck and Hauerwas's
view that the separation of religion from the state is beneficial to religion. For Kennedy, the state is part of the larger public community in
which religious individuals live, and what happens in the government
sector will necessarily influence religion. When the government is
large and its expressions confined mostly to the secular, the effect will
be to diminish the importance of religion in the lives of its adherents
and to exert a secularizing influence on the larger society.
Justice Stewart made a similar argument in 1963 in his dissent in
School DistrictofAbington Township v. Schempp.68 2 The Court in Schempp
held that the practice of opening the public school day with readings
from the Bible and recitation of the Lord's Prayer violated the Establishment Clause. It is not clear how many, if any, of today's accommodationists would support Stewart's position regarding the
constitutionality of Bible reading in the public schools. Given his reasoning in Weisman, Justice Kennedy would probably argue that such
religious exercises place coercive pressures on students to participate,
and other accommodationists may also have reasons for disapproving
of the practices in Schempp. However, the reasoning thatJustice Stewart gives for his position provides a very clear and concise expression
of the type of concerns that underlie the contemporary accommoda682

374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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tionist position. The Court in Schempp defended its decision on the
grounds that Bible readings impermissibly advanced religion in viola68 3
tion of the requirement of government neutrality toward religion.
For Justice Stewart, it was removing religion from the public school
day that violated the principle of neutrality:
It might also be argued that parents who want their children exposed to religious influences can adequately fulfill that wish off
school property and outside school time. With all its surface persuasiveness, however, this argument seriously misconceives the basic
constitutional justification for permitting the exercises at issue in
these cases. For a compulsory state educational system so structures
a child's life that if religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in schools, religion is placed at an artificial and statecreated disadvantage. Viewed in this light, permission of such exercises for those who want them is necessary if the schools are truly to
684
be neutral in the matter of religion.
Stewart's argument, like Kennedy's, is that where the state occupies a large part of the individual's life, the exclusion of religious expression from this sector will place religion at an "artificial and state-

created disadvantage." 685 The separated religious community in the
context of the modern administrative state is, in this view, inherently
disadvantaged.
In Justice Blackmun's view, Justice Kennedy and the accommodationists are "would-be theocrats" 686 who would like to see the state ex-

press an "allegiance" to their religious views. 687 The creche in

Allegheny is, for Blackmun, nothing but the "gratification" of such a

desire. 68 8 Justice Souter expresses a similar view regarding the graduation prayers at issue in Weisman. They were, he suggests,
"brought... into the ceremony 'precisely because some people want a
symbolic affirmation that government approves and endorses their
religion, and because many of the people who want this affirmation
place little or no value on the costs to religious minorities.' 689 In
both cases, there was no identifiable burden on religious practices,
and thus, the government's expressions were merely a "gratuitous lar683 See id. at 222-26.
684 Id. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
685 Id.
686 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 611.
687 Id. at 611-612.
688 Id. at 612.
689 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 630 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting
Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEo. WAsH.
L. REv. 841, 844 (1992)).
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gesse. ' 69 0 just as the accommodationists unfairly accuse their opponents of hostility to religion, Justice Blackmun and Justice Souter's
interpretation of the accommodationists' position distort their views.
While the accommodationists draw historical support for their position from the numerous examples of government encouragement of
religion in the founding era and share the view of those who favored
these mild establishments that religious communities and language
play a critical role in shaping and fostering faith, their concerns are,
in fact, quite different. Contemporary accommodationists do not believe that people are too sinful and weak to sustain religious communities without public provision for religion, nor do they go as far as
those who supported mild establishments in the founding era in affirming a proactive role for the state in inculcating religion. 691 Their
desire is also not to have government proclaim an "allegiance" to religion. Rather, what they envision is a limited role for the state in acknowledging and recognizing the central place that religion already
plays in American society. For the accommodationist, these acknowledgments are not intended to promote religion but, rather, to preserve religion from encroachment by a pervasive secular state. If
government cannot take note of the central role that religion plays in
American society, religion will be at an unfair disadvantage. Thus,
when Justice Souter calls graduation prayers a "gratuitous largesse,"
he shows that he misunderstands the concerns that underlie the accommodationist position. Government expression acknowledging
America's religious heritage is not a gratuitous largesse for the accom-

690 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 629.
691 Some accommodationists have argued that nonpreferential state support for
religion (i.e., support that treats all sects equally and does not prefer one over the
other) is consistent with the Establishment Clause, but this argument does not appear
in the Court's cases addressing religious expression by the state, and the accommodationist argument is not the same as the argument for nonpreferential aid to religion.
For opinions arguing that nonpreferentialism is consistent with the requirements of
the Establishment Clause, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (holding that the Establishment Clause was not intended to prohibit nondiscriminatory aid to religion), and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (finding
"much to commend" the "view that the Framers saw the Establishment Clause simply
as a prohibition on governmental preferences for some religious faiths over others"),
and see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
401 (1993) (Scalia & Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("As for the asserted
Establishment Clause justification, I would hold, simply and clearly, that giving
Lamb's Chapel nondiscriminatory access to school facilities cannot violate that provision because it does not signify state or local embrace of a particular religious sect.").
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modationists; it is the only way that the state can be truly fair to religious views.
E. The PluralisticNature of Religion
As the discussion above demonstrates, many of the theological
divisions on the Court relate to different understandings about how
religious faith is formed and sustained and the role of the individual,
the religious community, and the larger public community in this process. The disagreements among the Justices regarding religious expression by the state result, in large part, from the fact that the
Justices have differing ideas about how religious faith is fostered and
sustained and, thus, different ideas about what position best protects
religion. There is, however, an additional source of disagreement
among the Justices regarding the nature of religion and the requirements for its protection, and this area of disagreement lies behind the
objections of the supporters of the endorsement test to the accommodationist position. For the supporters of the endorsement test,
religion is viewed as something deeply pluralistic in character. The
protection of religion requires a respect for this deeply pluralistic nature of religion and the fair and equal treatment of all religious adherents as well as those without religious commitments.
Accommodationists, on the other hand, are less sensitive to the differences among religious views and traditions, and they place less emphasis on the fairness concerns that are critical to the endorsement
position.
As discussed above, supporters of the endorsement test differ substantially over how they interpret and apply the test. For those who
interpret the test strictly, very little religious expression by the state is
permissible and the Establishment Clause demands a secular state.
Their position moves very close to that of the separationists, whose
application of the endorsement test becomes almost indistinguishable
from their separationist position. By contrast, Justice O'Connor
would allow much more room for religious expression by the state,
and she certainly does not envision the separated religious community
advocated by the separationists and strict interpreters of the endorsement test. Justice O'Connor recognizes that the concerns of religion
and government will necessarily overlap 69 2 and that there must be
some room for government acknowledgment of religion. 693 However,
while they disagree about when religious expression amounts to en692

See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).

693

See Allegheny, 492

U.S.

at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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dorsement, all supporters of the endorsement test are united in the
view that government may not engage in religious expression which
endorses religion over nonreligion or one religious group over another. In their view, one of the central, if not the central,6 94 purposes
of the Establishment Clause is to prohibit government from making
adherence to religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community by sending a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders.
When Justice O'Connor first articulated the endorsement test in
Lynch and Wallace v. Jaffree, her primary concern appeared to be to
protect religious minorities and nonbelievers from coercive pressures
by the state.695 Supporters of the endorsement test continue to argue
that the test protects the interests of religious liberty,6 96 but their pri-

mary concern has shifted, and they now emphasize that the endorsement test is necessary to respect the religious pluralism and diversity
in American society. In Allegheny, Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and
Stevens all argue that the Establishment Clause forbids the government from showing favoritism to religion and among religions, and
that such a prohibition is necessary to respect the diversity of religious
views in America. InJustice O'Connor's words, 'We live in a pluralistic society. Our citizens come from diverse religious traditions or adhere to no particular religious beliefs at all." 69 7 Where government

shows favoritism to particular beliefs, it does not "adequately protect
the religious liberty or respect the religious diversity of the members
698
of our pluralistic political community."
Behind the endorsement test lies a picture of religion as a deeply
pluralistic affair. Supporters of the endorsement test share the views
of the growing number of theologians in the 1990s who are emphasizing the fundamental differences among religious experiences and traditions and the wide range of forms that religious beliefs can take.
Few Justices have ever denied the fact of religious pluralism in American society, and even the separationists whose understanding of religion resembles the experiential view of the modern theologians rarely
follow modern theologians in believing that there is a common reli694 For O'Connor, prohibiting government endorsement is the central purpose
behind the Establishment Clause at least where religious expression by the state is

concerned. For separationists who have used the endorsement test, separation remains a distinct and independent value.
695 See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
696 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 628 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
697 I& at 627.
698 I& at 628.
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gious experience underlying all religious traditions. For the separationist, the "holy field" and "sacred enterprise" of religion has always
been a pluralistic one. However, the widespread adoption of the endorsement test on the Court in the past fifteen years reflects a new
emphasis on religious differences as well as a new insistence that protecting religion requires respecting and protecting this diversity. Like
the theologians in the 1990s who have sought to promote a sense of
unity and commonality among all persons that respects and retains
religious difference, supporters of the endorsement test envision a
political community in which all individuals, religious minorities and
nonbelievers alike, are treated equally and their differences respected
and preserved. For the supporters of the endorsement test, this requires limiting religious expression by the state to those forms of expression which do not endorse one religion over another or religion
over nonreligion. Official messages approving of religion over nonreligion or endorsing one particular sect over another would not be fair
to dissenters who are entitled to equal standing in the political
community.
Thus, fairness to believers and nonbelievers alike is the primary
concern that lies behind the endorsement test. The endorsement
test, by itself, is not about separating religion from government,
though separationists who have adopted the endorsement approach
also embrace separation as a distinct and independent value. Nor is
the endorsement test about preserving religion from the demeaning
influences of a secular state, though it may also mean that for its strict
interpreters. Rather, it is about treating all members of the American
political community equally. ForJustice O'Connor, the creche in Allegheny is not unconstitutional because it is the misuse of a sacred symbol which threatens to commercialize the holiday or otherwise
interfere with the sanctity of religion. It is unconstitutional because it
signals favored treatment for Christians and leaves other members of
the larger community out.699 The same is true for Justice Black-

mun.7 00 ForJustice Souter as well, the primary problem with the grad699
700

See id. at 626-27.
See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 611-12 (Blackmun, J.).
For both O'Connor and Blackmun, the menorah is constitutional because its
placement negates any message of endorsement. For Blackmun, the menorah's proximity to the Christmas tree and sign saluting liberty secularizes its meaning and "convey[s] the city's secular recognition of different traditions for celebrating the winterholiday season." Id. at 620 (plurality opinion); see also supranotes 539-42 and accompanying text. For O'Connor, the menorah is not secularized, but its inclusion in the
display sends a message of pluralism and freedom. See supra notes 531-32 and accompanying text. Expressing his separationist views, Justice Brennan criticizes both Black-
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uation prayers in Weisman is that they favor religion over nonreligion
and endorse the majority faith at the expense of minorities and
nonbelievers. 70 1 Justices Souter and Blackmun also speak about the
"taint" of a "corrosive secularism" where government interferes with
religion, and this concern is shared by separationists such as Justices
Brennan and Stevens. However, the endorsement test itself is primarily about fairness to all religious believers and nonbelievers.
Accommodationists argue that the removal of all government expression endorsing religion will harm religion by marginalizing religious language and beliefs and reducing their relevance to the lives of
adherents. Supporters of the endorsement test clearly do not believe
that prohibiting speech endorsing religion will have such an effect,
and their disagreement with accommodationists on this point can be
traced to differing views regarding the role that the public community
plays in sustaining faith. They also argue that accommodationists unfairly misrepresent their intentions when they accuse them of hostility
to religion. Justice Blackmun responds that 'Justice Kennedy . . .misperceive[s] a respect for religious pluralism, a respect

commanded by the Constitution, as hostility or indifference to religion. '70 2 Justice Stevens has a similar response: "Far from 'border[ing] on latent hostility toward religion,' . . . [the] careful
consideration of context gives due regard to religious and nonreligious members of our society. ' 70 3 For supporters of the endorsement

test, it is the accommodationists who show a callous disregard for relimun and O'Connor for -allowing the state to appropriate the menorah to serve its
secular ends. Such an appropriation is offensive to believers and an unconstitutional
interference into religious matters. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 644-45 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supranote 626 and accompanying
text. As noted above in Parts III.B-C, Justice Blackmun also has separationist tendencies and has expressed the concern that state interference in religion degrades religion and risks the "taint" of a "corrosive secularism." See supranotes 623-24, 628, 669,
671-72 and accompanying text. Indeed, in his dissent in Lynch, Blackmun argues
that Pawtucket has "misuse [d] [the] sacred symbol" of the creche by "relegatling] [it]
to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the religious
tenor of a display of which it is an integral part." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 727
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, Blackmun does not display similar concerns in Allegheny when he permits the state to use the menorah in conjunction with
the Christmas tree as "a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative tradition." Allegheny, 492 U.S. at
618 (plurality opinion).
701 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 629-30 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
702 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610.
703 Id. at 653 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting id. at
657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
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gion by ignoring the pluralistic character of religion in American society. To some extent, the charges of the supporters of the
endorsement test are correct. Accommodationists do misunderstand
their intentions. Both accommodationists and supporters of the endorsement test care deeply about religion. Where they differ is their
understanding of the nature of religious belief and what is required
for its protection. For supporters of the endorsement test, religion is
inherently pluralistic and protecting religion requires that religious
differences be respected and preserved. Accommodationists are less
sensitive to the pluralistic nature of religion, and fairness to all religious traditions is not their central concern. Justice Kennedy's response to those who might disagree with the Judeo-Christian religious
traditions celebrated by the displays in Allegheny highlights these differences between accommodationists and supporters of the endorsement test. According to Kennedy,
The creche and the menorah are purely passive symbols of religious
holidays. Passersby who disagree with the message conveyed by
these displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs,
just as they are free to do When they disagree with any other form of
70 4
government speech.
For supporters of the endorsement test, it is not enough that religious
minorities and nonadherents can pass by if they disagree with religious speech by the government. Where religion is concerned, government must show a scrupulous fairness.
It is, however, inappropriate to suggest that accommodationists
demonstrate a callous disregard for the concerns which motivate supporters of the endorsement test. Accommodationists are also concerned about fairness issues, but they believe that the problem lies
with removing religious language from the government sphere and
the disadvantage that such a removal causes to religion. Accommodationists are concerned with fairness to religion, and supporters of the
endorsement test are concerned with fairness among religious adherents, particularly religious minorities and nonbelievers. Both factions
on the Court have legitimate concerns. The purpose of the following
Part will be to try to develop an approach that respects and balances
both of these concerns as well as the other differences which divide
the Justices.
704

Id at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in

part). Justice Scalia makes a similar response regarding the graduation prayers in
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[M]aintaining respect for the religious observances of others is a fundamental civic virtue that government (including
the public schools) can and should cultivate .... ").
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By clarifying the theological divisions which underlie the Court's
disagreements regarding religious expression by the state, the preceding section sought to promote greater understanding among the Justices. This Part seeks to reconcile them by proposing an approach
that takes into account their various concerns. All of the Justices have
important insights regarding the nature of religious belief. While the
different factions on the Court tend to emphasize different aspects of
religious belief and, thus, different requirements for its protection, all
identify something important about religion which their opponents
tend to overlook.
Religion certainly is, in important respects, the communal phenomenon envisioned by postliberal theologians and the Court's accommodationists, and they are correct to emphasize that religious
communities play a critical role in forming and shaping faith. While
Jefferson envisioned religious investigation as an individual enterprise
beginning in adulthood, most people encounter religion far earlier in
life and their understanding of religion is colored and shaped by the
traditions of which they are a part. Nor is Jefferson's vision even feasible. Religious faith is not something arrived at through the autonomous power of human reasoning but is, to a large degree, something
learned from the belief systems which one encounters in one's relationships with others. Modern theologians also assume too much
when they suggest that all individuals share a common religious experience in the interior of the self. Humanity's ability to transcend its
own concrete existence through its capacity to reflect upon reflection
and question its own questioning does suggest an openness to the divine and a potential for a relationship to God, as do the limit experiences which drive us to consider what is beyond our finite existence.
However, to assert, as modern theologians do, that everyone shares an
innate experience of God's loving self-communication, the experience of love for God, or confidence in the worthwhileness of our own
existence is to overlook the role that religious communities play in
helping to develop this trust and showing individuals how to recognize the sacred and holy dimension to their lives. The Justices who
also suggest that individuals have a natural, though perhaps not universal or identical, relationship to the sacred deep within the self
which will seek on its own whatever communal supports that it needs
make the same mistake. The increasing secularization of modern society demonstrates that without the formative structures of religious
language and traditions, humanity is not, in fact, homo religious. On
their own, individuals can as easily give a secular interpretation to
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their lives and experiences as a religious one, and the sacred dimension to life may not be obvious to the unaided eye. For the eighteenth-century Baptist, it is the direct action of God that opens the eye
of the sinner to understand the divine truths contained in Scripture,
and community instruction and nurture need not be involved. However, as postliberals note, between God and the Bible, there is the
community which carries the Bible as its authoritative text and Which
guides the individual in how to read it. God may be involved in the
process of coming to faith and understanding Scripture (and I believe
that He is), but the community is never absent from this connection.
If, however, separationists in the founding era and modern theologians in the present have neglected the important communal dimension to faith, postliberal theologians have not fully recognized its
individual aspects. While religious belief begins in communities, for
most believers it does not end there, and faith is not simply a process
of being trained and socialized into a particular religious world view.
When the Baptists reacted to the carefully constructed system of training, preparation, and covenant-owning in the churches of the New
England standing order, what they found missing was an awareness of
the direct role of God in the process of salvation and the personal
encounter between God and the individual. The Baptist rejection of
the important role of communities in nurturing and shaping faith was
certainly an overreaction, but their insight into the deeply personal
nature of faith was not. For most believers, living within a religious
tradition means appropriating its norms and practices in a uniquely
personal way. Religious belief becomes real for individuals when they
accept the values and norms of a religious tradition as their own, and
faith is the personal struggle to understand and apply these guiding
principles to the unique circumstances of one's own life. For many,
this process of personal appropriation is one that is guided by a God
who is directly present in their lives. For most, it is also a process
which involves critical thought and inquiry. Justices Brennan, Stevens,
and Blackmun suggest that religion is only a matter of faith and not
reason. 70 5 While what is accepted by faith certainly exceeds the
bounds of what one can know through reason, and there are experiential elements to faith that relate more to feeling than to knowledge,
faith is not irrational or disconnected from knowledge. Jefferson,
Madison, and others deeply influenced by the Enlightenment in the
founding era were correct to see rational inquiry as an important aspect of religious belief, and they were right to reject an understanding
of religion as the acceptance of traditional opinions without question705

See supra notes 604-05 and accompanying text.
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ing or investigation. However, for most believers, faith has never been
something divorced from inquiry or investigation. Faith is often preceded by deep thought and questioning, and religious belief is understood as the best answer to these questions. Nor does the process of
critical inquiry ever end in the lives of most believers, but it continues
as they seek to understand their faith more fully and to explain it to
others. Benjamin Rush understood the relationship between community formation and personal inquiry well when he argued that formation in a specific religious system is the best foundation for a process
of free inquiry that enables the individual, and the larger community,
to come closer to the truth.
Thus, the relationship between the individual and the community
in the formation of faith is best understood as a dialectical process.
Humanity's ability to transcend its own concrete existence and its experiences in "limit" situations do suggest a fundamental openness to
the divine and a capacity for faith, but religious communities and traditions play an important role in providing the content for this faith
and making people aware of the religious dimension to their lives.
On the other hand, humanity's openness to the divine and the faith
that fills it always remain something deeply personal in nature. Individuals not only appropriate religious traditions in uniquely personal
ways, but this process of appropriation can lead individuals, and
through them larger communities, beyond the bounds of their existing understandings. Through the guidance of God or critical inquiry, but usually both, the saint and the rebel are part of the process
by which traditions change and develop. Also critical to this process is
the interaction of belief systems with other religious communities as
well as nonreligious world views. Theologians in the 1990s are correct
to emphasize that religious belief systems are necessarily in interaction
with outside cultures and are open to change from the outside. They
are also correct that belief systems have much to learn from outside
influences, and that truth is better served by an openness to these
influences. Kathryn Tanner and Linell Cady's argument that truth
should not be identified with any particular historical understanding
of religious beliefs and practices and that the meaning of even core
religious beliefs remain provisional may be questioned by many religious believers. However, the idea that there is room within all religious traditions to learn from each other and to develop a fuller
understanding of the truth that they embody should not be.
Few believers would deny the pluralistic nature of religion, and in
spite of the efforts of modem theologians to identify a core religious
experience which underlies all religious traditions, theologians in the
1990s and the Justices who support the endorsement test are correct
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to note that there are fundamental differences between them. However, while religious pluralism is undeniable and the divisions between
traditions are sometimes very deep, religious pluralism is not radical.
For most religious believers, the traditions that they embrace tell them
something true about themselves, the world, and God, and they embrace these traditions because of their power to explain their fundamental experiences as human beings. When Saint Augustine writes
that "you have made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it
rests in you, '70 6 he is expressing the common feeling among believers
that their convictions match the deepest yearnings of their heart and
the true goal of human existence. The fact that religious traditions
have this power to explain human experience and to open one's eyes
to a dimension to existence that is at once novel and surprising but
also familiar and recognizable suggests that behind religious pluralism
there is a common truth about humanity which all traditions seek and
understand in part. Thus, humanity is homo religious, if not in fact
then in potential, and it is this potential unity among all individuals
that enables individuals from different religious traditions to converse
with and learn from one another. Religious pluralism reflects the fact
that a full understanding of the truth towards which believers strive
lies beyond them and is now glimpsed only in part and "in a mirror
dimly. ' 70

7

However, religious pluralism also promotes truth by provid-

ing individuals and communities with new insights that can enhance
their own understanding. Respecting religious pluralism is, therefore,
not only a command of fairness, but is also critical to the pursuit of
truth. As Cady and Tanner argue, dialogue and conversation that is
inclusive of all religious voices promotes truth better than separating
oneself off in one's own religious community. Cady and Tanner emphasize the provisionality of all religious claims. I would emphasize
the truths that they all contain, but the lesson is the same. All believers benefit from entering into dialogue with each other and remaining open to the contributions that others can make. Secular voices in
the larger society also have something to add. Hauerwas is certainly
correct that religious communities can provide important "contrast
models" to the secular world, but they also have something to learn as
well as to give. It is through the interaction of the individual and the
community, reason and inspiration, religious traditions and the larger
cultural world, that humanity's capacity for faith is filled and individuals and communities come closer to the truth. For many believers,
706 SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 3 (Henry Chadwick ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1991) (397-400).
707 1 Corinthians13:12.
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this is the process by which God brings the individual and the world
closer to Himself.
The description above of how religious faith is formed and sustained and how religious pluralism is related to this process is not intended to be a definitive explanation of the nature of religious belief.
There will, no doubt, be readers who disagree with various aspects of
my formulation. However, the sketch I have offered seeks to reflect a
common sense view of religious belief that accords with how most religious believers experience their faith. On the one hand, this sketch is
designed to show that religion certainly is both an individual and communal phenomenon as well as a deeply pluralistic affair and that all
the Justices have recognized important aspects of the nature of religious belief. As will become clearer below, it is also designed to show
where the Justices may not fully understand how religion functions in
the lives of believers and what it means for individuals to accept a
religious tradition "by faith."
Thus, all of the factions on the Court have important insights regarding the nature of religious belief as well as legitimate concerns
regarding its protection. When separationists emphasize the deeply
personal nature of religious belief, they identify something fundamental to faith. While individuals do not come to faith on their own and
communities are integral to the process of religious formation, faith
remains something very personal and unique to the individual, and it
involves a dimension of life which is sacred, holy, and special. Separationists are correct to worry that mixing this dimension with mundane
'70 8
matters of government may "demean[] the sacred enterprise.
When Justice Stevens objects to the commercialization of the creche
in Allegheny and Justice Brennan objects to the appropriation of the
menorah to send a political message, they correctly observe that government is easily tempted to use religion for its own secular purposes
and that religious expression by the government may distort and demean the sacred meaning that religious language and symbols carry
for many individuals. Likewise, when they affirm the important role
that religious communities play in fostering and sustaining faith,
separationists and strict interpreters of the endorsement test are correct to fear that the integrity of religious communities may be compromised by too close a union between religion and government.
However, the Court's accommodationists are also correct that
separating religious communities off into a private sphere will harm
religion. Religious communities are necessarily in interaction with
the larger public culture and open to change from outside influences.
708 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 640 n.10 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Where religious language and symbols are removed from a pervasive
government sector, there is a danger that the vitality and relevance of
religious language and traditions will be undermined and the process
of exchange between religious and nonreligious belief systems
weighted in favor of the secular. The interaction of religious belief
systems with the larger culture is to be welcomed, but the process of
exchange must be a fair one. The entire community is impoverished
by the marginalization of religious perspectives and the contributions
they can make.
However, supporters of the endorsement test are also correct to
emphasize the pluralistic nature of religion and to defend the fair
treatment of religious minorities and nonbelievers. If the price of preserving the vitality of religion in American life is religious expression
by the government that endorses religion over nonreligion or one
religious sect over another, the important value of fairness to all members of the political community is violated, and the contributions that
minorities can make to public culture will be marginalized. Fairness
to all religious adherents as well as nonbelievers is not only necessary
to respect the religious diversity in American society, but is also critical
for promoting truth.
Balancing all of these concerns is difficult to square with any significant role for religious expression by the government. Some scholars have suggested that at least some of these concerns can be met by
more inclusive religious expression by the government. For example,
Michael McConnell envisions religious expression by the government
which "mirror[s]" the makeup of American culture as a whole, and he
suggests that such broadly inclusive expression will answer accommodationist concerns regarding the marginalization of religion, meet
Justice O'Connor's concerns regarding the fair treatment of religious
minorities and nonbelievers, and ensure that government expression
70 9
does not distort or otherwise alter the religious life of the people.
According to McConnell, if government expression mirrors the culture as a whole, the "influence and effect of government involvement
would be nil: the religious life of the people would be precisely the
way it would be if the government were absent from the cultural
sphere.17 10 In McConnell's view, if "members of minority religions
(or other cultural groups) feel excluded by government symbols or

709 See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REv.
115, 193 (1992).
710 Id. at 193.
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speech, the best solution is to request fair treatment of alternative tra71
ditions, rather than censorship of more mainstream symbols." '
McConnell's approach has much to recommend it, but in practice it will be unable to adequately address the concerns of separationists and supporters of the endorsement test. Ensuring that
government expression accurately mirrors the religious life of an increasingly diverse American public will be no easy task, and even in
communities with the best of intentions, majority religions will almost
certainly be overrepresented. 7 2 Even if all religious and nonreligious
voices are fairly represented, separationists will still be concerned that
government use of religious language and symbols will involve dangers of secularization and politicization. The separationist concern is
that religious expression by the government always risks demeaning
the sacred enterprise where the government uses symbols and language that retain a religious meaning. They point to the commercialization of the creche in Lynch, the politicization of the menorah in
Allegheny, and the trivialization of the prayers in Marsh. In Allegheny,
Justice Brennan suggests that trying to "lump the ritual objects and
holidays of religions together" in a broadly inclusive holiday display
will present additional dangers. 713 In Brennan's view, such displays
distort the meaning of particular religious symbols and offend believers for whom such an eclectic display diminishes the distinctiveness of
their own traditions.7 14 Many scholars have voiced similar concerns.
Douglas Laycock expresses these concerns well when he argues that
religious expression by the government will be "theologically and liturgically thin" and "politically compliant." 7 15 Even in tolerant communities, he fears that "efforts to be all-inclusive inevitably lead to
desacralization, to the least common denominator, to a secular incarnation with plastic reindeer, to Christmas and Chanukah mushed to711 1L
712 For similar arguments, see Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation
and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 72 (1997) ([I]f government were free to praise or
condemn religion, celebrate religious holidays, or lead prayers or worship services,
government could potentially have enormous influence on religious belief and liturgy. Government is large and highly visible; for better or worse, it would model one
form of religious speech or observance as compared to others."); Ira C. Lupu, To
ControlFaction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CozTrMp.
LEGAL ISSUES 357, 370 (1996) (stating that there is "no neutral way for government" to
celebrate religious holidays).
713 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 645 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
714 See id.at 644-45.
715 Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 373,
380 (1992).
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gether as the Winter Holidays. '7 16 McConnell certainly does not have
desacralized, watered-down religious speech in mind, and indeed, he
specifically objects to government expression which would "tame[ ],
cheapen [ ], and secularize [ ]" religion. 7 17 However, the separationists
and strict interpreters of the endorsement test are correct to fear that
religious expression by the government always carries the danger of
such secularization. When the government uses religious symbols and
language, it can only try to mirror the religious life of the people. It
does not share the faith that motivates believers and ensures that their
speech will be genuine, and the temptations to tame, commercialize,
and politicize religious speech are always present. Policing these
temptations and their distorting effects may be just as difficult as ensuring that government expression fairly represents all religious adherents and nonbelievers.
While more inclusive religious expression by the government will
not address the concerns of all the Justices, their divisions can be reconciled by an approach that focuses on protecting and accommodating robust private religious expression in the public sphere rather
than on accommodating religion through government expression.
Where sufficient opportunities for private religious expression in the
public sphere exist and religious individuals and groups take advantage of these opportunities to participate actively in public life, religious language and symbols will remain an integral part of public life
without the dangers associated with government interference in religious matters and the unfairness associated with government endorsement of religion. Government-operated speech fora present some of
the best venues for the public presentation of religious and other
views, and as long as religious groups have equal access to them, they
can use these fora to participate fully in public debate and to keep
religious symbols and ideas alive in public life. As will be discussed
further below, government-operated speech fora include "traditional
public fora" such as streets and public parks as well as other fora designated by the government for expressive purposes or more limited
public luse. 71 8 Because of the large role that the governmental sector

plays in the lives of Americans, the state should continuously seek to
716 Id. at 380; see also Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another
False Claim About the Establishment Clause, 26 VAt. U. L. REv. 37, 62-63 (1991). Ira
Lupu speaks of the "now-familiar Christmas-Chanukah pairing for Winter celebration
in many public schools" as distorting the role of Chanukah in the Jewish calendar and
"de-theologizing ... Christmas." Lupu, supra note 712, at 370-71.
717 McConnell, supra note 709, at 127.
718 The Court has distinguished between three types of government-operated
speech fora. They include "traditional public fora," "designated public fora," and
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open up additional avenues for private expression and debate. Opening up spaces for private expression will be particularly important in
settings where the government plays an especially large role in structuring and regulating the lives of its citizens, such as in the public
schools or where religious speech might otherwise be disadvantaged
by the predominance of secular government expression. As long as
these efforts to accommodate private religious expression do not favor
religious speech over nonreligious speech and any avenues for debate
are available on an equal basis to religious and nonreligious speakers,
separationist and endorsement concerns should be met while also addressing accommodationist concerns regarding the marginalization of
religious language in public life.
Two examples will illustrate this approach. In the holiday display
context, government celebration of the holiday season would be limited to its secular aspects, but the secularism of the government's displays can be balanced by private expression emphasizing the holidays'
religious dimensions. Where parks or other public fora are already
available for private speech, religious individuals and groups should
take responsibility for erecting their own creches and menorahs.
Where public places are not already available for such displays, the
government should open up spaces for privately-sponsored expression. As long as the government administers these spaces in a neutral
way and makes them available on an equal basis to religious and nonreligious speakers, the government will avoid any message of endorsement of religion over nonreligion and make room for public
celebration of religious holidays in a way that avoids the dangers of
commercialization, secularization, and politicization.
In the public school setting, Justice Stewart's concern that public
school education so structures a child's life that the removal of religious expression from this setting will place religion at an artificial
state-created disadvantage can be addressed by providing students
with opportunities during the school day to acknowledge and express
their religious views and commitments on their own and among one
another. The role that public schools play in transmitting fundamental values and forming character makes opening such spaces for private religious expression by students critical where government
speech must remain secular. As long as the opportunities that the
schools provide for private expression are available equally to religious and nonreligious students and the school is scrupulous not to
prefer religious over nonreligious activities, place pressures on stu"nonpublic fora." For further discussion of these fora and the rights of private speakers to use these fora, see infra notes 727-34 and accompanying text.
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dents to participate in religious exercises, or otherwise interfere with
student religious speech, the concerns of separationists, supporters of
the endorsement test, and accommodationists should all be met. The
federal government has already provided one such opportunity in
public secondary schools receiving federal funding. In 1984, Congress passed the Equal Access Act, which guarantees student religious
clubs equal access to school facilities where they are made available to
other noncurriculum related groups for meetings during noninstructional time. 71 9 The protections of the Act extend to nonreligious
groups as well as religious groups, and discrimination is prohibited
where it is based on the "religious, political, philosophical, or other
content of the speech at such meetings." 720 Thus, instead of prayers
designed and administered by the government, students are provided
with the chance to engage in their own religious expression on an
equal basis with nonreligious groups. By providing the opportunity
for students with religious commitments to support one another in
their faith as well as to share their faith with other students in a noncoercive setting, the school makes it possible for students to affirm their
religious commitments without government involvement or endorsement. As long as they are not designed to encourage prayer over nonreligious forms of reflection, moment-of-silence laws also provide
students with opportunities to acknowledge the importance of religion in their lives without government endorsement or interference.
The Court addressed the constitutionality of moment-of-silence laws
in Wallace v. Jafftee.72 1 While the Court struck down Alabama's statute
on the grounds that the purpose of the legislature in enacting the law
was to endorse prayer, 7 22 two of the Justices who joined the Court's
judgment expressly stated that they would approve moment-of-silence
laws where the laws were neutral towards religion in purpose and effect, 7 2 3 and three dissenting Justices voted to uphold the Alabama
724

law.

Robust private religious expression in the public sphere is not
only the best way to balance the concerns of all the Justices, but it also
719 Equal Access Act of 1984 §§ 802-05, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1994).
720 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (a).
721 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
722 See id. at 56.
723 See id. at 62, 66 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 73-74, 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
724 Of the dissentingJustices, two argued that the Alabama statute did not, in fact,
endorse prayer over other activities. See id. at 85-90 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
90-91 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that general endorsement of
prayer is not unconstitutional. See id. at 114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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has significant advantages over religious expression by the state. It is
in living one's faith by expressing and sharing one's views with others
and seeking to explain and justify what one believes in public dialogue
and debate that the role of religion as the guiding framework for
one's life is best preserved. Government expression can reflect the
religiosity of the people, but it can never live their traditions. Furthermore, even at its most inclusive, government religious expression only
mirrors the religious life of the American people. Private religious
expression in the public sphere is not just a static reflection of the
religious beliefs of Americans, but it is also part of the dynamic process by which religious traditions grow and develop in interaction with
each other and the larger culture. Where private religious expression
in public settings takes the form of dialogue and interchange among
religious and nonreligious points of view, religious speakers learn
from one another and from nonbelievers, and the entire community
benefits from the valuable contributions that religious perspectives
can make to public culture. It is in this living process of expression,
interchange, growth, and development that religious traditions are
best preserved and their most important contributions to American
public life are made. As long as there are sufficient opportunities for
such public expression and dialogue and religious speakers have full
and equal access to public debate, religion does not need the support
of government acknowledgment or recognition.
The success of this vision depends in part on the willingness of
religious individuals and communities to enter into dialogue and debate in the public sphere, but it also depends upon sufficient opportunities for private religious speakers to voice their opinions on an equal
basis with nonreligious speakers. Where the state operates speech
fora available for public use, religious speakers must be guaranteed
equal access to these fora on the same basis as nonreligious speakers.
Government should also be encouraged to open up additional avenues for debate, and courts should give deference to these efforts to
accommodate private religious expression as long as the fora are available to believers and nonbelievers alike on an equal basis and the state
shows no favoritism towards religious expression. The Court has generally been very protective of the rights of religious speakers to participate in speech fora, and in each of its existing cases addressing the
participation of religious speakers in government-operated speech
fora, the Court has upheld the right of the religious speaker to use the
forum. When the Court upheld the Equal Access Act in Board of Education v. Mergens, 725 it also showed deference to the federal govern725

496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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ment's effort to accommodate private religious expression in the
726
public school setting on an equal basis with nonreligious speech.
However, in its early cases addressing private religious expression in
government-operated speech fora, the Court always left open the possibility that in some circumstances the Establishment Clause might
place special limitations on the access of private speakers to these
fora, and in its most recent cases, a majority of Justices have made
clear that they believe that special restrictions on private religious expression are sometimes required. As the discussion below demonstrates, the concerns that motivate these Justices are understandable,
but the Justices both overestimate the potential dangers associated
with private religious speech in government-operated speech fora,
and they underestimate the detriment to religion that would result
from restricting its access to public debate. In so doing, they propose
a differential treatment for religious and nonreligious speech that
threatens to undermine the full participation of religious speakers in
public life and the robust private religious expression which are the
most promising avenues for reconciling the concerns of all the Justices regarding religious expression by the state.
The Court has decided five cases addressing the access of religious speakers to government-operated speech fora. In each case, the
government entity operating the forum sought to exclude the religious speaker on Establishment Clause grounds. Except in Mergens,
where the Court addressed statutory protections for student speech,
the Court began by considering the rights of the speaker under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and then considered
whether the Establishment Clause placed a special bar against the religious expression at issue. In addressing the speaker's free speech
rights, the Court followed its standard forum-based approach for evaluating restrictions on private expression on government property.
This approach distinguishes between "traditional public fora," "designated public fora," and "nonpublic fora." Traditional public fora such
as streets and public parks are places "which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate," 727 and in
these fora, the government may not enforce content-based restrictions
unless these restrictions are "necessary to serve a compelling state in726 For the plurality in Mergens, it was significant that the Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of the "political, philosophical, or other" content of student speech

as well as its religious content. See id. at 248-49 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Congress's
protection of secular as well as religious speech supported the plurality's finding that
the legislature did not intend to endorse religion over nonreligion. See id. at 249.
727 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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terest and... narrowly drawn to achieve that end."7 28 A designated
public forum is property that the state has opened up for use by all or
part of the public.7 29 The designated public forum is a "limited" public forum if it is only open to a part of the public, and it is "unlimited"
in character if it is open generally to the public.7 30 Restrictions on
speech in designated public fora are subject to the same standards
that apply to traditional public fora.7 3 ' If the government excludes a
speaker who falls within the class of speakers to which the designated
public forum is made generally available, the exclusion is subject to
strict scrutiny. 732 Other speech fora are nonpublic fora. In a nonpublic forum, the government can enforce content-based exclusions as
long as "the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum" 73 3 and "not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." 73 4 The
Court's cases addressing the access of religious speakers to government-operated fora have involved all of these types of fora.
The Court's first case addressing the access of religious speakers
to government-operated speech fora was Widmar v. Vincent,73 5 which
was decided in 1981. In Widmar, the Court held that student religious
groups at the University of Missouri at Kansas City were entitled to
equal access to university facilities made generally available for the activities of student organizations. 7 36 According to the Court, by opening its facilities for use by student groups, the University had created a
designated public forum and, thus, was required tojustify any content7 37
based restrictions on student speech by a compelling state interest.
The University argued that exclusion of religious groups was required
by the Establishment Clause. 738 The Court rejected the University's
728 Id. at 45.
729 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
730 Id.
731 See id. (citing Peny, 460 U.S. at 46).
732 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
733 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 49).
734 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
735 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
736 For the facts in Widmar, see id. at 264-65.
737 See id at 269-70. The Court in Widmar actually used the term "generally open
forum," not designated public forum. See id. at 269. The Court developed the term
"designated public forum" in later case law, and it has subsequently identified the
forum in Widmar as falling into the designated public forum category. See Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 802-03; see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
738 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-71.
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claim that use of its facilities by student groups would violate the Establishment Clause. 739 The Court noted that the University did not
identify itself with any student groups and that the facilities were open
to a wide spectrum of student groups. 740 According to the Court, at
least in the absence of evidence that religious groups would dominate
the forum, an equal access policy would not have the impermissible
741
primary effect of advancing religion.
In 1990, in its decision in Mergens, the Court held that the equal
access policy in the federal government's Equal Access Act did not
violate the Establishment Clause. Writing for a plurality of four, Justice O'Connor evaluated the constitutionality of the Act under the endorsement test, and she found that at least where religious clubs do
not dominate a school's club system, secondary school students are
mature enough to understand that the school's message is one of neutrality, not endorsement. 742 Like the Court in Widmar, O'Connor left
open the possibility that the Establishment Clause would be violated if
religious groups dominated the forum. 743 In an opinion concurring

in the judgment,Justice Marshall,joined by Justice Brennan, also used
the endorsement test, but he argued that the fact that many high
school club systems are designed to promote fundamental values and
citizenship will mean that the participation of religious groups will almost certainly signal school endorsement unless the school takes steps
to disassociate itself affirmatively from the club system as a whole or
the religious speech in particular.7 44 Justice Kennedy, joined by justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the use of
the endorsement test.7 45 They agreed with Justice Marshall that the

inclusion of religious groups in a club system designed to further the
739
740
741
based

See id.
See id. at 274.
See id. at 274-75. The Court's Establishment Clause analysis in Widmar was
upon the three-part test developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

Under the Lemon test, a government policy must have a secular purpose, not have a
principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. See id at 612-13. According to
the Court, while access to the forum in Widmar would benefit the religious groups

"incidentally," advancement of religion would not be the forum's primary effect at
least where religious groups do not dominate the forum. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at

274-75.
742

See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250-51 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,

plurality).
743 See id, at 252-53.
744 See id. at 267, 270 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
745 See id. at 261 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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development of students will endorse religion, but they argued that
such endorsement was a permissible accommodation of religion
under the approach developed by Justice Kennedy in Allegheny. 74 6 Justice Stevens dissented on statutory grounds. 74 7
Three years later in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District,748 the Court held that a church was entitled to equal
access to public school facilities which were made available to the public for social and civic uses during nonschool hours. 749 The church
planned to use the facilities to show a film on child rearing and family
values from a Christian perspective. 750 The school district denied access on the grounds that allowing the church to use the school would
violate the Establishment Clause. 75 1 The Court assumed for the purposes of deciding the case that the school facilities were a nonpublic
forum and, thus, that the school district could make content-based
restrictions on speech as long as the restrictions were "reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum and . . .viewpoint neutral. '752 According to the Court, because the church's plan to use the

forum for a film on child rearing fit within the general category of
social and civic uses and their application was denied solely because of
the religious perspective of their program, the school district had en746 Justice Kennedy evaluated the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act under
the accommodationist approach he developed in Allegheny. See id. at 260-62. According to Kennedy, the Act does not, on its face or as applied, coerce participation, see i&L
at 261-62, or give benefits to religion in such a degree that it "establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so," id. at 260 (quoting County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part)).
747 Justice Stevens argued that the Equal Access Act applies onlywhen a school has
chosen to open up its club system to at least one group whose purpose is the advocacy

of partisan theological, political, or ethical views. See Mergens, 469 U.S. at 276 (Stevens,J., dissenting). In that case, the school may not discriminate on the basis of the
religious, political, philosophical, or other content of student speech. Injustice Stevens's view, the majority interprets the statute too broadly when it construes the Act to
require equal access to religious and other partisan groups whenever a school admits
a club not directly related to the school's curriculum. For the majority's view, see id.
at 239-40 (O'Connor, J.). Because the club system in Mergens had not been opened
to such partisan groups, Justice Stevens found it unnecessary to reach the Establishment Clause question. See id. at 284 (Stevens,J., dissenting). While six of the justices
in Mergens agreed on the statutory issues, there was no majority regarding the Establishment Clause issue.
748 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
749 See id. at 386-87.
750 See id. at 387-88.
751 See id. at 394.
752 Id. at 392-93 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
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gaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination.7 53 The Court rejected the school district's argument that exclusion of the church was
required by the Establishment Clause.7 54 Citing the fact that the film
would have been shown after school hours without sponsorship by the
school and in a forum open to and repeatedly used by a wide variety
of private organizations, the Court found "no realistic danger" that
the community would think that the school district was endorsing
755
religion.
While the Court protected the right of the religious speaker to
use the government-operated forum in each of these cases, it always
left open the possibility that in certain circumstances the Establishment Clause might require restricted access. In Widmar, the Court
suggested that where religious groups dominate the forum, unrestricted access would violate the Establishment Clause even absent
any intent to favor religion on the part of the government. Justice
O'Connor agreed when she applied the endorsement test in her plurality opinion in Mergens, and Justices Marshall and Brennan would
have gone even further in requiring schools to affirmatively disassociate themselves from student religious groups whenever a club system
is designed to further student development. In Lamb's Chapel, the
Court's use of the endorsement test also suggested that in different
circumstances where access to the forum could lead to the appearance of government endorsement, the Establishment Clause might require special restrictions on religious speech.
In 1995 in CapitolSquare Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,75 6 the
question left open in Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel was addressed squarely by the Justices, and a majority argued that the Establishment Clause does place special limitations on private religious
expression in government-operated speech fora. The question in
CapitolSquarewas whether the Establishment Clause would be violated
by allowing the Ku Klux Klan to place a cross on a state-owned plaza
surrounding Ohio's statehouse. 75 7 The Klan applied for permission
to place its cross on Capitol Square after the Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Board authorized the state to put up its annual Christmas tree and granted a rabbi's application to erect a menorah on the
plaza. 75 8 Because Capitol Square is a traditional public forum, the
Court held that the Board was required to justify any content-based
753
754
755
756

See id. at 393-94.
See id. at 394-95.
Id. at 395.
515 U.S. 753 (1995).

757
758

See id. at 757-58.
See id. at 758.
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restrictions on speech by a compelling state interest.7 59 The Board
denied the Klan's request on the grounds that allowing the Klan to
place its cross on the plaza would send a message of government endorsement of Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. 7 60
The Court agreed that compliance with the Establishment Clause is a
sufficiently compelling state interest to justify restrictions on speech in
public fora, but rejected the Board's argument that the Klan's cross
would violate the Establishment Clause.
The seven Justices who joined the judgment in Capitol Square disagreed over the appropriate analysis under the Establishment Clause
and, in particular, over whether the endorsement test should be applied to private religious expression. Writing for a plurality of four
composed of the Court's accommodationists, Justice Scalia argued
that the endorsement test is only applicable where religious expression by the state is involved. 76 1 The Establishment Clause is not violated where the government merely allows purely private speech in a
traditional or designated public forum which is administered neutrally
by the state and open to all on equal terms.7 62 The fact that private
speech might be confused with government speech does not justify
exclusion from the forum unless the government has fostered or en7 63
couraged the mistake.
The remaining five Justices argued that analysis of the cross
under the endorsement test was appropriate and that the endorsement test is not limited to religious expression by the government. 7 64
According to these Justices, permitting private religious speech in government-operated speech fora violates the Establishment Clause
where a reasonable observer would confuse the speech with government expression or endorsement.7 6 5 Justice O'Connor gave the example of private religious speech which dominates the forum, and she
also argued that in some cases the geography of the forum, the nature
of the public space, or the character of the religious speech at issue
759 See ikat 761.
760 Seeid761 See id at 764-66 (Scalia, J., plurality).
762 See id at 770.
763 See id at 766.
764 See i&at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id-at 786-87 (SouterJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
iULat 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
765 See id. at 777-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); i&L
at 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As discussed infra note 772, the Justices disagree
over what knowledge should be attributed to the "reasonable observer."

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL-

75:2

might lead to a confusion of private and public actors. 766 Where this
occurs, nonreligious speech would be permissible, but religious expression would not be.
Three of the Justices who applied the endorsement test in Capitol
Square found no violation of the Establishment Clause. In a concurrence joined by justices Souter and Breyer, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the square had been used for expression by a variety of
nongovernmental groups and that the Klan was willing to place an
adequate disclaimer on its cross informing the community that the
cross was not government expression or endorsed by the government.7 67 Justice Souter was more troubled that the placement of an

unattended religious symbol on government property in front of a
government building could lead easily to a perception of government
endorsement, 768 but he also noted the possibility of attaching an adequate disclaimer to the cross. 769 Justice Stevens dissented from the
judgment of the Court and argued that no disclaimer would be sufficient to negate the message of endorsement that the Klan's cross
would send. According to Stevens, where the state permits an unattended religious symbol to be displayed on its property, the "normal
inference" is that the state has endorsed the message of the display,
and this is particularly so where the display is in front of the state's
capitol building.770 A disclaimer would not negate the message of endorsement because the state's decision to allow a third party to place
the symbol on its property continues to send a message of endorsement, 77 1 and in this case a disclaimer could easily be overlooked by

passing motorists and pedestrians. 77 2 Justice Ginsburg also dissented.
766 See id. at 777-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
767 See id at 782.
768 See id. at 785-86 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
769 See id. at 784, 793-94.
770 See id. at 801-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
771 See id. at 806.
772 See id. at 806 n.13. Justice Stevens also disagreed with Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer regarding the knowledge that should be attributed to the "reasonable
observer" who is the subject of the endorsement test. According to O'Connor, the
endorsement test should be applied with respect to a reasonable observer who is
aware of the "history and context" of the forum in which the display appears. See id at
780 (O'Connor, J., joined by Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). By contrast, Justice Stevens argued that the endorsement test is
violated if any reasonable person could perceive a message of endorsement, including
tourists, traveling salesmen, and school children. See id. at 799-800 & n.5, 808 n.14
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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She argued that the disclaimer used by the Klan was not sturdy and
that the district court did not mandate an adequate disclaimer when it
ordered the Board to allow the Klan to display its cross. 7 73 Justice
Ginsburg left open the question of whether a sturdier disclaimer
74
could withstand Establishment Clause challenge.
Thus, for five of the Justices in Capitol Square, the Establishment
Clause places special limitations on private religious expression in government-operated speech fora where the speech can be confused with
government expression or endorsement even if the government does
nothing to foster the mistake and administers the forum on a neutral
basis. Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer suggest that in many
cases a disclaimer will solve the problem of endorsement and, thus,
the exclusion of the religious speaker will not be required. However,
Justice Stevens argues that the ameliorating effects of disclaimers are
limited at least where unattended displays are at issue, and Justice
Ginsburg would subject any disclaimers to exacting scrutiny. None of
the Justices would require disclaimers from nonreligious speakers
where both religious and nonreligious speech can be confused with
government endorsement 7 7 5 AsJustice Scalia points out in his plurality opinion, religious speech alone may be required to disclaim public
7 76
sponsorship.
On the same day that it decided Capitol Square, the Court addressed another possible restriction on religious speech in government-operated speech fora in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia.777 In Rosenberger,four of the Justices who applied
the endorsement test in Capitol Square argued that the Establishment
Clause also places special restrictions on the participation of religious
speakers in public fora where funding by the state is involved rather
than merely access to government property. The religious speaker in
Rosenberger was a student organization at the University of Virginia
formed to publish a magazine addressing philosophical, personal, and
community issues from a Christian perspective. 778 "Wide Awake Publi773

See id- at 818 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

774 See id.
775 See, e.g., id. at 793-94 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). According to Justice Souter, the Board in Capitol Square could have addressed the endorsement problems associated with the Klan's cross either by requiring the Klan to place a disclaimer on its display, or by restricting all unattended
displays to one area of the square permanently marked by a sign disclaiming government sponsorship or endorsement.
776 See id. at 769 (Scalia, J., plurality).
777 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
778 See id. at 825-26.
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cations" sought reimbursement for its printing costs from a university
student activities fund generally available to other student news, information, and opinion groups. 779 The University denied funding under
a university policy excluding "religious activities" that "primarily promote [] or manifest[ ] a particular belie [f] in or about a deity or an
ultimate reality" from the fund, 780 and defended its decision on Establishment Clause grounds. 78 I In a decision written by Justice Kennedy,
the Court found that the student activities fund was a limited public
forum "more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic
sense," 782 and that the University's decision to deny funding was viewpoint discrimination. 78 The Court rejected the University's argument that the exclusion was required by the Establishment Clause.
According to the Court, the University's program was neutral towards
religion,7 8 4 and the funding involved was indistinguishable from government expenditures to maintain physical fora such as the meeting
rooms in Widmar and Mergens.785 In the Court's view, the University

was essentially funding a "pure forum for the expression of ideas" in
78 6
which student religious groups were entitled to participate.
The dissent in Rosenberger was authored by Justice Souter and
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. According toJustice
Souter, participation by religious publications in the student activities
fund would involve the direct funding of religious activities, which the
Court has prohibited under its cases addressing aid to religious
schools and other religious organizations. 787 This prohibition applies
even where the funding is made on a neutral basis to both religious
and nonreligious organizations. 78 Souter distinguished Widmar and
Mergens on the grounds that they involved "the preservation of free
speech on the model of the street corner."789 Where the forum is not
one for "literal speaking" and direct government funding of expression is involved, participation by religious groups violates the Estab779 See id. at 824-25, 827.
780 Id. at 825, 827 (quoting from university guidelines governing disbursements
from the student activities fund).
781 See id. at 837.
782 Id. at 830.
783 See id. at 829-32. Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined by Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas.

784
785
786

See id. at 840.
See id. at 842-43.
Id. at 844.

787

See id. at 873-75, 877-85 (Souter, J., dissenting).

788
789

See id. at 877-85.
I& at 888.
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lishment Clause. 790 Justice O'Connor wrote a concurrence
acknowledging both the importance of government neutrality to religion as well as the Court's prohibition against the direct funding of
religious activities, 79' and she sought to resolve the conflict between
them by using the endorsement test. Pointing to the fact that a wide
range of groups receive funding, that financial assistance is limited to
printing costs, and that student groups are independent of the University, Justice O'Connor found no danger that the participation of
religious groups would convey a message of endorsement of
7 92
religion.
The Justices who argue that the Establishment Clause places special limitations on private religious expression in government-operated speech fora have understandable concerns. As Justice Souter
noted in Capitol Square, the perception of government endorsement
makes religious minorities and nonbelievers feel like outsiders even if
the government does not intend this effect.7 93 Justice Souter also wor-

ries that government funding of private religious expression in public
fora will involve the same dangers of the "secularization of a creed"
which are present when government engages in religious expression
directly.7 94 However, while their concerns are not without some basis,

the Justices tend to underestimate the harm to religion that would
result from the differential treatment of private religious expression
and overestimate the potential dangers associated with equal access
for religious speakers to government-operated fora. While some private religious expression might be confused with government endorsement of religion even in neutrally-administered speech fora, the
dangers of endorsement are far lower than in situations where the
government does the speaking. Similarly, while there is a possibility
that funding for private religious expression in public fora will have a
distorting or secularizing effect on religious speech, this possibility is
small where the government remains strictly neutral among viewpoints and is careful not to identify itself with private expression. By
contrast, the detriment to religion associated with restricting the access of religious speakers to public debate is great. Where government speech is limited to the secular, robust private religious
790 See id. at 889. Justice Souter also argued that the University had not engaged in
viewpoint discrimination. See id at 895-99.
791 See id. at 846-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
792 See id. at 849-51.
793 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 786-88
(1995) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
794 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 891 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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expression in the public sphere is essential if religion is not to be
marginalized in the lives of believers. Restricting the participation of
religious speakers in government-operated speech fora not only diminishes the opportunities for private religious expression, but it also
skews public debate and exchange in favor of the secular and deprives
the larger community of the contributions that religious viewpoints
can make. For example, if student religious groups at a public university do not have the same opportunities to publish their views that
nonreligious groups do, secular ideas will take prominence over religious ones and valuable contributions to student debate will be lost.
Likewise, if public fora are restricted to secular celebrations of the
holiday season, the richness that is associated with its religious dimensions will be overshadowed. The Klan's cross on Capitol Square was
surely abhorrent, but as Justice Stevens argues, if the cross is unconstitutional, so is the rabbi's menorah. 795 Moreover, where nonreligious
speakers have access to fora which present dangers of endorsement
but religious speakers do not, a message of government endorsement
of nonreligion over religion will be sent. Where religious expression
is not excluded but special disclaimers are required of religious speakers but not nonreligious speakers, a similar discriminating effect will
result.
Those who argue that the endorsement test should be applied to
private religious expression in government-operated speech fora also
overestimate the dangers associated with religious speech even when
it can be confused with government expression. In many cases, religious speech in a public forum will be a catalyst for debate that encourages other religious and nonreligious actors to participate as well.
The Justices who apply the endorsement test to private speech have
recognized that a wide range of speakers in the forum significantly
reduces the potential for endorsement. However, they have always focused on the range of speakers who have used the forum in the past
and are using the forum at the time of litigation. What they do not
take into account is the significant chance that religious speech which
might be confused with government expression in the present will, in
the future, provoke vibrant debate that will negate any endorsing effect. If religious speech is excluded from a forum because it might be
confused with government endorsement at the time a lawsuit is underway, the possibility that it might be a source of valuable dialogue and
debate in the future will be cut off.
The facts in Capitol Square illustrate the potential that religious
speech has for stimulating interchange and debate. When the Justices
795

See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 808-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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in Capitol Square evaluated the potential for government endorsement
associated with the Klan's cross, they focused largely on the range of
groups which had used the forum in the past, the dangers associated
with having an unattended religious display so close to a government
building, and the potential ameliorating effects of a disclaimer. What
they did not focus on in their application of the endorsement test was
the ongoing process of expression which stimulated the Klan's display
and in turn was stimulated by it. The story of the holiday display in
Capitol Square began when the Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board authorized the state to put up its annual Christmas tree. 79 6 A
rabbi followed with an application to erect a menorah on the plaza,
which the Board granted. 797 The rabbi's application promoted the
response by the Klan and their application to place a cross on the
plaza.798 While the Board initially denied the Klan's application, it
granted the permit for the cross after the Klan filed suit in federal
district court and the district court issued an injunction requiring the
Board to allow the cross. 79 9 The final stage in this story occurred after
the Klan erected its cross when a number of local churches responded
to the bigotry that the Klan's cross represented by adding their own
crosses to the display. 0 0 The end result was that part of the square
was, to use Justice Souter's words, "strewn with crosses." 80 1 One
glance at the photograph of the scene in the United States Reports is
sufficient to demonstrate that the eclectic, messy scene which resulted
could not possibly be confused with government action. Far from the
pleasant and commercialized display in Lynch or the well-orchestrated
displays in Allegheny, the scene on the plaza was clearly a dialogue involving numerous voices, some very ugly and others quite uplifting. It
is this sequence of events and the debate that it represents that is the
most convincing evidence that the speech was private. Not all private
religious expression which might be confused with government endorsement will provoke such an interchange, but it is better to err in
favor of the free exchange of ideas and the valuable contributions that
religious expression can make than to shut off the possibility of future
dialogue or skew debate by subjecting some voices to special restrictions. The costs to participants and to society from restricting free
debate and expression are too great a price to pay when there is a
796
797
798
799
800

See id at 758 (Scalia, J.).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 758-59.
See id. at 759; see also id. at 792 (SouterJ., concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment).
801 Id. at 792 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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strong chance that what may be confused with government endorsement in the present will not, in fact, be the last word. For those who
are concerned that religious expression can be confused with government expression, the appropriate response is to jump into the forum
rather than to litigate.
The fact that some religious expression which can be confused
with government endorsement will not provoke the dialogue or debate necessary to negate any endorsing effects may mean that it is not
possible to fully satisfy the supporters of the endorsement test. However, perhaps they can be reconciled if they consider that the dangers
of endorsement associated with private religious expression in government-operated speech fora are low when compared to the high costs
to religion that would result if it were subject to special restrictions
that do not apply to nonreligious speech. The concerns of the accommodationists are real. Just as it is appropriate to ask accommodationists to take into account the positions of the separationists and
supporters of the endorsement test and to consider a secular state, it is
also appropriate to ask supporters of the endorsement test to take into
account the concerns that lie beneath the accommodationist position
and to consider equal protections for private religious expression
even when this expression might occasionally be confused with government endorsement. If all of the Justices compromise a little, it will
be possible to balance all of their concerns.
For some Justices and scholars, the value of unrestricted debate
among private religious actors in the public sphere is not as great as I
have represented it to be. For example, in Capitol Square,Justice Stevens emphasizes that debate among religious adherents always carries
the potential of bitter strife and controversy particularly when the participants perceive that their opponents' expression might be confused
with government endorsement.8 0 2 For Justice Stevens, the story in
Capitol Square was such a story of strife and controversy, and it justifies
his view that, where there is a danger of confusing private religious
expression with government endorsement, the balance should be
struck in favor of stemming divisiveness rather than in favor of ensuring equal access of religious speakers to public debate. Justice Stevens's view that religious debate carries dangerous potential for strife
and factionalism is a common view among scholars who favor strict
limitations on religious expression by the government. For example,
Ira Lupu speaks of the potential for religion to become a "source of
802

See id at 811-12, 814 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf.County of Allegheny v. AGLU,

492 U.S. 573, 651 & n.10 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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ugly and destructive factional dispute. 80° 3 While it can also be a "force

of great social good and personal inspiration,"8 0 4 religion presents "a
unique set of social hazards" and "an unusually grave risk of factional
conflict."8 05 According to Lupu, a central function of the Establishment Clause is to control this potential for strife by "deterring religiously motivated fights" that result from the involvement of religious
institutions with the government. 80 6 The "unique constitutional disability" 0 7 of religion under the Establishment Clause is required to
prevent this danger of "nightmarish conflict and potential tyranny."8 08 For Kathleen Sullivan as well, the primary purpose of the
Establishment Clause is to end the "war of all sects against all" by establishing a "secular public moral order," 0 9 and she argues that the
"price of this truce is the banishment of religion from the public
square"8 1 0 and the "privatiz[ation]" of religious disputes and ques803 Lupu, supra note 712, at 357.
804 Id.
805 Id. at 360. William P. Marshall offers a particularly vivid account of the "dark
side" of religion and its inherent tendency towards conflict and division in The Other
Side of Religion, 44 HAsrNGS LJ. 843 (1993).
806 Lupu, supra note 712, at 362. According to Lupu, the Establishment Clause
functions to control religious faction by requiring the principle of "equidistance." Id.
Equidistance, which Lupu has also referred to as "equal religious liberty," see, e.g., Ira
C. Lupu, Reconstructingthe Establishment Clause: The Case Against DiscretionaryAccommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 567 (1991), means that the government may
not explicitly favor one religious sect over another, see Lupu, supra note 712, at 362.
Equidistance can take the form of either separationism or formal neutrality among
sects and between religion and nonreligion. See id. Lupu generally favors formal neutrality over separationsim except where separationsim is required to achieve equidistance. See id. at 362-63. One example of where separationism is required is in the
holiday display context; government may never celebrate the religious aspects of a
holiday with religious meaning. See id. at 370. Lupu distinguishes religious expression by the state from private religious speech in public fora. See id. at 370 n.47.
807 Lupu, supra note 712, at 362.
808 Id- at 360. While Lupu argues that the Establishment Clause places special
disabilities upon religion, he also argues that the Free Exercise Clause gives special
protections to religious adherents. See id at 357. According to Lupu, the Free Exercise Clause should be construed to mandate limited exemptions from neutral, generally applicable government policies which burden individual free exercise. See id. at
375-84. For Lupu's views about when exemptions should be required, see id. at
379-80, and see also Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 743, 775 (1992), and Lupu, supra note 806, at 562-63. Lupu links the special
protections for religion under the Free Exercise Clause to the positive value of religion as a force of social good and personal inspiration. See Lupu, supra note 712, at
357.
809 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and LiberalDemocracy, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 195, 198
(1992).
810 Id. at 222.
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tions.8 11 In Sullivan's view, as in the view of the majority of Justices in
CapitolSquare,where private speech can be confused with government
expression, government must be non-neutral to religion.8 12 When
Justice Ginsburg cites Sullivan's defense of a "secular public order"
with approval in CapitolSquare,8 13 she suggests that she also shares Sullivan's views.
There is no doubt that religious debate can lead to sharp disagreement and deep controversy and that historically some of these
disagreements have been very destructive. However, what these Justices and scholars tend to overlook is that these debates can also be a
source of great value for participants as well as the larger society even
when disagreement becomes intense. The Justices and scholars who
emphasize the negative aspects of religious controversies tend to understand religion as something divorced from knowledge or reason,
and thus, religious disagreement becomes a battle among irreconcilable factions who take their positions on faith and, thus, are unable to
engage in productive dialogue or interchange. In Lupu's words, the
dangers of religious factionalism are, in large part, the "unfortunate
byproduct of the individual suppression of doubt upon which religious faith depends," 8 14 and the claims that religious institutions make
to divine inspiration as a basis of power and legitimacy "discourage
skepticism" 8 15 and undermine the "habits of mind necessary for democratic decisionmaking."8 16 When Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and
Stevens speak of religion as a matter of faith, not reason, they express
a similar view of religion. For example, in his separationist concurrence in Weisman, Justice Blackmun describes religious faith as something beyond rational deliberation and incompatible with dialogue
and dissent:
When the government arrogates to itself a role in religious affairs, it
abandons its obligation as guarantor of democracy. Democracy requires the nourishment of dialog and dissent, while religious faith
puts its trust in an ultimate divine authority above all human delib-

811 Id. at 211.
812 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades,Public Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems
of Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. Rav. 243, 258 (1996).
813 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 817 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
814 Lupu, supra note 712, at 360.
815 Lupu, supra note 806, at 597.
816 Id. at 598.
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eration. When the government appropriates religious
truth, it
8 17
"transforms rational debate into theological decree."
When Justice Stevens discusses the potential for divisiveness and bitter
controversy among religious adherents in Capitol Square, he also describes religion as "the realm . . . where knowledge leaves off, and
where faith begins."8 18
As I have argued above, these Justices misunderstand the nature
of religious belief when they suggest that faith is disconnected from
knowledge or reason. Scholars who suggest that faith involves blind
obedience which suppresses critical inquiry, questioning, and rational
deliberation also present a distorted picture of religious faith. These
Justices and scholars are surely correct that religious belief involves
matters of faith that are beyond the capacity of humanity's rational
faculties to fully understand, and they are correct to emphasize that
faith has important experiential dimensions that relate as much to
feeling as to knowledge. However, for most believers, faith also involves critical reflection and inquiry and it is not a matter of blind
obedience. Deep thought and questioning often precede a decision
to accept a particular religious tradition as one's own, and when this
decision is made, it is because these traditions have the power to make
sense of one's world and experiences. Thus, faith is part of a process
by which individuals use their capacities for reflection, investigation,
and judgment to better understand their world. A decision of faith
may mean accepting claims that are beyond humanity's capacities to
fully understand, but these claims are not irrational and the response
of faith is a reasonable one that can be discussed and shared with
others. Furthermore, for most believers, questioning and reflection
never end as they seek to understand the truths that they have embraced more fully and apply them to their lives. Discernment, debate,
growth, and development are intrinsic aspects of faith both in the lives
of individual believers and in religious communities as a whole, and
both benefit from interchange and dialogue with members of other
traditions as well as nonreligious world views. It is through open debate and discussion that religious traditions are brought closer to the
truth that they seek, and the important insights that they contain are
shared with each other and the larger community. To be sure, where
817 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 (1992) (Blackmun,J., concurring) (quoting
Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Note, The Free Exercise Boundaries of PermissibleAccommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE LJ. 1127, 1131 (1990)).
818 Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 812 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Clarence
Darrow, Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927)
(on file with Clarence Darrow Papers, Library of Congress)).
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government engages in religious expression or otherwise offers active
support to religion, the potential for sectarian rivalry and struggle for
official favor is likely to generate conflict which is destructive in nature. However, where only private access to public fora is involved,
the consequence of any mistaken perception of government endorsement will simply be a more vigorous and inclusive debate as those who
feel left out join the conversation. There is no need for religious
speakers to curry favor with the government in order to enter into
debate in a public forum as long as equal access is available to all.
For Justice Stevens, the fact that the Christmas tree and menorah
in Capitol Square provoked just such a response from the Klan, and in
turn from the churches who added their own crosses, is only evidence
of an unfortunate "battle"8 19 and a destructive controversy. If one focuses on the Klan's response alone, Capitol Square does, indeed, present a bleak picture that supports the views of those who emphasize the
vicious and negative aspects of religious controversy. The messiness of
the overall scene seems no more uplifting, and one could easily conclude that an empty public square, or at least a square limited to secular symbols of the holiday, would have been better. However, when
viewed as a whole, the sequence of events in Capitol Square invites a
closer look. The story in Capitol Square did not end with the cross.
When the Klan turned "one of the most sacred of religious symbols
[into] a symbol of hate,"8 20 a number of local churches responded by

emphasizing the meaning of the cross as a symbol of love and concern
for others, including those outside of their own religious tradition. In
so doing, they gave the story in Capitol Square a redemptive ending
and demonstrated the positive contributions that religious voices can
make to society. These churches became part of a long tradition of
religious groups in America who have drawn upon their religious resources to press their fellow believers and the larger society to live up
to their higher values and to renounce hatred, discrimination, and
the exploitation of others.8 21 In demonstrating solidarity with the Jewish community, they also showed that discussion among religious tra819

Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 811.

820 I& at 771 (Thomas, J., concurring). For Justice Thomas, the primary message
of the cross was not a religious one, but a political one. See id. The Klan used the
cross to send a message of racism and intimidation, see id. at 770-71, and in Thomas's
view, the case may not have involved religious speech at all, see id. at 771. However,
while the Klan certainly exploited the cross for political ends, the fac that the Klan
erected its cross as part of a larger holiday display suggests that a least in this case, the
Klan's expression did have a dual religious and political meaning.
821 For example, religious groups played a central role in the fight to end slavery
and in the civil rights movement. See NOONAN, supra note 3, at, 250-52, 256-58.
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difions need not take the form of disagreement, but can take the form

of cooperation and mutual respect. Thus, what happened on Capitol
Square was messier and uglier than a holiday display designed by the
state, but in many ways it was also more valuable. It was a real debate,
and the churches who placed their crosses on the plaza not only affirmed the relevance and vitality of religious language and practices to
their lives, but they also lived their traditions in a way that mere government acknowledgment of religion never can. As they did so, they
challenged the Klan to live up to the real meaning of the symbols they
displayed and reminded the larger community of its fundamental
commitment to equality and fair treatment of all members of society.
One might also argue that allowing the Klan to display its cross diffused some of the animosity of its members rather than increased it,
and that it is the suppression of religious factionalism, not open debate, that contributes more to its strength. The positive aspects of the
religious debate and dialogue come at a price, and there will always be
ugly and divisive voices such as the Klan. However, to gain the benefits that religious expression and interchange bring, one must be willing to allow all voices to participate fully in public debate, and the
story in Capitol Square shows how open debate can even bring something good out of evil.
Thus, in the end, the story in Capitol Square showed how robust
private religious expression in the public sphere can be a force for
good in society while also preventing the marginalization of religion,
ensuring the fair treatment of religious minorities and nonbelievers,
and preventing the secularization of religious symbols and traditions
that results from too close a union between religion and government.
It also confirms the suggestion above that while religious pluralism is
both deep and inescapable in American society, it is not radical. Most
Americans can appreciate the positive messages that were present on
the plaza, both in the menorah and in the church's crosses, just as
they will condemn the hatred behind the Klan's message. Conversations among religious believers and nonbelievers are possible and
fruitful: there is a truth towards which we all strive and which we can
glimpse in part, and we are not so radically different from one another that we cannot understand and appreciate the insights that different religious voices can bring to American society.
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